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SECTION I
INTRODUCTION
i.I EARTH AVOIDANCE STUDY OVERVIEW
The 1989 Galileo mission to Jupiter is based on a VEEGA
(Venus-Earth-Earth Gravity-Assist) trajectory which uses two flybys of Earth
and one of Venus to achieve the necessary energy and shaping to reach
Jupiter. These intermediate planetary encounters were not needed on the
previous version of the Galileo mission because of the planned use of the
Centaur upper stage, which could provide sufficient energy to reach Jupiter on
a direct trajectory from Earth. However, after the Challenger accident and
the subsequent cancellation of the Centaur as an upper stage for use in the
shuttle, it became necessary to design considerably more complex trajectories
in order to reach Jupiter with the only remaining upper stage available, the
Inertial Upper Stage (IUS). Since the Galileo spacecraft uses radioisotope
thermoelectric generators (RTGs) for electrical power, the question arises as
to whether there is any chance of an inadvertent atmospheric entry of the
spacecraft during either of the two Earth flybys. The purpose of this report
is to document a study that has been performed to determine the necessary
actions, in both spacecraft and trajectory design as well as in operations, to
insure that the probability of such re-entry is made very small, and to
provide a quantitative assessment of the probability of re-entry.
In order for the spacecraft to actually enter the Earth's
atmosphere during either flyby, a specific sequence of failures and
consequences is necessary. First, a spacecraft or ground failure must occur.
This failure must cause a velocity change (AV) to be applied to the
spacecraft, this _V must be one that will place the spacecraft on a
trajectory that intersects the Earth, and the ability to correct the
trajectory must have been lost. A logic diagram showing the possibilities for
this sequence of events is indicated in Figure i-I. Such failure sequences
can be classified by whether they occur as a result of a planned trajectory
change, i.e., a maneuver, or as occurring even though no course change was
planned. The first failure sequence corresponds to following the left branch
in Figure i-i, with an impacting trajectory resulting either from normally
occurring statistical navigation dispersions, (which occurs with probability
less than 10-6 , based on the navigation strategy to be used), or as a
consequence of a failure in implementing the maneuver. In either case, a
failure that precludes a recovery maneuver is also necessary in order for
impact to occur. The second classification of failure sequences corresponds
to the right branch in Figure I-I, and covers the case where the spacecraft is
in nornml quiescent cruise with no planned maneuvers, and a failure happens
which not only causes a _V to occur, but also produces a _V of magnitude
and direction such that an impacting trajectory results. As before, in order
for such a failure to cause an actual impact, it is necessary for either this
failure or a subsequent failure to preclude the performance of a recovery
maneuver. A detailed analysis has been completed which characterizes all such
failures, along with their associated probabilities and consequences. These
results have then been used to develop a navigation strategy for delivery of
the spacecraft to each Earth flyby such that the vulnerability of impact to
these failures is made very small and, in some cases, eliminated entirely.
The results of this effort are documented in the following sections of this
report.
I-I
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1.2 Organization of the Report
The material in Section 1.3 provides a concise summary of the
overall Earth Avoidance study, the factors considered, the manner in which the
mission is to be flown from launch through the time of the second Earth flyby,
and the results. The recommended approach to reading this report, for both
the reader looking for a quick overview as well as the reader planning a
detailed perusal, is to read this summary before going into the more detailed
technical material of Sections 2, 3, and 4 and the Appendix.
Section 2 contains overview material on mission design, navigation,
sequencing, and the spacecraft, with particular emphasis on how each of these
areas relates to the overall issue of inadvertent entry. This material is
primarily intended as background information for the reader not familiar with
the Galileo Project, and generally does not describe work done specifically in
support of the Earth avoidance study.
A summary of the analysis of spacecraft failure modes is contained
in Section 3, and a detailed and highly technical description of the analysis
is contained in the Appendix at the end of this report. Specifically, the
Appendix material covers the identification of failures that could cause a
AV to occur, the causes of such failures, and the consequences and possible
recovery options if, in fact, such a failure causes an Earth impacting
trajectory to occur. The velocity changes occurring as a result of such
failures are categorized in terms of their range of magnitude and direction.
Probability values are assigned to each failure mode, both in terms of such a
failure occurring, and its conditional probability as a function of time along
the trajectory.
Section _ describes the overall plan for navigating the spacecraft
past the Earth. A trajectory design strategy is developed using the
spacecraft data of Section 3 and the Appendix in such a way as to reduce, and
in some cases eliminate entirely, the vulnerability of the trajectory to
inadvertent entry as a consequence of potential spacecraft and ground
failures. The total probability of entry is developed, including
contributions due to normally occurring navigation delivery dispersions, as
well as potential spacecraft and ground failures.
This report does not cover the case of re-entry as a result of
failures during the launch phase or the on-orbit IUS operations phase of the
mission. It also does not report on the breakup analysis for an entry
occurring either during launch or at one of the Earth flybys. These potential
failure modes and consequences are analyzed and discussed in the NSTS Data
Book and the Galileo Final Safety Analysis Report prepared by the DOE.
1.3 SUMMARY OF THE EARTH AVOIDANCE STUDY RESULTS
This Section provides a s_ry of the analyses conducted and the
results achieved in the Earth Avoidance Study. It is intended to provide a
non-technical overview of the report, as well as providing a useful starting
place for the reader intending to pursue specific areas in depth. Frequent
references are made to areas in the report where a specific topic is discussed
in detail.
1-3
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1.3.1 Terminology
Throughout this report, the terminology is used that "impact"
refers to a re-entry of the spacecraft into the Earth's atmosphere and "an
impacting trajectory" refers to a trajectory that would result in impact if it
were allowed to propagate uncorrected. However, the spacecraft, while on an
impacting trajectory, may have from days to years to go before impact would
occur, during which time corrective action can be taken to avoid impact.
1.3.2 Results
As mentioned previously, there are only two ways for impact to
occur during either of the two flybys. The first of these is for a
statistical dispersion in the navigation process to lead to an impacting
trajectory, followed by either a failure to correctly identify the situation
or the inability to take the necessary corrective action. The second way is
for a failure to occur, either in ground operations or on the spacecraft, that
causes a velocity change to be imparted to the spacecraft that, in fact,
places the spacecraft on an Earth impacting trajectory. This must then also
be followed by either failing to correctly identify the outcome of the failure
or an inability to take corrective action.
The orbit estimation accuracy capability as a function of time
described in Section 2, combined with the biased trajectory strategy described
in Section &, shows that at any time in the trajectory the uncertainty in
where the current trajectory would pass by the Earth is many times smaller
than the planned miss distance at that time in the trajectory. Hence, there
can never be any risk of failing to properly identify an impacting trajectory
if one actually existed at any time in the mission. Any trajectory that was
determined to be passing sufficiently near to the Earth that there was some
question as to whether it was on an impacting trajectory would necessarily be
well off from the planned trajectory at that time in the mission, and the same
corrective action would be taken as though it were clearly identified as being
on an impacting trajectory.
The spacecraft failure analysis of Section 3, and the navigation
strategy developed in Section _ based on the spacecraft analysis, have led to
the result that the total probability over both Earth encounters that a
spacecraft or ground failure will cause a velocity perturbation to the
spacecraft, that this perturbation will result in an impacting trajectory_ and
that a corrective maneuver will not be successfully performed, is 5 x i0 -_.
The navigation strategy has also been developed such that at any
time a trajectory correction maneuver is performed, the a priori probability
that this maneuver will result in an impacting trajectory is less than
10 -6 . Then, considering the probability of being able to implement a
corrective maneuver, given that an impacting trajectory has resulted, and
using the probability of recovery values of Table 3.1, the overall probability
of impact occurring as a result of navigation dispersions is so small that it
makes no contribution to the total probability when combined with the value of
5 x 10 -7 from ground operations errors and spacecraft failures of the last
paragraph.
1-4
1625-396, Rev. A
Hence, the total probability of impact, the sumof the probability
due to navigation dispersions and the probability due to spacecraft and ground
failures, is 5 x 10-7 •
1.3.3 Assessment of the Results
There are places in this analysis where probability values required
for events, failures, human error rates, etc., were based on previous
experience with interplanetary flights, a knowledge of design and test
experience, and an engineering evaluation of how the different systems can
reasonably be expected to perform. Since this approach requires somewhat
subjective judgement, it was useful to understand how sensitive the final
r_sult was to variations in values determined in this manner. The most
important area where this approach was used was in the specification of the
probability of a subsystem failing at some time over the life of the mission.
This influenced both the failure probabilities used in some cases as well as
the probability of being able to perform a recovery maneuver, given that a
failure had occurred that led to a recovery maneuver being required. The
analysis that was done to evaluate this is described in more detail below as
well as in Section 4. It is demonstrated in chapter 4 that the final result
is not overly sensitive to the values used for the probability of subsystem
failure. Considering this and the inherent conservatism in the analysis, the
total probability of impact quoted above and derived in Section 4 is
considered a "best estimate" upper bound on the actual probability of impact.
To elaborate on how sensitive the answer might be to various of the
model assumptions, note, as shown in Section 4, that over 70% of the total
probability comes from a failure due to a micrometeoroid puncture of the
propellant tanks. This probability determination was based in part on the
following assumptions:
(i) The fluence model for cometary micrometeoroids used by
Galileo was deliberately made conservative relative to the
standard NASA model (see description in the Appendix).
(2) Asteroidal micrometeoroids were included in determining the
biasing strategy and the probability of a tank puncture, even
though there exist expert opinions to the effect that this
source does not exist.
(3) The threshold of micrometeoroid mass and velocity that would
cause a tank failure was calculated using models known to be
conservative.
(4) The probability of recovery from a micrometeoroid induced
failure has been taken to be zero, although in fact,
depending on the specific failure that occurs, there is some
prospect of implementing a recovery maneuver to avoid Earth
impact. Note also that this means that the values used for
recovery probabilities do not influence the probability of
impact calculations for micrometeoroid-induced failures.
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Whenthe analysis was repeated using the NASAcometary model and
eliminating the asteroidal model, and keeping all other parameters the same,
the probability of impact due to micrometeoroids went from 3.7 x 10-7 to
1.3 x 10-7.
The approach taken to the problem of assigning values to subsystem
failure probabilities was to assign the Project design goal value of 0.01 as
the probability that any half subsystemwould fail over the eight year life of
the mission. The probability of recovery values of Table 3.1 were derived
using this value. The assumption that this goal wasmet is an engineering
judgement based on the fact that all subsystemshave been very carefully
designed, tested, and analyzed, both as subsystemsand as part of the overall
spacecraft system functional and environmental testing. Then, as a check on
the reasonableness of this assumption, part failure rate data for the two
Voyager spacecraft was applied to the appropriate Galileo parts, and the
corresponding predicted failure rate determined. (The Voyager failure rates,
even though based on spacecraft built and launched over i0 years ago, are the
most recent available empirical data source for estimating spacecraft failure
rates.) Basedon these data, a probability of about 5%for half subsystem
failures on Galileo was calculated. The analysis for all non-micrometeoroid
failures was repeated using this higher failure rate, and the impact
probability only increased from 1.4 x 10-7 to 3.8 x 10-7 . Given i) the
technical advances incorporated in the Galileo spacecraft parts relative to
those used in the Voyager spacecraft, 2) the greater amount of part
reliability analysis and design efforts performed on Galileo, and 3) the
considerably greater pre-launch test time on Galileo, JPL concluded that the
1%subsystemfailure rate was appropriate for the baseline.
The results of this sensitivity analysis are summarized in Table I.i.
The micrometeoroid probability is bounded by 1.3 x 10 -7 and 3.7 x 10 -7 ,
depending on the model used as discussed above. The other failures result in
probabilities of impact ranging from 1.4 x 10 -7 to 3.8 x 10 -7 . In consider-
ing the combined effects, it has been concluded that the sum of the baseline
values stated (3.7 x 10 -2 for micrometeoroids and 1.4 x 10 -7 for all other
failures) is a proper estimate for an upper bound, given the conservative
assumptions used in calculating the effects of the non-micrometeoroid failures,
as well as the conservatism in the micrometeoroid model.
Table I.i. Sensitivity Analysis Results
Probability of Earth Impact
Risk Source Minimum Baseline Maximum
Micrometeoroids 1.3 x 10 -7
All others (I x 10 -7
Total
3.7 x 10 -7
l.&, x 10 -7
.5 x 10 -7
3.7 x 10 -7
3.8 x 10 -7
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1.3.4 Navigation Strategy
A navigation strategy has been developed which is to be implemented
in-flight from the time of launch through the second Earth flyby to insure
that the risk of Earth impact due to both navigation activities and spacecraft
and ground failures is kept very small. The basis of this strategy is a
trajectory design which insures that for the time period between launch and
the second flyby, exclusive of the sixty day period prior to each encounter,
the spacecraft is on a path that misses the Earth by many thousands of
kilometers, and for a considerable portion of this time misses by millions of
kilometers. Then, beginning at sixty days before each encounter, with
improved orbit estimation accuracy and reduced sensitivity to velocity
perturbations due to the shortened propagation time, the point at which the
trajectory would pass by Earth if left to propagate without further control is
gradually moved closer. At sixty days, it is moved in to a few thousand
kilometers. At 25 days, it is moved to the final encounter conditions. A
final maneuver is scheduled at ten days for the final trajectory control if
necessary. At the time of the 25 day maneuver, at a distance of about 20
million km from the Earth, the 99% trajectory control capability at the Earth
is about 75 km, and by the time of the ten day maneuver, at about an 8 million
km distance, it is down to about 25 km. This strategy results in an increase
in the use of spacecraft propellant to remove these biases in the trajectory,
but little in the way of increased operational complexity, since many of these
maneuvers would have been required in any event as part of the normal
navigation process.
Two criteria determine the selection of the size of the miss
distance to be built into the trajectory at any point in the mission. One is
to insure satisfying the 10-6 .constraint on navigation activities mentioned
earlier, and the second is to keep the risk associated with spacecraft and
ground failures very small. Details on how these criteria are met are given
in Section 4. A summary is provided here. Any time a maneuver is to be
designed and implemented in flight, a constraint region outside of which the
probability of an impacting trajectory resulting from the maneuver is less
than i0-6 is to be determined. This contour then constrains the possible
set of target trajectories to those lying outside of it. The determination of
this constraint is a routine function of the Navigation Team each time a
maneuver is to be done, and is based on all data available at that time,
including orbit estimation accuracy performance, the actual trajectory
resulting from the last maneuver, etc.
As a further constraint, it is also required that if the maneuver
is aborted at any time prior to its completion, the resulting trajectory is to
also satisfy the same 10 -6 constraint. Once the region of acceptable
trajectories based on the navigation constraint is determined, the next step
is to consider the consequences of potential spacecraft failures that might
occur during the cruise period between this maneuver and the next. The
velocity perturbations that can result from these potential failures are
described in the Appendix. The sensitivity of the trajectory to such
perturbations varies with time along the trajectory. Knowing how these
sensitivities vary, and what the potential velocity changes are, allows the
navigators to select different trajectories at each maneuver time that will
reduce the risk associated with each potential failure, and in many cases
eliminate the risk altogether.
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An exampleof this is that while the spacecraft is passing within
the asteroid belt between the two Earth flybys, its trajectory is designed
with a bias such that if a AV occurs as a result of a collision with an
asteroidal micrometeoroid, in all but the very worst case outcome, the AV
will not be sufficient to movethe trajectory enoughto reach the Earth. This
bias in the trajectory is not removed until after the spacecraft has exited
the region containing asteroidal material. There is no concern, relative to
Earth avoidance, about the possibility of the spacecraft encountering any
debris which may be orbiting near the asteroid which the spacecraft encounters
because, while it is believed that this environment represents very little
hazard to the spacecraft, it represents no hazard of Earth impact because of
this same bias relative to the Earth that is built into the trajectory. A
representative set of targets for a trajectory launched on October 9, 1989, is
shown in Section 4. In actual flight, this specific set would not be used,
rather the techniques summarized here and developed and described in Section 4
would be used to generate a sequence of aimpoints that meet the criteria in
the presence of the prevailing conditions at the time of each maneuver.
The minimum flyby altitude of 300 km occurs at the second Earth
encounter. This value was selected prior to the completion of the analysis
described in this report as a compromise between the desire to go as low as
necessary to minimize the total spacecraft propellant requirement to achieve
the trajectory to Jupiter, and the need to insure that there was no risk of
Earth impact nor even any risk of passing close enough to She upper atmosphere
to cause heating to the spacecraft. The value of 300 km satisfied both these
criteria. However, as the spacecraft failure analysis progressed, the idea
was raised that perhaps the total probability of impact, which was driven by
failures and not normal delivery dispersions, could be reduced by forcing the
minimum altitude higher. Further analysis demonstrated this not to be the
case.
For failures leading to AVs of a few meters per second, the
probability of impact is essentially determined by the probability of the
failure and the probability of recovery. This is due to the fact that, as a
consequence of the trajectory biasing strategy stmmmrized above and described
in detail in Section 4, most failures before the 25 day maneuver point do not
produce enough velocity change to reach the Earth, and after that point the
ability is virtually unaffected by the altitude over a variation of several
hundred kilometers. The probability is kept small due to the very short
period of vulnerability. On the other hand, the cost of raising the altitude
has been determined to be prohibitive. A cost in increased propellant usage
equivalent to one to two of the ten satellite encounters in the Jovian tour is
associated with each I00 km increase in flyby altitude, the variability being
a function of the time of launch within the launch period. As a consequence
of these results, it was determined that raising the minimum altitude was
neither feasible nor beneficial.
The gravity assist technique to be used at Venus and Earth for the
Galileo mission is identical in both concept and implementation to that used
in previous JPL missions, including the Mariner X mission to Venus and Mercury
and the two Voyager spacecraft to Jupiter, Saturn, and beyond. The fact that
the Earth is a "target" for this mission doesn't introduce any different
issues, other than the safety issue addressed in this report, because
radiometric spacecraft navigation is always done relative to the Earth. Then,
when the target body is other than the Earth, the position of the spacecraft
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relative to the target is found by determining the vector difference of the
spacecraft and target, positions relative to the Earth. The navigation process
is more accurate when the target is the Earth because there are no errors
introduced by uncertainties in the position of the target body, and the
radiometric data is more accurate because the range from the spacecraft to the
tracking station is shorter.
1.3.5 Spacecraft Failure Modes
A thorough study has been conducted to identify all spacecraft and
ground operations failure modes that could result in an anomalous AV being
applied to the spacecraftprior to the second Earth flyby. Since the
spacecraft is never deliberately placed on an impacting trajectory and since
the navigation activities will never, with probability less than 10 -6 per
maneuver, place the spacecraft on an impacting trajectory, the only way for an
impact to occur is as the result of a spacecraft or ground operations
failure. The following set of failures have been identified as those that
could cause a AV to occur. A detailed analysis of each, including causes,
consequences, recovery options, and associated probabilities is provided in
the Appendix.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(lO)
(ll)
(12)
Propulsion system tank failure
Propulsion system thrusters stuck, either open or closed
Thruster failures
On-board computer memory failures
Structural failures
On-board computer programming errors
Off-Sun thermally induced failures
Micrometeoroid impacts on the spacecraft
Radiation, cosmic ray, and SEU effects
Spacecraft charging
Command generation process
Uplink command errors
A summary of the resulting risk of Earth impact due to these
potential failure modes is given in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2. Probability of Earth Impact by Failure Mode
Failure Mode
Failures Due to Micrometeoroid Impact
Thrusters Stuck Open or Shut
Retro-Propulsion Module Overpressure Conditions
Other Spacecraft Failures
Ground Operation Errors
Total Probability of Impact
Probability of Impact
3.7 x 10 -7
6 x 10 -9
3 x 10 -9
I x 10 -9
1.3 x 10 -7
5 x 10 -7
(
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1.3.6 Spacecraft Design Changes
As a result of the spacecraft failure analysis, it was determined
that one of the major contributors to the total risk of Earth impact was
having a failure that would cause loss of ability to command the spacecraft.
This of itself would not be a concern from the standpoint of Earth avoidance
since the spacecraft is never left on an impacting trajectory. However, since
the spinning spacecraft would maintain its inertial attitude, as it moves
around the Sun it would gradually change its pointing direction relative to
the Sun. Direct sunlight would cause the propellant tanks to overheat,
causing an overpressure condition and eventu_lly a failure. This failure
would release pressurized propellant, causing a velocity change to the
spacecraft from which no recovery would be possible if an impacting trajectory
resulted. As a result of this potential hazard, the spacecraft design was
modified to incorporate pressure relief devices to insure that no overpressure
c zdition sufficient to cause tank failure can exist. These valves are
designed such that no net velocity change would result from an overpressure
venting. Details of the failure analysis and design changes are included in
the Appendix.
Once the overpressure concern had been dealt with, the remaining
primary contributor to the risk of impact was that due to micrometeoroid
impacts. One proposal to reduce this was to increase the amount of shielding
blankets used to protect the RPM tanks. This option was analyzed in detail
with the conclusion that the current design was optimum. Adding more material
incurred a mass penalty for no improvement in the RPM tank protection. As a
consequence, the blanket design was left intact.
1.3.7 Operational Guidelines and Constraints
A set of guidelines and constraints has been developed to be
applied to the operation of the spacecraft during the approach to each Earth
encounter to achieve the highest possible likelihood that no anomalous events
will occur, and to insure that the detection of any such events occurs as
quickly as possible. These plans are described here. The total probability
of impact summarized above and developed in Section 4 was determined without
factoring in any additional benefits to be gained from these restrictions, so
the operational implementation described here provides an additional margin of
safety.
Uninterrupted tracking of the spacecraft by the Deep Space Network
(DSN) is to be scheduled for at least 35 consecutive days prior to each
encounter. This tracking provides both Doppler data and telemetry. Doppler
data will provide quick and certain evidence of any deviation in the
spacecraft's trajectory. Telemetry data provides insight to the spacecraft's
health and status. Many events or failures that would indicate a propulsive
event has occurred or is impending can be seen through the spacecraft data.
The purpose of this continuous tracking, in addition to supporting the normal
operation and navigation of the spacecraft, is to provide the earliest
indication possible of any unplanned events.
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After the encounter minus i0 day maneuver to place the spacecraft
on its final flyby trajectory, no thruster firings, other than those required
for spin maintenance and pointing corrections, are to be performed except as a
contingency to protect spacecraft health and maintain the correct trajectory.
No propulsive maneuvers are planned, and no dual-spin to all-spin transitions
are to be performed.
The spacecraft is nominally Sun-pointed throughout most of the
early part of the VEEGA trajectory for thermal control reasons. Limited
excursions from this attitude are planned for science, engineering, and
navigation purposes. However, from the next to last maneuver at encounter
minus 25 days on to closest approach for both Earth flybys, no such excursions
are to be permitted. To make such turns requires thruster firings, and this
restriction is made to minimize the possibility of a ground or spacecraft
failure.
1.3.8 Conclusion
The total probability of the Galileo spacecraft impacting the Earth
on either of the two flybys has been determined to be, as a "best estimate"
upper bound, 5 x 10 -7 • A sensitivity analysis was performed, indicating a
range in probabilities for each failure mode, depending on the level of
conservatism used in certain key assumptions. All spacecraft or ground
operations failures that could lead to a velocity change being imparted to the
spacecraft have been identified and analyzed. A navigation strategy, in
conjunction with the trajectory design, has been developed which, at the cost
of spacecraft propellant, is responsive to the set of failures in reducing the
risk of Earth impact to the above value. In addition, operational constraints
have been developed and will be implemented to even further reduce any risk.
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SECTION 2
SYSTEM OVERVIEWS
2.1 MISSION DESIGN OVERVIEW
2.1.1 Trajectory Overview
The baseline trajectory for the Galileo mission is a 1989 VEEGA
transfer. As the name implies, the VEEGA trajectory makes use of three
gravity-assist planetary flybys between launch from Earth and arrival at
Jupiter: one with Venus and two with the Earth. This extensive use of
planetary gravity assists dramatically reduces launch energy requirements
compared to other Earth-Jupiter transfer modes, and allows the spacecraft to
be launched by the shuttle/IUS.
The launch period for the Galileo VEEGA mission extends from
October 9, 1989 through November 24, 1989. The arrival date at Jupiter is
December 7, 1995. A sample VEEGA trajectory for an October 13, 1989
injection* date and the December 7, 1995 arrival date is shown in
Figures 2.1-1 and 2.1-2. Figure 2.1-1 shows the inner-solar system portion of
the trajectory from launch through the second Earth flyby, and Figure 2.1-2
shows the entire trajectory to arrival at Jupiter.
This sample VEEGA trajectory begins with launch of the spacecraft
on an Earth-Venus transfer with a very low launch energy (C3 = 17 km2/s2),
compared to that required for a direct Earth-Jupiter transfer. The Venus
gravity-assist (VGA) flyby occurs on February 9, 1990 at an altitude of about
14,700 km. This encounter alters the orbit such that the spacecraft is
directed bask to the Earth and also adds energy to increase the orbit period
to approximately one year with aphelion on the Venus-Earth transfer at about
1.3 AU. Approximately two weeks after VGA, the spacecraft passes through
perihelion at about 0.70 AU.
The first Earth gravity-assist (EGAI) flyby, shown in Figure 2.1-3,
occurs on December 8, 1990 at an altitude of about I000 km. This encounter
adds considerably more energy to the spacecraft, increasing the orbit period
to about two years. Approximately one month after EGAI, the spacecraft passes
through a second perihelion at about 0.90 AU. Aphelion of the two-year
Earth-Earth transfer occurs at approximately 2.3 AU.
The second Earth gravity-assist (EGA2) flyby, shown in
Figure 2.1-4, occurs on December 8, 1992 at an altitude of 300 km and adds the
final energy increment to the spacecraft which is required for the transfer to
Jupiter. At EGA2, the orbit period is raised to about 5.6 years. The total
flight time from Earth to Jupiter is about 6 years.
* "Injection" refers (approximately) to the time of the IUS burn. "Launch"
refers to the shuttle liftoff time. The time from launch to injection _or
nominal deployment is about 8 hours; hence, the distinction is not
particularly significant for the purposes of this report.
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2.1.2 Gravity-Assist Concepts
The Galileo VEEGA trajectory utilizes three gravity-assist flybys:
VGA, EGAI, and EGA2. The primary effect of these gravity-assist flybys is to
reduce the launch energy significantly below that required for a direct
Earth-Jupiter transfer. In effect, the spacecraft is being delivered to
Jupiter for the launch energy required to go to Venus.
Each of the three gravity-assist flybys adds energy (i.e. velocity)
to the spacecraft with respect to the Sun. The manner in which a
gravity-assist flyby can increase spacecraft velocity is illustrated by
Figure 2.1-5, which shows a "velocity-vector diagram" for EGAI. The
spacecraft trajectory with respect to the Earth is a hyperbola; the spacecraft
approaches and departs along the asymptotes of this hyperbola at a constant
velocity, called the "V-infinity." The angle between the incoming and
outgoing asymptotes is referred to as the "bend angle." The velocity vector
of the Earth with respect to the Sun at the time of the flyby is indicated on
Figure 2.1-5 by the symbol V E. Adding the incoming and outgoing
V-infinities to the velocity of the Earth yields the velocity vectors of the
spacecraft with respect to the Sun before and after the flyby.
The effect of the hyperbolic flyby in a planet-centered reference
frame is simply to rotate the V-infinity; there is no net energy change for
the spacecraft trajectory with respect to the planet as a result of the
flyby. However, the rotation of the planet-centered V-infinity has the effect
of increasing the magnitude of the velocity vector in a Sun-centered reference
_1 h CLOSEST APPROACH
2/8/90
_///-o\
0 = 39° _"OUT .--/ --' +2_,h_''
Figure 2.1-5. Gravity-Assist Velocity Vector for Earth Flyby #I
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frame. In this example, the Sun-centered velocity has increased from
30.1 km/s to 35.3 km/s, corresponding to an increase in the orbit period from
about one year to slightly more than two years.
An important relationship between the radius of closest approach,
V-infinity magnitude, and bend angle (a measure of the effectiveness of the
gravity assist) is given by the equation shown on Figure 2.1-5. This equation
demonstrates a basic fact of gravity-assist theory: namely, that for a fixed
V-infinity magnitude, a closer flyby (smaller rp) will result in a larger
rotation of the V-infinity and, hence, a larger change in the Sun-centered
velocity. In other words, the effectiveness of a gravity-assist flyby
increases as the closest approach distance decreases. Theoretically, the
effectiveness of a gravity-assist flyby is limited by the physical radius of
the flyby body. Practically, however, the lower limit for the closest
approach altitude is dictated by concerns over atmospheric heating effects and
impact probability. For the Galileo VEEGA trajectory, the lower limit for the
Earth flyby altitude is 300 km.
The 300-km altitude constraint was selected as a value that is low
enough to minimize the propellant required for trajectory design and, at the
same time, is high enough virtually to guarantee that the spacecraft will not
reenter the Earth, and will not even come close enough to experience
aerodynamic heating. The 99% delivery errors to the final aimpoint range up
to about 25 km, depending on the strategy used for achieving the final
aimpoint. This means that at a 300-km targeted altitude, and allowing
conservatively i00 km for atmosphere, approximately a 20a error is required
for reentry to occur. In other words, no statistical event will ever lead to
reentry; only a failure could do so.
The limitation to the effectiveness of a gravity-assist flyby (due
to the flyby altitude constraint discussed above) explains why the VEEGA
trajectory requires two Earth flybys. In order for the first Earth flyby to
add sufficient energy to the spacecraft to enable it to reach Jupiter, the
Sun-centered velocity would have to be increased to about 39.0 km/s. This
would require a bend angle for the flyby of about 90 ° and a corresponding
flyby radius of 2100 km, equivalent to an altitude of -4300 km. Allowing a
second Earth gravity-assist flyby results in flyby altitudes at or above
300 km for both flybys.
2.1.3 Trajectory Characteristics
The Galileo VEEGA trajectory will be targeted to have one or more
close encounters with an asteroid during interplanetary cruise. There are two
possible locations for these asteroid flybys: (i) where the spacecraft enters
the inner edge of the asteroid belt on the Earth-Earth (EE) leg of the
trajectory, and (2) where the spacecraft crosses through the asteroid belt on
the Earth-Jupiter (EJ) leg of the trajectory.
The exact strategy of which asteroid(s) will be targeted for each
day of the launch period is dictated by spacecraft propellant considerations
and has not been decided at this time, although the general characteristics of
the strategy are known. For about the first two weeks of the launch period,
trajectories will be targeted for a flyby of asteroids 951-Gaspra (EE leg) and
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243-Ida (EJ leg). Then the Ida flyby will be eliminated, and trajectories for
a range of subsequent launch dates will be targeted only for a Gaspra flyby.
Sometimenear the middle of the launch period (near the end of October 1989),
a switch will be madeto trajectories which are targeted only for a flyby of
the asteroid 2825-1938SDI (EE leg).
The choice of December7, 1995as the Jupiter arrival date and the
trajectory reshaping necessary to include close asteroid flybys meansthat all
trajectories require one or more small velocity changesprovided by the
spacecraft propulsion system. Sucha velocity change, called a DeepSpace
Maneuver(DSM), may be located on any one of the following trajectory legs:
Venus-Earth (VE), Earth-Earth (EE), and Earth-Jupiter (EJ). In general, the
existence of a DSM is linked to either the condition of an Earth flyby
altitude bein_ at the 300-km lower limit or the necessity of reshaping the
trajectory to include a close asteroid flyby, or both.
In general, optimal trajectories which have flybys of both Gaspra
and Ida require a DSM on all three legs. In most cases, the DSM on the EE leg
occurs after Gaspra, although early-launch trajectories may have a DSM both
before and after Gaspra or the entire DSM may occur before Gaspra. Optimal
trajectories with a flyby of Gaspra only behave similarly except that the DSM
on the EJ leg is always smaller (because of the elimination of the Ida flyby),
and the DSM on the EE leg sometimes has a very small magnitude (< I m/s).
Optimal trajectories with a flyby of 1938 SDI generally have only a DSM on the
EE leg; this DSM occurs before the 1938 SDI flyby.
In order to insure that the probability of Earth impact is kept
very small, all trajectories will be required to have biased aimpoints until
some time prior to both Earth flybys. (The biasing strategy is explained in
detail in Section 4.) This requirement means that all trajectories which,
without regard for Earth avoidance, do not have a DSM on the VE leg will have
to be forced to have a DSM on the VE leg. Therefore, the trajectory will be
suboptimal from a propellant utilization viewpoint, although the propellant
cost is relatively small. This situation occurs for early-launch Gaspra plus
Ida trajectories and for all 1938 SDI trajectories.
The constant Jupiter arrival date of December 7, 1995 and the
constraint of including one or more close asteroid flybys on the trajectory
result in little variation in the Earth flyby altitudes. The Earth flyby
altitude characteristics for the Galileo VEEGA mission may be summarized
simply as follows:
Earth Flyby Altitude (km)
Trajectory Type EGAI EGA2
Gaspra + Ida i000 300
Gaspra I000 300
193_ SDI 4500 300
The EGAI altitude can vary from the value listed in the above table by
± I00 km, and the EGA2 altitude can in some cases be slightly greater than
300 km by a few tens of kilometers.
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2.2 NAVIGATION OVERVIEW
2.2.1 Introduction
Navigating the Galileo spacecraft safely past the Earth must be
insured with great confidence. This purpose is pursued by reviewing the
navigation task and relating the history of its performance with the
prediction of its capabilities.
Navigation is defined as the process of locating the position and
predicting the flight path of the space vehicle and controlling that predicted
flight path to achieve mission objectives. A pre-f[ight mission design
activity provides the baseline trajectory for the space flight, from which
navigation provides the systems required to execute that flight. Navigation
support for each deep space mission involves a planning phase, in which flight
accuracies are predicted and the systems to execute the flight are developed,
and an operations phase, where the actual process of navigation is executed.
Deep space navigation has experienced an extensive history over the
past years. In the 1960's, beginning with the Mariner 2 mission to Venus in
1962, a series of spacecraft was sent to the inner planets to perform remote
science sensing during flyby encounters. In the 1970's, the range of
navigation applications was expanded to include the delivery of spacecraft to
orbit the inner planets; first with the Mariner 9 mission to Mars in 1971,
followed by the Viking missions to Mars in 1976, and the Pioneer program to
Venus. Finally, in the 1970's the exploration of the outer planets was begun,
with the early Pioneers to Jupiter and Saturn, and then with the Voyager
program.
The JPL navigation system has evolved over the last 26 years and is
currently employed on NASA planetary missions. Section 2.2.2 describes the
elements of the measurement system and data processing system that comprise
today's navigation system. A summary is provided of the recorded historical
performance achieved with the system during the past 26 years of planetary
exploration, along with a description of how the system is used
operationally. Section 2.2.3 provides a description of the Galileo mission in
terms of applying the navigation system to achieve high confidence in the
ability to estimate the flight path and, in turn, to navigate the Galileo
spacecraft safely past the Earth.
2.2.2 The JPL Navigation System
Figure 2.2-1 illustrates, in schematic form, the elements of
measurement and computation that comprise the current JPL navigation system,
which is being employed for the Galileo mission. The left-hand side of the
diagram shows a spacecraft acquiring optical television images of the target
body and being tracked by two ground antennas. On the right-hand side is
shown the ground processing system, which models the trajectory motion,
estimates the orbit, and computes the flight path corrections.
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2.2.2.1 The Measurement System. The baseline navigation measurement system
of the 1960's consisted of two-way S-band (2.3 GHz) radio Doppler. This
system was used to navigate the early Mariner missions to Venus and Mars.
Beginning with Mariner 9, two-way, I MHz bandwidth ranging data were also
employed. Ranging data were used as supplementary data to Doppler during the
cruise to Mars, and were used as a backup for Doppler during the planet
orbiting phase, when the Doppler data noise increased dramatically near
superior conjunction. Ranging data, if taken nearly simultaneously from two
widely separated stations on Earth, can be used to obtain a direct measurement
of the geocentric direction to a spacecraft. Voyager navigation uses ranging
data acquired in this near-simultaneous mode.
Beginning with the Viking mission in 1975, NASA spacecraft
transponders have transmitted S-band and X-band (8.4 GHz) downlink to Earth,
both signals being coherent with the uplink S-band. The processing of S- and
X-band data allows a calibration of the effects of charged particles on the
downlink signal. Mapping methods are employed to infer the effect on the
uplink. This dual frequency technique has been used successfully to calibrate
both Doppler and range during periods of high activity in the solar plasma and
in Earth's atmosphere.
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Optical measurements, acquired from the science cameras onboard the
spacecraft, have been used on the Viking and Voyager missions to improve the
target relative orbit determination accuracies in the final approach stages of
their planet and satellite encounters.
2.2.2.2
are brought to the Jet Propulsion Laboratory and buffered on computer tape.
large software system is operated at JPL to determined the spacecraft orbit
and compute trajectory correction parameters. The elements of the software
system are listed in Table 2.2-1. For each program, the Table provides a
short functional description, the size of the program in terms of the
approximate number of lines of Fortran code, and the resident computer.
The Data Processing System. Doppler, range, and optical image data
A
Newly acquired radio data are first processed in the Intermediate
Data Records Stripper Processing System (IDRSPS) Program, where the data
blocks from different tracking stations are merged into a single time-sequenced
array. Data of poor quality are removed from the array in this system and the
array made ready in computer storage for the orbit estimation process.
Two modules are used in the orbit estimation process. First, the
Double Precision Trajectory (DPTRAJ) system computes an N-body numerical
integration of the trajectory and state transition partials from initial
conditions. The numerical integration is performed using a variable order
predictor, corrector method. The Orbit Determination Program (ODP) computes
simulated observables corresponding to each actual observation based on the
trajectory "modelled'l by DPTRAJ and computes the partial derivatives of the
observables with respect to the initial conditions of the trajectory. It may
also compute partial derivatives with respect to a multitude of additional
trajectory and observation model parameters, such as planet gravity terms,
target ephemeris coordinates, spacecraft gas leaks, and tracking station
locations. An array of observation residuals is computed and regression
analysis is performed to produce a best estimate of corrections to the initial
state parameters and the other desired parameters. The product of the process
is a numerically integrated trajectory which best fits the observations.
The best estimate trajectory serves as the basis for computation of
the velocity correction parameters required to correct the flight path to meet
the mission target objectives, a computation which is performed in the
Maneuver Operations Program (MOPS).
2.2.2.3 Navigation System Accuracy. Deep space navigation requires the
computation of accurate orbits and targeting corrections. These are made
possible by the use of submeter accurate modelling throughout the navigation
processing system, and the use of several model support systems, which furnish
data and constants necessary for accurate computation. Submeter modelling is
achieved by the use of double precision (16 decimal digits) in all trajectory
and observable computations, and the use of a relativistic light time solution
algorithm in the Doppler and range observable computations, which takes into
account the retardation in the velocity of light by gravity and the transfor-
mation from solar system barycentric coordinate time to Earth station proper
time. Model support systems provide the location of planets and natural
2-9
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Table 2.2-1. Major Software Elements of the JPL Navigation
Data Processing System
~ Size
(Lines of
Fortran
Program Function Code) Computer
IDRSPS 30,000 UNIVAC II00
ODP Fits data to obtain 200,000 UNIVAC ii00
orbit
DPTRAJ Integrates trajectory 150,000 UNIVAC Ii00
MOPS Computes correction 60,000 UNIVAC II00
maneuver
Edits and formats
radio data
MEDIA Calibrates radio data 30,000 UNIVAC ii00
APP Plans optical navigation 5,000 VAX 11/780
pictures
Extracts optical
observable
Computes optical data
partials
0NIPS 30,000 VAX 11/780
ONP 15,000 VAX 11/780
L -
v
satellites in the solar system, the location of the tracking stations on
Earth, variations in Earth's rotation and orientation, and the effects of
transmission media on the radio signal. A description of these support
systems is given here.
(i) The Planetary and Satellite Ephemeris System -- JPL planetary
ephemerides are derived primarily from optical transit data,
acquired by: the U.S. Naval Observatory over the past
century; radar planet surface-bounce range data from the NASA
Deep Space Network over the past decade, and spacecraft
ranging data from past planetary missions. A large data
reduction system, the Solar System Data Processing System
(SSDPS) is maintained at JPL to process these many observa-
tions and produce the world-standard JPL ephemerides. With
the advent of spacecraft ranging data, and with the refine-
ments from lunar laser ranging data, JPL ephemerides for the
inner planets and Jupiter are accurate to within 0.2 geocen-
tric microradians. Ephemerides for the planets' natural
satellites are developed almost exclusively from astrometric
plate measurements and are computed in a data reduction
system similar to SSDPS.
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(2)
(3)
(4)
Tracking Station Locations -- Position coordinates of the
Deep Space Network tracking stations are computed in the ODP
itself from Doppler data taken from planetary encounters.
The locations of the stations are, therefore, tied to the
ephemeris used in the data reduction. As a new planetary
ephemeris is generated, so the locations of the Earth
tracking stations are recomputed. Stations are located
relative to the current ephemeris, to an accuracy of I meter
perpendicular to the spin axis and longitudinal directions,
and within 15 meters along the Earth's spin axis.
Universal Time and Polar Motion -- UTI and polar motion data
are obtained from the Bureau International de l'Heure (BIH)
in Paris after its reduction of meridian circle data. These
Earth rotation variations are stored in computer files in
polynomial form and are applied as calibrations to the
computed radio observables.
Transmission Media Effects -- Tropospheric effects on Doppler
and range are modelled in equation form. Charged particle
effects from the Earth's ionosphere are modelled as
elevation-dependent daily varying calibrations, whose values
are computed using Faraday rotation data from a NASA
Applications Technology Satellite in geosynchronous orbit,
the Japanese ETS2 satellite, and the Italian SIRIO
satellite. The charged particles in the solar plasma are
calibrated directly from analyzing the S- and X-band Doppler
data from the spacecraft of interest.
2.2.2.4 Navigation System Operations. The navigation system is operated in
support of each deep space mission, both before the actual flight and during
the flight. Long before the actual launch, navigation system software is
exercised with simulated data. Covariances generated in these exercises
enable the analyst to identify the major error sources for the mission of
interest and define the total achievable mission accuracy, along with the
required measurements and their acquisition schedule. One can also define
performance constraints on the spacecraft systems, such as total required
propellant or maximum allowable gas leakage rates.
During flight, the navigation system is operated to support the
actual guiding of the flight profile. The system produces all of the
maneuvers which correct the flight path and furnishes all trajectories used to
compute the spacecraft science instrument-pointing sequences and spacecraft
antenna-pointing and turning sequences. Doppler data are processed in the
navigation system to investigate all spacecraft anomalies, such as abnormal
gas leaks, which may affect the flight path. The navigation system predicts
the times of all dynamically related mission events, such as occultation
times. Finally, reconstructed orbits are used to accurately locate the
instrument viewing footprints, which aid the analysis of the science data.
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Whenactual data processing begins, it is conducted as a scientific
experiment, in which a hypothesized flight path is adopted and tested against
the observations. This testing process is patterned after the pre-flight
analysis and is matured well before planetary encounters and usually involves:
i. Computinga multiplicity of flight path solutions, including:
Solutions for various radio tracking data arc lengths
to examine the distinguishing effect of changing
geometry.
Solutions for various choices of data types to examine
the degree of compatibility or conflict between data
types and establish realistic data weighting policies.
Solutions for various combinations of estimated
parameters to detect mismodelled phenomena and
establish corrected model parameter values.
Solutions using various data filtering algorithms and a
priori statistics on estimated parameters, to detect
and compensate for stochastic forces acting on the
spacecraft.
Solutions using different sets of charged particle data
calibration coefficients, to examine the quality and
reliability of the different calibration techniques.
Solutions with and without the non-gravitational force
models derived from attitude limit-cycle data to
examine the effectiveness of such models.
, Computing the expected error covariances of all solutions and
their sensitivities to errors in those model parameters which
may be difficult to estimate from available data.
. Selecting an adopted "best-estimate" flight path solution
strategy from an in-depth analysis of the following
characteristics of all solutions:
* The noise and signatures in the data residuals,
The comparison of the flight path estimates with
previous results,
The compatibility of model parameter estimated values
with estimated values from other sources, and
The comparison of computed error covariances and error
sensitivities to unestlmated model parameter errors and
stochastic phenomena.
4. Exercising the adopted strategy to produce the final
"best-estimate" flight path.
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The computation of maneuversis also a complexprocess. It
requires the placing of maneuversat times which are conducive to both
minimizing propellant use and achieving high accuracy, and the actual
computation of the velocity corrections necessary to reach the desired
target. It also requires a strong interaction with the mission managementand
the often evolving mission goals and policies.
2.2.2.5 Doppler Navigation Performance. One measure of navigation system
performance is the statistical accuracy with which navigation delivers a
spacecraft to its target. To look at the record of planetary encounter
deliveries, it is enlightening to first examine analytically the accuracy
which can be achieved from Doppler data received from a station on the Earth,
tracking a spacecraft in distant space. This information content can then be
compared to actual flight experiences.
On the left half of Figure 2.2-2 is shown a station on the Earth,
Doppler tracking a spacecraft at range R, with the Earth rotating at rate W.
The Doppler signal i_ proportional to the spacecraft-station range rate, which
follows in time a pattern which closely resembles a sine wave. In the
equation within the Figure, we see that the topocentric range rate is
approximately equal to the geocentric range rate plus the sinusoidally varying
term. The average signal is thus proportional to the geocentric range rate.
The amplitude of the sinusoidal term is proportional to the cosine of the
geocentric declination.
There are three important points to note concerning the information
content of Doppler data in the determination of the position of the spacecraft
in the plane perpendicular to the Earth-spacecraft direction (plane of the
sky): first, the basic Doppler measurements provide geocentric angle
determination, thus the position accuracy of the spacecraft is directly
proportional to the geocentric range. Second, the ability of this system to
determine declination is inversely related to the sine of the geocentric
declination. Therefore, an error in declination is magnified by a factor of
the reciprocal of the sine of the declination. This explains the traditional
low declination problem often referred to in space navigation literature.
Third, the determination of right ascension is not particularly sensitive to
variations in geometry. In practice, right ascension is nearly always
determined more accurately than is declination. The third dimension along the
Earth-spacecraft direction is measured directly very accurately, i.e., <i km,
with the radio metric range data.
An examination of the delivery error record of deep space
navigation over the past 26 years requires that the parameters by which
performance is judged are carefully chosen. This is because the planetary
encounters in the program have occurred at many different geocentric ranges
and declinations. Figure 2.2-3 provides an illustration of the Earth relative
directions and distances of planetary encounters in the deep space exploration
program. Note that Venus encounters generally occurred at geocentric ranges
less than one AU, Mars encounters occur outside one AU, and Jupiter and Saturn
encounters occur very far from the Earth indeed. Also, note that since all of
these encounters have occurred near the ecliptic plane but over a wide range
of solar longitudes, the geocentric declinations and right ascensions of the
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various encounters necessarily differ. Since all these encounters are at
various ranges, we must map the range down to some con_non range like i AU. In
addition, the comparative navigation performance index for a specific mission
might be best represented by the equivalent geocentric declination error at
some common declination, such as 23.5 degrees, according to the formula listed
in Figure 2.2-3.
Figure 2.2-4 provides the flight record of achievement of deep
space radio navigation in terms of the actual delivery error, mapped and
adjusted for the differences in declination and range, into equivalent
geocentric declination error at 23.5 degrees.
The error values were derived by selecting from the flight records
the best or most credible flight path solution based on data obtained before
the spacecraft experienced appreciable effects from the gravity field of the
encountered planet and subtracting the best, post-flight orbit solution based
on data taken during planetary encounter. Since approach trajectory estimates
based on data obtained during encounter are extremely accurate due to the
effect of gravity on the spacecraft and the Doppler, this difference repre-
sents a very good approximation to the actual error in the delivery flight
path. The delivery errors for Mariners 2 and 4 were relatively large, but
later missions have experienced a remarkable consistency in navigation
performance. Note also that Doppler navigation systems have delivered
spacecraft to distant targets over the past several years with an accuracy of
about 0.25 geocentric microradians (at an equivalent declination of
23.5 degrees).
Note that three mission encounters are missing from the Figure.
These are:
i) Mariner 7 at Mars, which experienced small accelerations due
to outgassing from a cracked battery case. These
accelerations corrupted the Doppler data, precluding accurate
reconstruction of the encounter orbit. However, even with
this anomaly occurring 5 days before encounter, no
significant trajectory change resulted and the previously
determined flight path was utilized resulting in a successful
encounter.
2) Pioneer multi-probe mission to Venus, which released several
probes to Venus then impacted the planet itself, making it
difficult to reconstruct an accurate orbit estimate.
3) Voyager 2 at Jupiter, which experienced a failed capacitor in
the transponder which adversely affected the Doppler.
2.2.2.6 Two Station Range. An obvious concern develops with the accuracy
of Doppler navigation if the target planet is near zero declination when
encountered by the spacecraft. Conceptually, a singularity occurs and Doppler
orbit determination accuracies in declination fall off sharply. Saturn was at
near-zero declination when both Voyager spacecraft encountered the planet.
Hence, a new radio metric observation, near simultaneous two-station two-way
range, was developed for that mission. If two tracking stations with a long
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north-south baseline, as shown on the right half of Figure 2.2-2, measure the
range at almost the same time, errors in the measured range are proportional
to the reciprocal of the cosine of the declination, not the reciprocal of the
sine. Hence, no'singularity occurs at zero declination. The-current plane-
tary ranging system produces deep space range measurements accurate to
5 meters; hence, two-station range from stations at California and Australia,
with a north-south baseline of 5000 km, can provide a direct measurement of a
spacecraft declination accurate to about i microradian.
Figure 2.2-5 illustrates, in schematic form, the approximate
navigation accuracy which is inherent in the current JPL deep space radio
navigation system. The performance possible with Doppler is illustrated by
the curved line which approaches an error of 0.25 microradian for high
declinations, but falls off to large errors for low declinations. The near-
simultaneous range measurement provides a 1 microradian "safety valve" at low
declinations.
_j
2.2.3 Orbit Knowledge Determination for Earth Flybys
In support of each Earth flyby, a covariance analysis was conducted
to determine the accuracy to which the spacecraft's state is known as a
function of time. Results for each flyby are based on the spacecraft tracking
schedule, which acquires two tracks of coherent S-band Doppler data per week
during cruise, and continuous Doppler within ten days of spacecraft
maneuvers. One range measurement is contained in each Doppler track. Each
covariance was developed using techniques and error source models which have
been proven by past experiences of flight projects to be valid.
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Radio Navigation System
In the analysis of each flyby, knowledge of the spacecraft's state
was derived as a function of time, as were uncertainties in maneuvers,
constant and random nongravitational accelerations due to gas leaks, and the
component of solar pressure along the Sun-spacecraft line (radial).
Incorporated in these derivations are the considered effects of constant
errors in tracking station locations, ionosphere, troposphere, Earth's
ephemeris, and Earth's gravitational parameter (_). (Errors sources which
are not estimated but yet permitted to influence the covariance are said to be
"considered.") State knowledge is expressed in terms of the Earth encounter
B-plane where B.T can be thought of as the radial (with respect to Earth)
projection of the spacecraft's encounter position onto the ecliptic plane, and
B-R is the corresponding projection orthogonal to the ecliptic. In terms of
B-T and B'R, Figure 2.2-6 illustrates the knowledge uncertainty of the
spacecraft position as a function of time for EGAI. The knowledge profile for
EGA2 is similar.
As a means of assessing the sensitivity of the knowledge solution
to the major error sources, uncertainties in solar pressure and a constant
nongravitational acceleration were not estimated but rather treated as sources
of constant errors in the estimation of the spacecraft's state. Table 2.2-2
lists the contributions of the above error sources to uncertainty in knowledge
of spacecraft position at 70 and 30 days before EGAI. It is readily seen that
solar pressure is a dominant error source. For example, at 70 days prior to
EGAI, the assumed 8_ error in solar pressure, if not solved for, would
contribute 97 km to a total 126 km uncertainty in B'T. The probability of
an error of this magnitude remaining undetected after a year of cruise, during
which solar incidence conditions vary considerably, is very low. However,
even if it were undetected, the contribution of this error source to Earth
impact probability is negligible with the biasing strategy described in
Section 4.
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Table 2.2-2. Major Error Source Contributions to l-a Uncertainties
in Position Knowledge
EGAI Minus 70 Days EGAI Minus 30 Days
B-R B-T B-R B.T
Error Source (km) (km) (km) (km)
Data Noise 27 47 28 23
Nongrav Accelerations 6 34 5 4
Solar Pressure 43 97 I0 12
Ionosphere 71 8 12 4
Troposphere ii 5 I i
Tracking Station Location 49 43 2 5
Earth Ephemeris 24 34 I 0
Earth _ 0 i 0 0
RSSt 104 126 33 27
tSquare root of the sum-of-squares of the error contributions.
It should be noted that the Earth's ephemeris is not a dominant
error for the flybys, since Earth is the target, as well as the observing
platform.
2.3 SEQUENCE PROCESS OVERVIEW
The sequence process for Galileo takes the basic desires of the
Galileo Flight Team (Orbiter Engineering, Probe Engineering, Navigation,
Mission Design, and Science Teams), generates the spacecraft commands
necessary to achieve them, and causes the correct execution of those commands
on the spacecraft.
There are three basic phases to the process:
i) Generating and reviewing the desired activities
2) Translating the activities into the spacecraft commands and
validating them, and
3) Executing the commands correctly onboard the spacecraft.
2.3.1 Activity Generation and Review
The process begins with the Mission Design Team (MDT) generating a
timeline showing major activities and tracking coverage (a skeleton Cruise or
skeleton Orbit Plan). It is a high-level plan for a given spacecraft command
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load. The next level of detail shows the science and engineering requests at
the activity level. Individual functions such as a trVS observation or
pointing correction are identified. These activities define the plans to a
level which can be assessed for feasibility, risk, and resource usage (a
Cruise or Orbit Plan). The planned activities are then approved by the
Mission Director or Project Manager.
At this point, maneuver activities are separated out from all other
planned activities, and treated as a special process. A space is reserved in
the sequence for the maneuver, while the rest of the sequence is designed and
implemented. The maneuver is designed, and commands for it generated later,
when more information is available from navigation. However, for
understanding the sequencing process, maneuvers can be used as a good example.
The sequencing activity for propulsive maneuvers starts with a set
of inputs from the Navigation Team. These inputs are used by the Orbiter
Engineering Team (OET) to define a set of parameters that can be executed on
the spacecraft. These parameters are then used by the Navigation Team (NAV)
to validate the maneuver design.
The next step in this process is for the OET to provide the
maneuver parameters to the Sequence Team (SEQ). These parameters are entered
into the program set called SEQGEN, internally reviewed by the OET, and then
released to the SEQ. This file contains the parameters that will be used to
generate the actual command load for the spacecraft.
At this point the Project conducts a Maneuver Design Approval
Meeting. This is the meeting in which the Project Manager/Mission Director
must review and approve the OET's Engineering Request File. The review covers
the navigation design, the OET's implementation, and the NAV maneuver
verification. This review is to ensure agreement between the Project and the
flight teams as to the design and implementation of all propulsive maneuvers.
v
2.3.2 Command Generation and Validation
SEQGEN is a set of tested programs that contains expansion and
constraint algorithms for all "standard activities." These standard
activities are called sequence components, and all maneuvers are designed to
use these sequence components. Sequence components are the building blocks of
the Galileo sequencing system. They are profile activities (PAs), ground
expanded blocks (GEBs), spacecraft expanded blocks (SEBs), and commands.
Profile activities are complete functions, such as a continuous slew mosaic or
engineering calibration. Ground expanded blocks are algorithms used by
several PAs to perform a specific function. Spacecraft expanded blocks are
stored onboard the spacecraft and used by PAs. The SEBs are called by a
perform command onboard the spacecraft and supplied data by the sequence.
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Profile activities have four main sections. The first is called
input parameters; these are the variables needed to define a specific
activity, examples are turn attitude and burn duration. Next is the
relational constraints section which performs internal consistency checks and
forces inputs to comply with mission and flight rules. The expansion section
is an algorithm that uses the input parameters to generate the time-ordered
command list and calls to any SEBs if required for that activity. The checker
section combined with SEQGEN checks constraints that are external to the
component, examples are downlink and recorder availability. This is also the
central program for enforcing mission and flight rules. Each flight and
mission rule is assigned to be checked in one or more ways, i.e., ground
software or team procedures.
Returning to the process, these parameters are used to generate a
time-ordered list of conmmnds and to check many constraints associated with
sequencing.
The next step in the process is for the SEQ to produce the detailed
products for Flight Team review. This includes the spacecraft sequence file,
the spacecraft event file, and SEQTRAN products. The spacecraft sequence file
contains the time-tagged set of commands and is read by SEQTRAN to produce the
sequence load. The spacecraft event file is generated from the spacecraft
sequence file and also contains the time-ordered list of commands, plus
additional statements describing the command functions and expected spacecraft
events during execution. The SEQTRAN products include the ground com_nand
file, which contains the actual data that will be transmitted to the
spacecraft, and a human-readable form of the sequence load. The MCT then
generates the integrated sequence of events (an integrated listing of
spacecraft and ground events) at this time, using the spacecraft event file as
input.
When sequence components are used to generate these products, no
ground simulation is necessary. This is because of the extensive testing and
review each component goes through before use. Each component was thoroughly
acceptance tested before delivery to the Project. The next phase of testing
was to simulate their execution on the Minimum Capability Hybrid Simulator.
This is used to verify the correct execution of a component in the CDS. It
verifies that the sequence was correctly translated by SEQTRAN and that the
CDS will issue the co_mmnds at the correct time. The final phase of testing
was executed on the spacecraft during system test. This assures that the
spacecraft will perform the activity as planned and designed. During
spacecraft testing, an end-to-end verification was accomplished. The
spacecraft testing included all types of maneuvers. The test cases were
designed for both nominal and fault cases (e.g., burn longer than maximum burn
time) of the sequence.
This is the way Galileo plans to perform cruise and orbital
operations sequencing, including maneuvers. If a sequence is generated from
individual commands or by editing a standard sequence component, then it is
required to be validated on the Minimum Capability Hybrid Simulator at this
point in the process. This will verify that the CDS issues the commands as
required and thai'the translation was done correctly.
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An additional safeguard for all sequences is the restricted command
list (all propulsive maneuver commands are on this list). All sequences are
searched for any command on the list. This is accomplished using a program
called STRIPPER, and the set of commands on this list found in a sequence is
delivered with every sequence load. This list of restricted con=hands is part
of the review package delivered to the flight teams. The list must be
approved by the OET Chief and the Mission Director.
These products are distributed to the flight teams and the Project
Office for review. The Maneuver Con_nand Product Review and Approval Meeting
is then held. Here, again, the Mission Director along with the flight team
must approve the sequence. This review ensures that the sequence to be sent
to the spacecraft accurately represents the maneuver design previously
reviewed. All sequences are subject to this level of review.
The process for non-maneuver sequences is similar. Only the names
of the reviews and the teams giving inputs are different. The approval of all
changes to a sequence rests with the Mission Director.
2.3.3 Spacecraft Execution
Conm_nd loads are transmitted as messages. Each message has an
error detection and correction code (the code is a shortened BCH). This code
allows the correction of any single error and the detection of more than one
error. The spacecraft will reject any message with more than one error. Each
frame in the uplink message also contains a checksum, which is verified in the
hardware command decoder. Each message is assigned a sequential number by
SEQTRAN. The spacecraft keeps track of each message as it is received. The
last message contains the conditional execute for the load. The load will not
become active unless all the messages have been received and accepted by the
spacecraft.
Onboard protection for certain types of faults and execution errors
is also provided. Before starting a turn, the sequence checks a global
variable called SYSI, to ascertain whether or not any one of a set of system
faults has occurred. If SYSI has a bit set, the sequence is terminated. The
sequence machine will then wait for new instructions to be uplinked. If there
are no system-level faults indicated, the sequence continues.
The sequence checks the status of SYSI before each segment in a
pulsed maneuver and at the completion of each continuous axial burn maneuver
(the axial maneuver block sets the thruster branch before the first segment).
This is true for vector mode and non-vector mode maneuvers. The response is
the same, if a system fault has occurred the sequence is terminated. If no
fault is indicated the sequence continues as planned. For continuous axial
burns, the nominal termination of the burn is under accelerometer control and
for pulsed burns, the number of revolutions. In both cases the sequence has a
worst-case burn complete time after which a stop conm%_nd will be issued to
terminate the burn.
An additional constraint is placed on accelerometer-controlled
burns, a minimum burn time before which the burn cannot be terminated by the
accelerometer. This ensures a minimum burn even if the accelerometer fails.
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In addition, a maximum burn time is also specified to insure against an
overburn if the accelerometer fails.
The onboard system fault protection has the ability to cancel
sequences if needed. Due to the fact that none of the sequenced activities
(except launch and relay-JOl) are time critical, the philosophy of cancelling
the sequences in the presence of a fault has been adopted. This will result
in the sequence virtual machine terminating all sequence activities. The
system fault protection will also terminate any maneuver that is occurring.
2.4 SPACECRAFT OVERVIEW
2.4.1 Introduction to the Galileo Spacecraft Design
The Galileo spacecraft (shown in Figure 2.4-1) consists of three
major parts. Two parts are the spun and despun sections of the spacecraft
which will orbit Jupiter. The third is a Probe which will be released into
the Jovian atmosphere.
2.4.1.1 Spacecraft Sections. The spun and despun sections are connected by
the Spin Bearing Assembly (SBA), which controls rotation and transmits power
and signals between the two sections. The spun section nominally rotates at
3.15 rpm and contains most major engineering subsystems, including the Retro
Propulsion Module (RPM), the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators, the radio
frequency (RF) subsystem and antennas for ground communication, as well as many
of the science instruments. A star scanner and Sun sensor are mounted on this
section to allow spacecraft attitude determination. The science instruments on
the spun section are those which make measurements while continuously sweeping
throughout space, as opposed to being pointed in a single direction. The spun
section's rotation provides these instruments with a 360 ° sweep in "clock"
angle, while some incorporate internal capability to point in "cone" angle to
provide a complete 4_-steradian coverage of space. The spun section instru-
ments are the Magnetometer, Energetic Particle Detector, Plasma, Plasma Wave,
Dust Detector, Extreme Ultraviolet, and Heavy Ion Counter subsystems. These
instruments will measure and map the Jovian magnetosphere, the Io torus, and
the solar wind, and provide insight into their interaction in the vicinity of
Jupiter.
The despun section of the spacecraft provides the capability to
point a platform of scientific instruments in a fixed direction. The despun
section contains only the electronics necessary to its function, since the spun
section provides a more evenly cooled housing for the majority of the elec-
tronics. The major component of the despun section is the scan platform, which
is articulated by the Scan Actuator Subassembly (SAS), to point through 180 ° of
cone angle. The scan platform is also articulated by the SBA which moves the
entire despun section through 360 ° of clock angle. By controlling the SBA and
SAS, the scan platform instruments can be pointed in any direction. In addi-
tion, the despun section includes gyros and accelerometers for improved plat-
form pointing and spacecraft attitude determination. The science instruments
contained on the scan platform are the Solid State Imaging camera, the Near
Infrared Mapping Spectrometer, the Ultraviolet Spectrometer, and the Photo-
polarimeter Radiometer. These instruments provide broad spectral coverage of
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celestial bodies at which the scan platform is pointed and will provide
geological and atmospheric data on Jupiter and its moons.
The despun section also carries the Galileo Probe. This instrument
package is released about five months before closest approach to Jupiter on a
trajectory that will cause it to penetrate the Jovian atmosphere. After
entry, the Probe, operating on its own battery, transmits its data back to the
Orbiter. The Orbiter receives the data through an articulated antenna and
receiver mounted on the despun section and relays it to the Earth. The Probe
spends approximately an hour descending through Jupiter's atmosphere and
relaying data before the increasing depth causes loss of signal and eventually
crushes the Probe. The Probe instruments are designed to measure as much as
possible in the upper layers of the atmosphere. They include an Atmospheric
Structures Instrument, Neutral Mass Spectrometer, Helium Abundance Detector,
Nephelometer (cloud detector), Net Flux Radiometer, and Lightning and Energetic
Particle Detector.
A
2.4.1.2 Spacecraft Modes. The spacecraft is flown in six basic attitude
control modes during the mission. First, it is launched in launch mode with
the spun and despun sections mechanically locked together so they cannot move
relative to one another. Upon release from the shuttle, the spacecraft deploys
its booms in deployment mode and unlatches the spun and despun sections. The
Spin Bearing Assembly then keeps the two sections stationary relative to one
another, both spinning at the nominal spin rate. When all deployments are
complete, the spacecraft is placed in all-spin mode, which continues for
several days while the spacecraft maintains a nearly Sun-pointed attitude using
the Sun sensor.
As the spacecraft subsystems are further verified and calibrated,
the spacecraft is eventually commanded to a dual-spin state where the despun
section is held fixed in inertial space, the spun section spins at 3.15 rpm,
and attitude determination is done primarily using the star scanner (in cruise
mode) or the gyros (in inertial mode). Cruise mode will be the mode most
often used and is appropriate when neither maneuvers nor precise scan platform
pointing is being done. When the spacecraft must turn, the star scanner can
no longer provide attitude reference and inertial mode is used. The all-spin-
low mode is used to perform 10-newton thruster axial _V maneuvers. For these
maneuvers, the entire spacecraft is spun at 3.15 rpm.
The final mode is used for two critical events when the spacecraft
nears Jupiter. At the time of Probe release, the spacecraft is transitioned
to all-spin mode and then spun up to 10.5 rpm for Probe release. This is
"all-spin high" mode. It allows for better spin stabilization of the Probe
prior to separation. The all-spin high mode is used again about seven days
later to provide dynamic stability during the first of the mission's three
400-newton engine maneuvers. This maneuver, the orbit deflection maneuver,
adjusts the trajectory so that the spacecraft will overfly Jupiter rather than
follow the Probe into the atmosphere. The all-spin high mode is next used for
the Jupiter orbit insertion maneuver which occurs shortly after Probe entry and
relay and puts the spacecraft into orbit about the planet. About three months
later, the final 400-newton engine firing for the perijove raise maneuver
adjusts this orbit to keep the spacecraft outside of the most intense regions
of the Jovian radiation belts. Thereafter, the spacecraft returns to cruise
and inertial modes to conduct the orbital tour of Jupiter and its satellites.
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2.4.2 Spacecraft Subsystems
A simplified spacecraft block diagram is shownin Figure 2.4-2 where
the major engineering subsystemsare highlighted. The spacecraft receives
commandsand transmits telemetry to the ground through the S/X-band Antenna
(SXA) subsystem, the RF Subsystem(RFS), and the Modulation Demodulation
Subsystem(MDS). The Commandand Data Subsystem(CDS)processes commandsand
telemetry, executes autonomous programs such as stored sequences and fault
protection, and acts as a central interface to the rest of the spacecraft.
CDS communicates with all science subsystems, as well as the Attitude and
Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS), the Power and Pyro Subsystem (PPS), Data
Memory Subsystem (DMS), and the Probe Radio Relay Hardware (RRH). AACS
determines spacecraft attitude through several sensors, articulates the despun
section and scan platform, and controls the spacecraft attitude by commanding
the thrusters in the Retro Propulsion Module (RPM). The PPS controls pyro-
actuated spacecraft events and regulates and distributes electric power from
the Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) to the entire spacecraft.
The RRH consists of redundant receivers connected to an articulated antenna
designed to receive Probe data after entry. A more detailed description of
each of these subsystems follows.
2.4.2.1 S/X-Band Antenna Subsystem (SXA). Galileo uses a 4.8-meter-
diameter furlable antenna to communicate with Earth. This antenna is similar
to the type developed for NASA's Tracking Data Relay Satellites. Due to the
extremely high solar flux during the early.part of the mission, this High-Gain
Antenna (HGA) will not be used and will remain furled behind a Sunshade.
During this period and later for redundancy and when the HGA is not Earth
pointed, the spacecraft will rely on two wide beam low-gain antennas (LGAs),
pointed in opposite directions, one coaligned with the HGA.
Commands are received by the spacecraft primarily on S-band using
either the HGA or LGAs. Commands can also be received on X-band via the HGA
only. Telemetry is transmitted via X-band through the HGA and via S-band
through either the HGA or LGAs.
L
2.4.2.2 Radio Frequency Subsystem (RFS). Command data are received via an
S-band transponder and telemetry is returned to Earth using either a
10/30 watt S-band Traveling Wave Tube Amplifier (TWTA) or a 10/22 watt X-band
TWTA. The S-band system can use either the LGAs or HGA while the X-band
operates only over the HGA. The S-band transmitter is turned on after
separation from the shuttle Orbiter.
The two-channel downlink of the Orbiter is utilized in the following
manner. One channel is used for the continuous transmission of fixed-format,
low-rate (40 b/s), real-time, uncoded engineering data via S-band. The other
channel is used for either real-time or playback data, at data rates between
I0 b/s and 134.4 kb/s, via X-band. During the first solar orbit of the
mission, only the LGAs will be available for communications until the HGA can
be safely deployed and the spacecraft Earth pointed. Furthermore, the space-
craft is usually Sun-pointed until after the second solar orbit for thermal
control of the spacecraft, thereby precluding HGA command. The HGA will not
be deployed until the spacecraft range to the Sun is large enough to prevent
overheating of this antenna.
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2.4.2.3 Command and Data Subsystem (CDS) and Data Memory Subsystem (DMS).
The CDS is an active, redundant microprocessor-based system with a total of
384K bytes of memory that utilizes data buses for interaction with other
engineering subsystems, science instruments, and Probe relay receivers. Its
functions are uplink command processing, programmed sequence storage and
execution, fault protection, downlink data collection and formatting, and
onboard intercommunications.
Ground commands are decoded by a hardware command decoder and
responded to by sending the uplinked messages to the software elements of the
CDS. Uplinked messages are assembled into a sequence of stored commands for
later execution. In addition, CDS responds to spacecraft status indications
from several spacecraft sensors. These measurements are placed in telemetry
and also used to trigger fault responses. During the launch sequence, a
stored program, activated by IUS discretes, controls the propulsion venting
sequence, the boom deploy sequence, RF transmitter turn on, and thermal state.
The CDS also gathers and formats telemetry data for return to the
ground for processing. Data are sent to the ground via X/S-band telemetry.
The spacecraft tape recorder, the DMS, is utilized at several phases to record
data for later playback.
2.4.2.4 Attitude and Articulation Control Subsystem (AACS). The AACS is
also computer controlled and contains 64K, 16-bit words in Random Access
Memory (RAM), and a IK in Read Only Memory (ROM). The AACS points the
spacecraft for Earth communications and Probe release, controls thrusters for
attitude correction and maneuvers, points the scan platform, adjusts the RTG
boom positions for wobble control, and controls the spacecraft spin rate'and
position of the despun section. The AACS receives con=hands and program updates
from the ground via the CDS, as well as commands directly from CDS programs.
Inputs from the gyros, accelerometers, star scanner, Sun acquisition sensor,
spin bearing assembly, and scan actuator subsystem position encoders provide
feedback required for closed-loop control.
Propulsion control consists of latching isovalves, drive signals to
the 400-N main engine and the 12 10-N thrusters, and heaters on the two 10-N
thruster clusters.
The subsystem operates in six different modes, including the launch
and deployment modes, with mode selection by ground or CDS conm_nd.
2.4.2.5 Retro Propulsion Module (RPM). The RPM provides all of the
propulsive maneuvers of the spacecraft after IUS separation. The RPM is a
mechanical, separable self-contained module which is integrated as a load
carrying part of the spacecraft spun section.
The RPM is a bipropellant pressure-fed system using the hypergolic
propellant combinations of monomethyl hydrazine and a mixture of nitrogen
tetroxide with a small fraction of nitric oxide added. Its four propellant
tanks have a maximum usable capacity of 932 kilograms. The unified feed
system supplies a central 400-N engine for the large maneuvers near Jupiter,
and twelve 10-N thrusters for trajectory, attitude, and spin rate control.
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2.4.2.6 Power/Pyro SubsTstem (PPS). The PPS power electronic elements
convert the RTG electrical output into regulated 30 V DC and 50 V AC
spacecraft power. They distribute this power to all subsystems via latching
relays controlled by the CDS.
The PPS pyro electronic elements consist of two pyro units (one
spun and one despun) which store the energy necessary to fire all pyrotechnic
devices. Each unit employs capacitor banks for energy storage and Silicon-
Controlled Rectifiers (SCRs) for pyro initiation. Power to the pyro switching
units and fire command are controlled by the CDS. Critical functions require
two separate commands, one to enable the firing circuit and one to trigger the
SCR.
2.4.2.7 Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generator (RTG). Galileo uses General
Purpose Heat Source-Radioisotope Thermoelectric Generators (GPHS-RTGs) which
represent a design evolution from those flown on the two Voyagers. The two
RTGs convert heat from the radioisotope fuel (plutonium-238 dioxide) into
electricity by silicon-germanium thermoelectric converters. The RTGs are
located on articulating booms on the spun portion of the spacecraft. In
addition, 130 single-watt Radioisotope Heater Units (RHUs) are used throughout
the space- craft, and in several of the instruments.
There are two major components of an RTG, the GPHS-RTG and the
converter, as well as support assemblies for the GPHS and a housing that
encloses the generator and acts as a heat rejection radiator. The thermal
energy provided to the converter comes from the GPHS, which consists of a
stacked column of 18 individual modules, each providing about 245 watts from
the decay of encapsulated plutonium-238 oxide .which has a half-life of
87.8 years. The converter is composed of a thermopile that converts the
radioisotope generated heat into electrical power. The thermopile consists of
572 silicon germanium (SiGe) thermoelectric elements called unicouples
connected in a series parallel network.
2.4.2.8 Structure Subsystem. The structure subsystem mechanically supports
all other spacecraft hardware. Its elements are designed with an ultimate
factor of safety greater than or equal to 1.4 as required for STS safety. The
structural loads and thermal environment used in the design of the spacecraft
structure can handle worst-ease launch and abort landing conditions.
2.4.2.9 Radio Relay Hardware (RRH) and Probe (PRB) Subsystems. The despun
section of the spacecraft contains the radio relay hardware. This subsystem
consists of redundant receivers, each of which relaTs Probe data to each of
the redundant halves of the CDS. The Probe signal is received through the
radio relay antenna which is articulated in cone to track the Probe during its
travel in the Jovian atmosphere.
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2.6.3 Fault-Tolerant Design Concepts
Several concepts are important to the understanding of the Galileo
design. Theseconcepts have to do with fault tolerance of the design and are
described in the following sections.
2.&.3.1 Subsystem Redundancy. The spacecraft design incorporates redundancy
at the subsystem level. In principle, each subsystem must allow for one
failure without impairing the function of the spacecraft. For example, the
CDS consists of redundant halves, each capable of commanding all spacecraft
functions and collecting all critical telemetry. The AACS has redundant
memories, processors, and input-output units which can be individually swapped.
In some cases, full redundancy is impractical but can be achieved functionally.
For example, the AACS inertial attitude system does not contain redundant
gyros, but in the event of a failure, all control can be done using celestial
sensors. In other cases, redundancy is impossible given spacecraft design
constraints. There are two RTGs, for example, but the power from both is
needed to achieve anything but minimal mission objectives. In subsystems such
as this, the redundancy is built into the individual elements themselves. The
GPHS of the RTG consists of many individual units, the failure of any one of
which should not affect the others. The thermopile consists of a series
parallel network of devices which cannot individually degrade a single RTG
significantly. In summmry, non-redundant subsystems are designed to have large
demonstrated design margins.
In general, science subsystems are not redundant. Instead, the
multiple science objectives of the mission insure significant return even in
the event of the loss of one or two. individual instruments.
\
_/
2.4.3.2 Single Point Failure Policy. This design concept is best summarized
in the Galileo single point failure policy, Project Policy 17:
No single failure of any electrical, mechanical, or electro-
mechanical piece-part shall prevent:
l)
2)
3)
'4)
5)
6)
Probe delivery.
Probe data acquisition.
Science data acquisition from more than one Probe
instrument.
Successful Jupiter orbit insertion of the Orbiter.
Science data acquisition from more than one Orbiter
instrument.
Acquisition of more than 50 percent of the Orbiter
engineering data.
From this policy, it can be inferred that no single point failure
that has not been placed on an exception list and analyzed in detail can cause
an Earth avoidance concern.
This policy concept is expanded somewhat to preclude similar losses
from two point failures which may be likely to occur in conjunction with each
other, may be caused by the same event, are both more likely than the typical
failure, or create a particularly mission catastrophic event.
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Examplesof such special cases of two point failures which have
been protected against are:
l) No single failure in CDS combined with a single failure
in the RRH shall prevent the return of Probe data.
2) No two failures in different CDS subelements shall
prevent the operation of a functional CDS single string.
Furthermore, the likelihood of single failures has been examined
and made consistent in the design. Some failures are extremely unlikely and
not of concern. Others, however, approached a threshold of likelihood
considered unsafe for the mission. When this happened, the failure mode was
analyzed in detail and the design altered to eliminate the failure or reduce
its likelihood to a safe level. This threshold of concern became apparent
when a failure probability approached 1%. This made the probability of losing
that system and its redundant component 10 -4 , and amounted to an
unacceptable mission risk. In general, 10 -2 is considered an upper limit on
the acceptable probability for any specific single failure. Similarly, 10 -4
is an upper limit for any specific combination of two failures.
2.4.3.3 Fault Protection System. The Galileo spacecraft has been designed
to be fault tolerant. This is accomplished not just through system redundancy
and single point failure analysis, but through an extensive onboard fault
protection system. Spacecraft hardware and software has been designed to
respond to any spacecraft single fault by placing the spacecraft in a state in
which it will be operable and safe for at least ten days. By that time,
ground operators will be able to detect, analyze, and reconfigure the
spacecraft for the remainder of the mission.
This fault protection system includes hardware elements such as the
undervoltage detection and reconfiguration hardware. It also includes a
significant amount of fault protection software: systems, CDS internal, and
AACS internal. This software monitors a variety of detectable spacecraft
faults and reconfigures the spacecraft in response to the most appropriate
state for the current mission phase, including swapping in redundant subsystem
elements. Specific fault protection programs include undervoltage recovery,
command loss, RF loss, RPM overpressure, RPM thermal control, AACS heartbeat
loss, science alarms, CDS loss, and a variety of AACS attitude and sensor
failure responses. In addition, if either CDS or AACS undergoes a power-on-
recovery (essentially a microprocessor reset), detailed software responses are
selected appropriate to the failure type and the mission phase.
2.4.3.4 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis. For each subsystem, a failure
modes and effects analysis was done as part of the critical design review. In
this process, not only were the internal effects of failures on a subsystem
analyzed, but so too were the effects on other subsystems, the overall system,
and the mission. In each case, the analysis was evaluated using the single
point failure policy and design inadequacies were eliminated.
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SECTION 3
SPACECRAFT FAILURE MODE ANALYSIS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
A considerable analysis effort has been invested in the task of
identifying all possible failures, both on the spacecraft as well as on the
ground, that could cause an anomalous AV to be applied to the spacecraft,
thereby changing its trajectory. This Section describes this effort in a
stumnary form in order to provide an easily readable overview of the analysis
that was performed and the results. A detailed and highly technical
description of the work is included as an Appendix for the benefit of the
reader with the background and interest to understand in depth how the
specific results were obtained.
Failures which might incapacitate the spacecraft, but which would
not cause any velocity perturbations, are not included in this effort because
the navigation strategy summarized in Section I and described in detail in
Section 4 insures that such failures cannot result in Earth impact. Likewise,
failures occurring after the second Earth flyby are not included, since they
also cannot lead to impact.
Most of the failures that can cause a SV to be applied to the
spacecraft will not prevent the execution of a recovery maneuver if one is
required to avoid impact. The probability of being able to implement such a
recovery is dependent upon the nature of the failure and the time of
occurrence of the failure relative to the time of the next Earth encounter.
If the failure occurs well before the next encounter, and if it does not
incapacitate the spacecraft, then the probability of recovey is very high.
Conversely, if the failure occurs close to an encounter, there may not be
adequate time to design and transmit the necessary commands. However, an
ameliorating effect of these late failures is that a large _V is required to
influence the trajectory enough to lead to an impacting trajectory. Hence,
although the probability of recovery may be relatively low, the probability of
needing such a recovery is also low. The recovery probabilities that have
been used in this analysis are surmnarized in this Section, and a more detailed
rationale for the values is given in the Appendix.
3.2 PROBABILITY OF SPACECRAFT FAILURES
Before proceeding with the description of failures and the
analysis of each, the failure mode analysis will be put in perspective by
presenting some general insights into the problem. This analysis is general
in nature and does not strictly apply to every failure which will be later
considered. It serves to give a sense of the reasoning that will be used in
specific cases.
3.2.1 Probability of Single Failures
In general, every spacecraft subsystem was designed to be tolerant
of single failures, either through redundancy, alternate operating modes, or
otherwise. On a long duration mission such as Galileo, there is a significant
probability that a failure will occur and the spacecraft must be tolerant of
it such that the mission will not be lost. This strategy will be to no avail
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if the likelihood of single failures becomes so high that it is likely that
some subsystem and its backup will both be lost and the mission will fail.
In the design of each subsystem, special care was taken to minimize
the likelihood of single failures. When the likelihood of a specific failure
reached a certain threshold, the failure received significant attention.
Through analysis or redesign, the probability of the failure was reduced below
the threshold. The value of this threshold which required redesign was
approximately I% over the duration of the mission. In several specific cases
in the Galileo design where failure-prone elements were discovered, specific
Project policies were made requiring that the failure probability be reduced
to less than 1% per subsystem over the life of the mission. Notable examples
of this are the replacement of spacecraft memory components, both TCC-244 and
HA6504RRII, and certain logic parts, RCA CD4049 and RCA CD4050. Hence, in
general, the probability of failure of any specific subsystem on the
spacecraft is less than 10 -2 .
3.2.2 Probability of Double Failures
Single spacecraft failures can be tolerated through the activation
of a redundant element with few exceptions. The exceptions have been
specifically enumerated and exempted based on their low likelihood of
occurrence. In general then, for a spacecraft disabling failure to occur, two
failures must occur. They cannot be just two random failures, but one of a
set of pairs of specific failures which, together, cause a spacecraft
failure, lhe probability of any two specific failures is then the product of
the probabilities of the individual failures or 10 -4 .
3.2.3 Probability of Recovery
A detailed evaluation has been developed of the probability of the
spacecraft being able to perform a maneuver to recover from an anomalous _V,
given that the initial failure does not interfere with the recovery. This
probability is then only a function of the time of the initial failure
relative to the time of the next Earth flyby. There are several limiting
factors, the importance of which depends on this time. The limiting factors
are:
(1) A subsequent dual failure in the spacecraft which prevents
further recovery operations.
(2) A subsequent single failure in the spacecraft which aborts
the first recovery attempt, perhaps leaving insufficient time
for further recovery attempts.
(3) An error made in the process of developing the recovery
maneuver on the ground. By the time the error is discovered,
there may be insufficient time to execute another recovery
maneuver.
(4) The initial failure may occur so close to Earth flyby that
there is insufficient time to plan and execute a normal
recovery maneuver.
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Table 3.1 presents a s_ry of these recovery failure categories,
their relevant time domains, and the associated probability of no recovery.
This Table will be used in later detailed failure probability evaluations.
The Appendix presents the derivation of these numbers.
Table 3.1. Probability of No Recovery
Time of Failure
Before EGA
(days)
Probability of
No Recovery
i. 20 or more 2 x 10-6
2. i0 to 20 3 x 10 -4
3. 3-1/2 to i0 5 x 10 -3
4. I to 3-1/2 0.I
5. 8 hrs to I 0.9
3.2.4 Failure Categories
The preceding discussion is useful for understanding the overall
spacecraft design philosophy. It does not, however, apply to all failures,
and several examples can be found where one or more of the assumptions do not
hold. Specific problems have been found with micrometeoroid penetration
failures which do not require two spacecraft failures, stuck thrusters where
single point failures are possible, and the spacecraft drifting off its
nominal Sunpoint where recovery may not be possible.
In order to better understand the spacecraft failure possibilities,
a set of failure categories has been developed and each one analyzed to
determine its probability and consequences. These results are summarized in
the remainder of this section.
3.3 CATEGORIZATION OF FAILURES
All failures which can potentially cause a _V can be placed into
one of three general categories. These categories cover failures that occur
after the time of separation from the IUS and before the completion of the
second Earth flyby. These categories also cover only those failures which may
result in a _V. Failures which cause a loss of mission, but no possibility
of Earth impact, such as those that occur after the second Earth flyby, are
not included. The following are the three general categories of failures.
3.3.1 Spacecraft Failures
This category consists of all failures that occur due to internal
failures in the spacecraft itself. It includes failures in any element of
hardware or software that result in a failure of the subsystem to perform as
designed. Such failures can be due to faulty parts, aging, hardware or
software design errors not found in testing, or any other internal failure
that causes the system not to meet its design requirements.
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3.3.2 Environmental Failures
This category consists of failures which are externally induced.
These failures result from the environments in space to which the spacecraft
is subjected. Although the spacecraft has been designed to withstand such
environmental effects, there is still some probability that the effect of
micrometeoroid impacts or radiation, for example, may cause failures.
3.3.3 Ground Failures
The third category includes those failures which are induced in the
process of controlling the spacecraft. It includes all failures induced
through mission planning, operations, command generation, conmmnd
transmission, and command reception by the spacecraft.
3.4 SPECIFIC FAILURES AND THEIR EFFECTS
This Section discusses specific failures and their effects,
categorized within one of the general failures above. The specific failures
identified and examined for spacecraft failures are propellant line or tank
ruptures, stuck thrusters, thruster failures, electronic parts failures,
structural failures, AACS software errors, CDS software errors, and spacecraft
drifts off-Sun. The specific failures identified and examined for
environmental failures are micrometeoroid penetration, radiation, and
spacecraft charging. The specific failures identified and examined for ground
failures are command generation and command transmission.
For each failure mode, the total probability of failure is given.
These numbers represent the probability of a failure occurring between launch
and the second Earth flyby which causes an anomalous AV. The derivation of
these values, except for ones that are essentially zero, is contained in the
Appendix. The probability that these failures will lead to Earth impact,
considering the trajectory characteristics, the probability that the _V will
cause an impacting trajectory, and the probability of being able to do a
recovery maneuver, is developed in Section 4.
3.4.1 Spacecraft Failures
3.4.1.1 Propellant Line or Tank Failures. This category includes any
hardware failure in the Retro Propulsion Module (RPM) which leads to escaping
propellants or pressurant and results in an anomalous velocity imparted to the
spacecraft. In analyzing the hardware failure modes of the RPM itself, it was
discovered that by far the most likely failure mechanism was due to impact of
RPM components by a micrometeoroid. No structural failure of propellant tanks
or lines inherent in the hardware was determined to be as probable as the
chance of tank penetration by a solid or liquified micrometeoroid. This
failure category is analyzed in considerable detail in the Appendix as one of
the environmentally induced failure categories. This failure mode is
summarized below.
3.4.1.2 Stuck Thrusters. A stuck open or stuck closed thruster valve
causes an anomalous velocity only during a maneuver (since only then are the
isovalves opened). In this category the cause of the failure is a hardware
failure in the thruster valve, the propulsion drive electronics (PDE), or the
PDE annex. Other hardware and software failures which might cause anomalous
thruster firing are covered in Sections 3.4.1.4, 3.4.1.6, and 3.4.1.7.
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The specific failure mechanism here is that a component fails in
the thruster valve or in the PDE, causing a thruster valve to stick, either
open or shut, and an anomalous velocity results.
Figure 3-1 shows the orientation and nomenclature of the twelve I0
N thrusters. Note that each thruster designation indicates 'A' or 'B'
plumbing branch, and thruster cluster number i or 2. Figure 3-2 shows a
simplified schematic of the propellant tanks and plumbing. This Figure shows
how the isovalves separate the 'A' and 'B' branch thrusters, and how
isovalves and thruster valves must both be open before a thruster can fire.
If only 'A' branch isovalves are opened, then no 'B' branch thruster can
fire. Isovalves are opened only when a maneuver is about to begin, and are
closed immediately upon completion.
The isovalves act as a safety net, limiting the damage that might
be done by a stuck open thruster valve. An isovalve stuck open would not by
itself result in imparted velocity. In any event, an isovalve stuck shut will
result in no maneuver being performed. This analysis considered both
isovalves and thruster valves stuck open, but the probability of such a double
failure occurring was so small that it made a negligible contribution to the
total probability.
When the spacecraft is close to the Sun (near Venus), a stuck open
thruster could cause off-Sun attitude excursions which result in temperature
damage to the high-gain antenna (HGA). Such damage could occur before
baseline fault protection responded. As a result, the addition of the Sun
gate and PDE annex devices were made to the spacecraft specifically to guard
against a stuck open thruster failure.
The Sun gate is a photoelectric sensor which triggers an on-board
fault protection response whenever the HGA-Sun angle exceeds a threshold due
to some spacecraft malfunction.
The PDE annex detects and prevents an anomalous signal to a
thruster valve when no signal was issued by the AACS I/0. Hence, the
probability of the propulsion drive electronics (PDE) causing a stuck open
thruster failure has been greatly reduced.
Since the data used in this analysis did not reflect the addition
of the Sun gate or the PDE annex, the probability of stuck thruster failure
will be substantially less than that used in this report.
Fault protection built into the spacecraft software will detect
many stuck thruster failures. A failure in fault protection has not been
included in this analysis because:
I) The probability of such a double failure occurring is
extremely small, and
2) The values used for the probability of a stuck thruster are
large since they do not reflect the addition of new failure
protection devices (Sun gate and PDE annex).
Values for probability of recovery are obtained from Section 3.2.3.
The stuck thruster failure does not preclude recovery since all propulsive
maneuvers have an alternate thruster branch with independent plumbing.
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The total probability of a thruster sticking, either open or closed,
sometime between launch and the second Earth flyby, has been determined to be
bounded by 6.5%. The derivation of this result is given in the Appendix.
3.4.1.3 RPM Thruster Failure. A recent failure in another satellite
thruster system which is based on the Galileo design has caused the Galileo
Project to take a careful look at their thruster system. The satellite failed
due to operating its thrusters at an operating point which caused thruster
overheating and melting, as well as melting of the thermally coupled redundant
thrusters. Since the Galileo spacecraft uses thrusters of similar design, but
operating at a lower flow rate, an analysis was done to assure that similar
failures were not a threat to Earth avoidance or the mission. The results of
this analysis indicate that the thrusters are only at risk of failure when
operated in the continuous mode, and then, based on fault protection currently
being implemented, the worst-case outcome is an anomalous _V of 0.04 m/s.
The spacecraft trajectory never can be made an impacting trajectory by a AV
that small, no continuous burns are planned near Earth, and a recovery
capability exists by using redundant thrusters in the pulsed mode.
Consequently, this failure mode poses no risk to Earth avoidance.
3.&.l.& Memory Failure. The worst-case failure in this category, in the
sense that it is probably the most likely failure as well as having the most
serious consequences, is where an AACS memory chip fails, causing an error in
thruster firing control at the next TCM. The worst-case situation is a failed
AACS memory chip that escapes detection until causing trouble during a TCM.
Most AACS memory is checksummed (including all the code) and checksum region
failures will be detected almost in,mediately, although the spacecraft takes no
action other than setting an indicator in telemetry. Two failure classes are
examined:
I) A failure that occurs outside of the checksum region such
that there is no internal detection,
2) A failure that occurs in the checksum region within two days
of a TCM such that there is insufficient time for detection
and corrective action from the ground.
The analysis for these two cases, as developed in the Appendix,
indicates the total probability of a memory failure causing an anomalous _V
between launch and the second Earth encounter is 7 x 10 -5 . The standard
recovery probabilities are used, since a failure in one of the redundant
halves of the AACS does not prevent normal use of the other half.
3.4.1.5 Structural Failures. Beyond the requirement to keep the spacecraft
together, Galileo's structure plays a vital role in stabilizing the spacecraft.
Galileo, like all spinning spacecraft, must have proper ballasting, structural
alignments, and control of mass properties to remain dynamically stable. If,
for example, an improperly designed piece of structure broke and released a
large component, the resulting shift in mass properties would affect the
spacecraft's rotation. At best, the spacecraft would be left with an
uncorrectable wobble which would degrade teleconlnunications and science
instrument pointing. At worst, the resulting nutation and wobble may make the
spacecraft uncontrollable.
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Given the navigation strategy which biases the spacecraft away from
an impacting trajectory, even worst-case structural failures which release
hardware will not lead to impact. The only hypothesized case where Earth
impact could be imagined are failures where an RTG breaks free and flies off
on its own trajectory. As will be shown in the following paragraphs, the
spacecraft's design makes this scenario implausible.
By themselves, most structural failures produce little or no AV
and so do not risk Earth impact. However, if an RTG could break free, its
angular momentum would hurl it away from the remainder of the spacecraft.
addition to acquiring AV, the RTG would be uncontrollable and a potential
hazard to the Earth.
In
This worst-case scenario is not credible for several reasons.
First, all spacecraft structure, including the RTG booms, is designed with a
large margin of safety (a factor of 1.4 or greater). Second, prior to launch,
the entire spacecraft is exhaustively tested on a dynamic shake table to
validate that all structural members can withstand launch vibration, the worst
dynamic environment of the entire mission. Finally, even if an RTG boom could
completely disintegrate, the RTG would still be retained by heavy electrical
cables. These cables can easily hold the RTG even against the tension (about
40 pounds at i0 rpm) resulting from a stuck-open spin thruster (second
failure) before onboard fault protection software intervenes. Although a
dangling RTG would leave the spacecraft with a severe wobble, the RTG will
remain with the spacecraft.
Given the design and testing practices which secure the RTG, there
is no credible structural failure which could lead to an RTG becoming
separated from the spacecraft. Accordingly, the probability of impact due to
this failure type is treated as zero.
3.4.1.6 AACS Flight Software Codin_ Error. A flight software programming
error might affect execution of some maneuver which fires thrusters. The
software error could be present at launch, or it might be introduced by an
in-flight software code change. A software error present at launch would
almost certainly be detected by TCMs preceding the Venus flyby. It is more
likely that such an error near an encounter would be introduced by an
in-flight software change. No such in-flight software changes are planned
until after the second encounter.
Only during a propulsive maneuver, when the isovalves have been
opened, can a software error cause an anomalous thruster firing. HGA
correction maneuvers will be performed approximately daily. Flight software
code errors which affect the HGA correction maneuver would therefore be
detected early. In spin correction maneuvers9 an anomalous thruster firing
would trip fault protection while imparting only a fraction of a meter per
second at most. The worst situation is an error affecting vector mode
maneuvers and not affecting HGA corrections. If an error caused a burn to
be too big, the burn would be stopped by the backup command which is built
into each burn sequence. However, an error in the burn control algorithm
could cause a lateral burn to be executed in the wrong direction, anywhere in
the plane perpendicular to the axial direction, or the selection of the wrong
thruster, either of which would escape on-board detection.
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Given the level of testing to which the software is subjected, it
is estimated that the probability of discovering in-flight an AACS software
coding error is bounded by 0.I for the eight-year mfssion. In the Voyager
mission to date, no such AACS software errors have been encountered during
execution.
The probability density for error occurrence is taken to be uniform
in time. An error in the critical section of code may or may not affect the
burn results. If the error affects the burn magnitude only, it will not pose
a risk to Earth avoidance because burns too large are stopped by the backup
co,_mand, and burns too small cannot result in an impacting trajectory. If the
error affects the burn arc or thruster selection, a burn of the right
magnitude but in the wrong direction may result. A worst-case assumption is
used, that the software error has a 50% chance of a resultant burn in the
wrong direction. Backup commands will prevent imparting too much velocity,
but the intended velocity magnitude may be delivered in the wrong direction.
The velocity error may be lateral or axial with equal probability.
3.4.1.7 CDS Software Errors. The worst-case consequence of a software
error in this category is one where the CDS sends an erroneous command to the
AACS. To be accepted by the AACS, the command must have a correct checksum.
In the worst case, the command causes the AACS to execute an anomalous burn.
The CDS is designed such that there is no more than a 1% chance of
sending an anomalous command to the AACS during the mission. A 16-bit
checksum is attached to every AACS command in order to prevent such anomalous
commands from affecting the spacecraft. The most likely way for such a
command to be received by AACS is for a valid command to be anomalously
distorted into an AACS command which induces thruster action and for that
command to have the checksum just happen to be correct. It should be noted
that these probabilities only account for an erroneous command being sent by
the CDS, and then being accepted by the AACS, with no allowance for the
further reduction when considering the likelihood that such a co,_mand would
lead to a thruster firing. This factor was not pursued in this analysis,
since the probabilities are already so small. The probability of recovery
from such a failure depends only upon the time available before encounter to
recover. The initial failure does not interfere with recovery.
The total probability of a software error in either the AACS or CDS
that causes a _V between launch and the second Earth encounter is 4.3xi0 -5.
3.4.1.8. Thermal Failures. The Galileo spacecraft is protected from extreme
temperature excursions by multi-layer insulation (MLI), which envelopes
critical subsystems (including the four Retro Propulsion Module (RPM)
propellant tanks), and by mechanical and structural shade devices. The
thermal control systems are designed such that subsystem temperatures will
remain within flight allowable limits as long as the angle made between the
spacecraft's -Z-axis and the Sun remains less than 14 ° . If the spacecraft
loses its sunpoint during the first three years of its mission, the resulting
thermal problems could lead to failures which could cause a _V, either
through inadvertent thruster firings or through an impulse due to RPM tank
rupture.
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Several thermally induced failures were examined, but only two were
determined to be serious enough to analyze in detail. Electronic parts
failures due to high temperatures resulting from off-Sun conditions are shown
to have sufficiently low probabilities of causing AVsas to be of no
concern. RPMtank rupture due to thermally induced overpressure was shownto
be of significant concern; however, the Galileo Project has incorporated
changes to the RPMdesign which will prevent the overpressure conditions that
could lead to a rupture.
As the spacecraft moves through space, its pointing relative to the
Sunmust be continually corrected by the spacecraft attitude control system
since the Sunpoint angle (the angle formed between the spacecraft's -Z-axis
and the Sun) would otherwise change throughout the course of the trajectory
around the Sun. The spacecraft would lose attitude control capability if both
redundant halves of someelement in the commandchain failed. This could
occur in the RFS,MDS,CDS,or AACS. A loss of commandability could cause the
spacecraft to lose its pointing relative to the Sun. If either of these
happened, then the spacecraft pointing relative to the Sunwould begin to
drift. The resulting off-Sun condition would eventually cause the RPMtanks
to be directly exposed to solar heating and the tanks' high temperatures,
without the design changementioned above, would have caused an overpressure
condition, resulting in a rupture and a resultant AV. Recovery
possibilities would have been essentially non-existent due to the loss of
propellant, even if the spacecraft's commandability were restored.
The off-Sun condition would also expose AACSPDEparts to excessive
solar heating, causing them to overheat and fail. This parts failure could
create an erroneous command,causing a large anomalousthrust with a resultant
AV. There could be insufficient capability to recover the spacecraft from
this failure.
It is noted that other electronics parts failures, such as memory
failures, may _eadto an anomalousthrust, but failure in the PDEleads to the
most direct and most likely failure.
Other failures involving an off-Sun condition were considered, but
are not worst case scenarios. For example, thruster valve failure due to
drifting off-Sun is not probable because valves are acceptance tested to
i15oc and are designed to survive to 160°C, but the valves' temperatures
will always be less than or equal to the tanks' temperatures which will never
exceed ll_°C. Another example, stuck thrusters, is not a worst case cause
of drifting off-Sun because although stuck thrusters are caused by a two point
failure and they result in an unpredictable off-Sun condition followed by
orbital drift, they tend to allow for recovery unlike the communication
failure which assumes none.
The probability of this failure leading to a SV has been
determined to be 1.5 x 10 -6 .
3.4.2 Environmental Failures
3.4.2.1 Meteoroid Damage to Propellant Tanks. Although no interplanetary
spacecraft is known to have suffered catastrophic meteoroid damage,
meteoroid-induced failure of a propellant tank poses a potential hazard to the
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Galileo spacecraft. The failure has the potential of expelling several
hundred kilograms of propellant, imparting velocity to the spacecraft, and
enveloping it in a cloud of caustic vapor. The resulting spacecraft damage
makesa recovery maneuverunlikely.
Empirical knowledge of the solar system's meteoroid distribution is
incomplete, especially for meteoroids large enough to harm propellant tanks.
Extensive data exist for large meteoroids (based on lunar and Martian
cratering) and for fine meteoric dust (estimated from zodiacal light
observations), but little is available for intermediate sizes. Since the
meteoroid sizes relevant to spacecraft failures include this intermediate
range, this report must rely on available models which employ interpolations
to predict the likelihood of tank failure. Whereassumptions must be made,
they have been chosen to err conservatively, overestimating rather than
underestimating the risk. A detailed analysis was done of the interaction of
micrometeoroids with fluid-filled tank walls and bumpershields, and howa
micrometeoroid penetration affects a tank. The findings of all of these
studies contributed to the results summarizedhere and described in detail in
the Appendix.
Four spherical titanium tanks carry Galileo's 955 kg propellant
supply. The fuel (monomethylhydrazine) and oxidizer (nitrogen tetroxide)
reside in tank pairs as shown in Figure 3-3. The innermost propellant tank
halves are completely enclosed by solid spacecraft structure; thruster booms
and electronic bays partially surround the outermost tank halves, but
otherwise only their multi-layer insulation (MLI) lies between them and space.
The probabilit_ of a micrometeoroid-induced RPM tank failure
causing a _V is 4.5 x I0 -_. Based on the questionable likelihood of being
able to recover after such extensive damage, the probability of recovery is
assumed to be zero. The manner in which the trajectory is designed to make
the risk of impact as a result of this potential failure mode very small is
described in Section 4.
3.4.2.2 Radiation. Although radiation has been carefully considered for
its effects on mission reliability, it poses a negligible threat to Earth
avoidance. This is due to the fact that the majority of the radiative effects
that will be seen by the spacecraft occur in the vicinity of Jupiter.
Galileo, like Voyager, is radiation hardened to the Jovian environment. The
dose that it will receive by the time of the second Earth encounter is less
than 5_ of the total dose designed for in the entire mission. Earth avoidance
protection from the two principal radiative effects, total dose and single
event upsets, requires only a small fraction of the design margin required to
withstand the Jovian environment. The probability of an anomalous _V
resulting from these two effects is I x 10 -4 . The standard recovery
probabilities are applicable since this failure does not interfere with
continued normal operation of the spacecraft.
3.4.2.3 Spacecraft Charging. Spacecraft charging also does not pose a
significant threat to Earth avoidance. Both surface and internal charging
have been considered. The most likely threat is from internal charging at the
first Earth encounter which may affect the first maneuver after the encounter.
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Spacecraft charging is defined as the buildup of charged particles
and subsequent arcing on external spacecraft surfaces or on (and inside)
internal surfaces. The former process is usually referred to as surface
charging while the latter is termed internal charging. Since each process is
associated with a different charged particle population, the details of the
charging processes are somewhat different. To accommodate this difference,
the two processes and their associated probabilities are treated separately.
Then, since the principle effect of the two, namely, induced electrical
transients, is similar, the final probability for failure due to spacecraft
charging is the sum of the two. Details of the development of this
probability are given in the Appendix. The total probability of a AV
resulting from spacecraft charging is 1.2 x 10 -3 . The standa?d recovery
probability values are applicable.
3.4.3 Ground Induced Errors
3.4.3.1 Command Generation. The sequencing process for generating and
checking commands for the spacecraft is described in Section 2.3. This
section will describe the most probable scenarios for errors to occur in that
process. Command generation errors occur due to the combined failures of
automated software checks and procedural checks (human error).
There are four ways to get an erroneous maneuver command to the
spacecraft:
i) Send an erroneous individual maneuver con_mand, instead of
another command, or instead of no command.
2) Send an erroneous value in any maneuver Profile Activity (PA).
3) Send an erroneous maneuver PA instead of another PA, or
instead of no PA.
4) Send an accurately built maneuver PA that reflects the
Navigation Team's requested maneuver, but the Navigation Team
has internally made an error.
In generating these scenarios, only the case where one erroneous
command is sent, or one erroneous PA is sent is considered. Cases with
multiple errors are considered even less probable. The exception to this is
where Navigation erroneously requests an incorrect maneuver. To cover worst
case situations, each error is assumed to be introduced as late as is possible
in the Uplink Sequence Generation process. The sequence checks are derived
from Galileo Space Fli_ht Operations Plan (625-505, Vol. II, Operating Plans).
3.4.3.2 Uplink Transmission Errors. The failure mode considered here is
where a correctly generated sequence is corrupted during the process of
transmitting it to the spacecraft, and then the spacecraft accepts it as a
valid sequence and initiates thruster firings.
The details of the sequence generation and uplink failure analyses
are co_tained in the Appendix. The total probabilit_ of these failure modes
leading to an erroneous AV are derived to be 5 x I0 -°.
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Spacecraft Failure Probability Summary
Failure Mode
Probability of Failure Occurring
and Causing a AV
Propellant Line or Tank Failure
Stuck Thrusters
Thruster Failure
Memory Failure
Structural Failure
Flight Software Error
Thermal Failure
Micrometeoroid-lnduced Failure
Radiation-lnduced Failure
Charging-lnduced Failure
Command Generation and Transmission Failure
0
0.065
0
7 x 10-5
0
4.3 x 10-5
1.5 x 10 -6
4.5 x 10 -4
i x 10-4
1.2 x 10-3
5 x 10-3
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SECTION 4
NAVIGATION PLAN
4.1 INTRODUCTION
This Section presents the navigation strategy for designing and
implementing the trajectory between launch and the second Earth flyby. The
goal of the navigation strategy is to develop a method for selecting a
sequence of target parameters for each maneuver such that the mission is
successfully targeted to Jupiter while the probability of an inadvertent
reentry into the Earth's atmosphere is made very small and propellant cost is
kept within reasonable bounds. The method will necessarily be adaptive to
changing conditions as the mission is flown. The goal here is to specify a
set of design criteria and rules which will determine the design and flight
profile of the Galileo mission. This strategy takes into account all of the
failures covered in Section 3, as well as other types of failures which could
disable the spacecraft without producing a velocity change. Finally, this
Section also provides an upper bound on the probability of Earth impact as a
result of this strategy.
As it turns out, there are only two failure types which tend to
dominate the design process because of their higher (relative) probability of
occurrence. That is, if the trajectory is modified to safely accommodate
failures from these categories, the other conceivable failure scenarios will
be at least one and, in some cases, several orders of magnitude less
significant. If these failures are accounted for, it will be shown that the
other failures will be covered as well.
Section 4 is divided into three parts. The first part (Sections
4.2 through 4.4) presents the general criteria and techniques that have been
used to design a trajectory which will satisfy Earth avoidance concerns. The
second portion (Section 4.5) is a detailed look at the application of these
methods to each maneuver between launch and the second Earth flyby for a
sample trajectory. Finally, the last part (Section 4.6) contains a summary of
the impact probabilities and an examination of the sensitivities of these
calculations to certain modeling assumptions.
4.2 FAILURE INFLUENCES ON THE TRAJECTORY
To understand the reasons for the various choices made, it is
necessary to categorize the failures and the possible responses that the
Galileo spacecraft system can make in the presence of failures.
At the highest level, there are two types of failure modes that can
result in a trajectory which leads to Earth impact. Each potential failure in
the Galileo spacecraft can be separated into one of these two categories,
based upon whether or not the failure alters the trajectory; that is, is the
failure capable of generating a velocity change (_V)?
The first is a failure which affects the performance of the
spacecraft, while not altering the trajectory. An example of such a failure
might be a loss of uplink capability which results in the inability to command
the spacecraft. It is theoretically possible, although very unlikely, that
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prior to the failure, the spacecraft could be on an impacting trajectory due to
the dispersions which arise from launch injection errors, maneuverexecution
errors, or orbit determination errors. Normally, if the spacecraft were on an
impacting trajectory as the result of these dispersions, corrective actions
would be taken immediately. However, if such a failure were to occur, the per-
formance c_ a corrective maneuvercould be precluded. For purposes of discus-
sion below, any failure which does not cause a AVwill be designated as Type I.
The secondmodeis one in which the spacecraft is on a nominal
non-impacting trajecory and a system failure occurs which imparts an
unexpected &V to the spacecraft. The _V vector could be of sufficient
magnitude and in the necessary direction to cause an Earth impacting
trajectory. Onesuch failure might be the unforeseen opening or closing of a
thruster valve during a maneuver. Another possibility "is the rupturing of a
fuel tank with a _V imparted by the escaping propellant and/or pressurant.
Sucha failure will be referred to as a Type II failure below. Section 3 has
provided a detailed analysis of Type II failures.
A failure which can cause an Earth impacting trajectory can be
further classified according to whether or not recovery is possible. If the
failure does not completely incapacitate the spacecraft, then it maybe
possible to commanda recovery sequence to correct the trajectory and avoid
Earth reentry. Associated with the probabilistic analysis of failures is an
analysis of the probability of recovery, which is factored into the final
impact probabilities.
For the purposes of aimpoint design and impact probability
calculations, each of the failure modesin Section 3 must be further
categorized as to whether the spurious velocity occurs during a maneuver, that
is at a discrete point during the trajectory, or during cruise, where the
probability of occurrence must be integrated over the period of vulnerability
to the failure. Table 4-1 lists each of the failures analyzed in Section 3,
the appropriate trajectory regime (cruise and/or maneuver) where each applies,
and the relative probability of recovery. As will be seen later (Section
4.4), the events which have a low probability of recovery will generally
dominate the impact probability calculations.
V"
Table 4-1. Failures Which Can Cause a AV
Paragraph Description Type P(Recovery)
3.4.1.1 RPM Tank Failure Cruise Low
3.4.1.2 Stuck Thruster (Maneuver) Maneuver High
3.4.1.2 Stuck Thruster (HGA correction) Cruise High
3.4.1.2 Stuck Thruster (Spin correction) Cruise High
3.4.1.3 RPM Thruster Failure Maneuver High
3.4.1.4 AACS Memory Chip Failure Maneuver High
3.4.1.5 Structural Failure Cruise Low
3.4.1.6 AACS Progran_ning Error Maneuver High
3.4.1.7 CDS Software Failure Mnvr./Cruise High
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Table 4-1. Failures Which CanCausea AV (contd)
Paragraph Description Type P(Recovery)
3.4.1.8
3.4.2.1
3.4.2.2
3.4.2.3
3.4.3.1
3.4.3.2
Off-Sun Thermal Failure
Micrometeoroid Impact
Radiation-SEU Effect
Spacecraft Charging
CommandGeneration Process
Uplink CommandErrors
Cruise Low
Cruise Low
Maneuver High
Maneuver High
Mnvr./Cruise High
Cruise High
4.3 EARTHIMPACTANDPROBABILITIES
The trajectories from launch to Jupiter are developed using highly
accu;ate double precision numerical integration with an N-body model of the
solar system, as well as detailed models for solar pressure and the
gravitational fields of the planets. For perturbations of these trajectories
by velocities resulting from the types of failures listed above, two body
conic elements are used to describe the encounter conditions and linear
perturbation techniques with K-matrices used to relate changes in the
encounter conditions to position and velocity along the trajectory. The
K-matrices are generated using a fully integrated trajectory with the same
models used to generate the design trajectories.
The osculating hyperbolic orbit at the time of closest approach to
the target body defines a coordinate system knownas the B-plane (Figure 4-1).
The point where the extended V_ vector intersects this plane is knownas
the impact parameter or b-vector. All of the flyby targets' encounter
parameters will be expressed in this coordinate system. Typically the
b-vector is written as an ordered pair of its projections onto the R and T
axes; b = (b-R, b.T).
Associated with any hyperbolic flyby, there is a minimumdistance
in the B-plane knownas the impact radius (Figure 4-2), such that if the
impact parameter lies within that distance, impact with the target body will
occur. This radius, BIR given by Equation (4-i), dependsonly upon the
planet's gravitational constant _, radius r0, and the V_ of the
trajectory.
BIR = r012_ 2 + I] 1/2
[r0v_ j
(4-l)
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For the purposes of this report, an extra i00 km has been added
onto the Earth's radius as a conservative upper limit of the extent of the
Earth's atmosphere where capture could occur. Thus, an Earth impacting
trajectory is'defined as any trajectory which has a radius of closest approach
less than 6478 (6378 + i00) km. Effects which would tend to lower this limit,
such as density models of the atmosphere and atmospheric skipping, have not
been modeled. Without these factors included, the model is more conservative
and simpler. Table 4-2 lists the impact radii and other parameters for the
Earth flybys for an October 9, 1989 launch date. For this launch date, the
flyby altitudes for EGAI and EGA2 are as low as they will be during the entire
1989 launch period.
Table 4-2. Earth Flyby Parameters
Earth i Earth 2
Altitude 970 km 303 km
V_ 8.99 km/s 8.88 km/s
b 11248 km 10593 km
BI R 10290 km 10367 km
4.3.1 Calculation of Type I Impact Probabilities
During the course of the mission, the exact conditions of the
currently targeted flyby conditions at the Earth encounters will not be
precisely known. This is the inevitable result of uncertainties in the orbit
determination process, as well as variations in the performance of the
propulsion system. At any particular point in the mission, say after the
completion of a maneuver, the uncertainty in the the Earth encounter
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conditions are modeledby a Gaussiandistribution and can be graphically
represented in the B-plane by a target (mean) and a dispersion (covariance)
ellipse (Figure 4-3). Let b0 denote the meantarget and let E denote the
covariance matrix. As indicated in Figure 4-3, the only dispersed points
which result in an impacting trajectory are those which intersect the impact
circle, a circle of radius BIR centered at the origin. Thus, conditional
upon there being no further corrective maneuvers, the probability of being on
an impacting trajectory, Pi, given this mean aimpoint and dispersion, is
just the integral of the Gaussian density over the impact circle [Equation
(4-2)]. Numerical techniques have been developed to accurately evaluate these
values.
IMPACTING
TRAJECTORIES
V
Figure &-3. B-Plane Projections of Target, Impact Circle, and
Sample Dispersion Ellipse
Pi =
2_,1_-I 1/2 Ibl!BiR
(4-2)
Suppose that the probability for a failure which precludes further
maneuvers occurring during a particular time period (say until the next
maneuver) is pf and that the probability of recovering from this failure is
Pr" Then, the total impact probability for this failure, assuming that
there are no maneuvers in this period, will be
P(Impact) = pipf (I - pr ) (4-3)
where Pi is given in Equation (4-2). Equation (4-3) indicates that the
probability of Earth impact from a Type I failure is simply the probability of
being originally being on a impacting trajectory (Equation 4-2) times the
probability of a failure occurring which would not allow a maneuver to correct
the trajectory.
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_.3.2 Calculation of Type II Impact Probabilities
For each failure category in Section 3, the analysts have provided
a probability of that failure occurring, as well as the density function for
the possible &V which could arise from that failure. Suppose that the
current target of the spacecraft is b and that a spurious velocity v has
occurred. Then, an impacting trajectory will result if and only if
Ilb + Kvll < BIR
where K is the 2x3 K-matrix mapping velocity into the B-plane for the epoch of
the impulsive velocity v (Figure 4-4).
Figure 4-4. A Velocity Error v, Which Causes an Impacting Trajectory
If the spurious velocities are distributed according to the
probability density function _(v), which is nonzero only on a region S in
velocity space, then the probability of impact given that the velocity has
occurred and that the spacecraft is currently targeted to b is given by
Pi(b) = (b+Kv)_ (v)dv (4-4)
S
where
X(b+Kv) =I I if [[b+Kvll0 otherwise.
< B IR
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Taking into account the fact that the current target b of the
spacecraft is itself a statistical quantity with mean b 0 and covariance
gives the total probability of impact given that the specified failure has
occurred.
Pi -
2_/_1112 Pi(b)exp - (b-b 0) Tz-l(b-b0) db
(_-5)
If the probability of a particular failure occurring, again denoted
by pf, and the recovery probability Pr are factored in, the probability of
impact from this failure is also expressed by Equation (4-3). In this case,
the probability of Earth impact from a Type 11 failure is simply the prob-
ability of the failure resulting in an impacting trajectory (Equation (4-5))
times the probability of a failure occurring which would not allow a maneuver
to correct the trajectory. Note that, depending on the complexity of the
evaluation of _, the evaluation of Equation (4-5) can be a five-dimensional
integral (three components of velocity and two components in the B-plane).
Techniques for accurate evaluation of Equation (4-5) have been developed.
r,
4.4 PROTECTING AGAINST SPACECRAFT FAILURES
There are two distinct ways that failures can be accommodated so
that the probability of Earth impact is reduced to an acceptable level. The
first is to modify the spacecraft components which have been identified as
most likely to contribute to a failure resulting in an Earth impacting
trajectory. For example, the spacecraft propellant tanks have been fitted
with pressure relief valves which will dissipate the propellant in a
controlled fashion should the tanks overheat. This modification makes the
probability of this failure causing Earth impact effectively zero. In some
cases, it is not possible or practical to modify the spacecraft. The only
remaining option is to modify the trajectory.
A simple technique for modifying the trajectory would be to raise
the altitude of the Earth flybys. The idea is that presumably there is an
inverse relationship between the altitude of the Earth flyby and the
probability of reentry. By increasing the altitude sufficiently, reentry
should become more and more unlikely. Unfortunately, the relationship between
flyby altitude and probability of reentry is fairly weak in light of the
spacecraft failures which are most likely to cause reentry. Thus, it would be
necessary to shift the altitudes of the Earth flybys by several thousand
kilometers. With these alterations, the mission would not be possible. The
spacecraft cannot carry enough propellant to make up for the energy shortfall
from raising the Earth flyby altitudes.
Another technique is to design the trajectory as optimally as
possible within the given constraints on minimum flyby altitude, then modify
the way it is flown. This process has been used in past JPL interplanetary
missions for planetary protectionstemming from biological contamination
concerns. The idea is that rather than aim directly at the final target
altitude for each Earth flyby, the spacecraft will sequentially move into the
final altitude at discrete time periods in the mission. The final target
parameters as specified in the design will be achieved but in sequential
4-8
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fashion. The increments in target altitude and time will be determined in
such a way that if there is a spacecraft failure during a particular time
period, the probability of this failure causing reentry will be minimized and
in many cases eliminated altogether. This will achieve the goal of making the
impact probability very small in a propellant-efficient manner.
4.4.1 Ground Rules
In the design approach for Earth avoidance, it has been productive
to impose several overall restrictions upon the aimpoint selections and
maneuver strategies, the first of which is:
l) At no point during the mission between injection and EGA2
will the probability of being on an Earth impacting
trajectory followin_ the successful completion of a maneuver
be greater than i0 -°.
The figure of 10 -6 was selected as a value that was feasible to
achieve in terms of additional propellant consumption, and at .the same time
small enough to eliminate all concern for Type I failures.
Needless to say, if the spacecraft were to end up on an impacting
trajectory due to navigation dispersions associated with the successful
completion of a maneuver, the Navigation and Orbiter Engineering teams would
design and implement a corrective maneuver as quickly as was operationally
feasible and safe.
As indicated below, this rule will need to be applied in the few
instances where navigation dispersions are relatively high, suc_ as when low
dispersions at a previous flyby are amplified by the flyby or there is a large
maneuver with correspondingly larger dispersions. What this rule (together
with Rule 2 below) accomplishes is to remove all concern about any Type I
failure. Because of the spacecraft's high fault tolerance and a conservative
estimate of the probability of failure to recover of at most 5 x 10 -3 over
the time interval where maneuvers are performed from Section 3.2.4, this
guarantees an impact probability from Type I failures of less than 5 x 10 -9 •
2) If, during the course of performing a maneuver, the maneuver
were to inadvertently terminate, the probability of an Earth
impacting trajectory resulting will no greater than 10 -6 .
Rule 2 is an adjunct to the first rule in the sense that it
requires that not only are the final target parameters for each maneuver
constrained by the 10 -6 level, but also the path which the maneuver traces
from initial to final aimpoint in the B-plane. Notice that in particular rule
2 implies that at no point during the course of a maneuver will the path from
the initial point to the desired target cross the impact circle. This insures
that if a maneuver fails to complete, there will be no possibility of an Earth
impacting trajectory.
3) The minimum perigee altitude that the spacecraft shall be
targeted to prior to 25 days before an Earth encounter shall
be 3000 km for EGAI and 2000 km for EGA2.
_-9
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Rule 3 is a protection from Type II failures. By targeting to the
higher altitudes until the final 25 days, a larger spurious velocity increment
must be realized in order to cause an impacting trajectory. In particular, if
there is an unexpected overburn during a maneuver, there is much less
probability of this resulting in an impacting trajectory when targeted to the
higher altitudes. During the final 25 days, when Galileo will be targeted to
the final target altitude, a larger spurious velocity would be necessary to
cause an impacting trajectory anyway. This is due to the fact that the
velocity required to cause an impacting trajectory is inversely proportional
to the time from encounter. The difference in the rule for the two flybys
accounts for the fact that the spacecraft system integrity and performance
will be better understood by EGA2 as well as accon_nodating the lower EGA2
target altitude.
4.4.2 Failure Categories and Their Influence on Aimpoint Selection
Following is a list of the failure types and their effect upon the
aimpoint selection process. As shown below, there are really only three types
that have directly affected the process. These are. navigation dispersions,
stuck thrusters, and micrometeoroid impact. Once these failures have been
accommodated by the aimpoint selection process, the other failures are also
covered.
4.4.2.1 Navigation Dispersions. Type 1 failures are accommodated by the
first ground rule. The first ground rule is a strict requirement on several
of the maneuver aimpoints, as well as the flyby conditions for Venus, EGAI,
and the asteroid encounter between EGAI and EGA2. The situation for the Venus
flyby is illustrated in Figures 4-5 and 4-6.
In some cases, the optimal trajectory between Venus and EGAI is
ballistic (i.e., there is no substantial trajectory altering maneuver between
the two encounters). If the trajectory were ballistic between Venus and Earth
I, then nominal delivery at Venus would result in a mean impact parameter at
Earth i of at most a few thousand kilometers away from the impact circle. If
the dispersions about Venus are mapped to Earth and centered around this
point, as in Figure 4-5, the probability of an impacting trajectory resulting
is 2 x 10 -2 . This is unacceptably high and precludes the use of a ballistic
trajectory. The post-Venus aimpoint must be coerced outside of a region
around Earth I. Figure 4-6 illustrates the region this constraint implies.
The elliptically shaped region represents a I x 10 -6 equiprobability
contour. If the post-Venus aimpoint lies inside the region, then, with the
navigational dispersions at Venus, there can be an Earth impacting trajectory
with a probability greater than i x 10 -6 . By the first ground rule, the
post-Venus aimpoint is to be outside this region. Given this constraint, the
optimal aimpoint placement is as indicated.
Exactly the same criterion must be applied to the first Earth flyby
and to the asteroid flyby. Given nominal delivery to the encounter, the
probability of an Earth impacting trajectory must be less than I x 10 -6 .
4.4.2.2 RPM Tank Failure. As indicated in Section 3.4.1.1, this is not
considered a credible failure mode unless there are environmental effects and
is covered below under micrometeoroids and thermal failures.
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L_ 330,000 kilometers
_EARTH1
1G Dispersion Ellipse
Figure 4-5. Post-Venus Dispersions About Optimal Earth 1 Target
New Aimpoint
750000 Kilometers D-.._
Earth 1
Figure 4-6. Equiprobability Contour of I x 10-6
4.4.2.3 Stuck Thrusters. A stuck thruster on the Galileo spacecraft can
cause a &V to occur in either the wrong direction or with the wrong
magnitude. Wherever possible, the targets have been designed so that a
maneuver of less than or equal to the correct magnitude and in any direction
will never lead to an impacting trajectory. Referring to Figure 4-7, the
maneuver is designed to go from b0 to bI. The achievable aimpoints from
b0 by a maneuver of less than or equal to the correct magnitude and in any
direction are indicated by the ellipse. As indicated, the impact circle
cannot be reached by such an erroneous maneuver.
In the case of too large a &V, a majority of these cases will be
covered by ground rule 3, which protects from an overburn. Thus, a large
percentage of the possible thruster faults can be eliminated as causing any
risk of impact by the design.
An additional aspect of some of the thruster faults is that they
cause a &V in a very particular direction. For instance, a stuck thruster
during a spin correction or HGA correction can only cause a small AV along
the spacecraft's Z-axis. For a large portion of the trajectory, the AV is
neither large enough nor in the right direction to ever cause an impacting
trajectory.
Of those remaining failures which can cause an Earth impacting
trajectory, there is a very high probability of recovery which makes these
failures of secondary concern.
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Figure 4-7. Achievable Targets From a Maneuver Which
Burns Short in Any Direction
4.4.2.4 RPM Thruster Failure. A thermally induced failure of an RPM
thruster can cause at most 0.04 m/s of AV. Given the biasing strategy
chosen to follow the ground rules, this amount can never cause an impacting
trajectory. Thus no special measures need be taken for this failure mode.
4.4.2.5 AACS Memory Chip Failure. The result of an AACS chip failure is
analogous to the stuck thrusters mentioned above in that the result is a _V
from a maneuver that was not in the expected direction and/or of the correct
magnitude. The same measures that were taken to account for stuck thrusters
also apply to the AACS memory chip failure scenario. Additionally, there is a
very high probability of recovery from an AACS memory chip failure.
4.4.2.6 Structural Failure. As indicated in Section 3.4.1.5, there is no
credible structural failure which could cause a AV which would lead to an
Earth impacting trajectory.
4.4.2.7 AACS Software Errors. Same comments as Sections 4.4.2.3 and 4.4.2.5.
4.4.2.8 CDS Software Errors. Same comments as Sections 4.4.2.3 and 4.4.2.5.
4.4.2.9 Offsun Thermal Failure. The possibility of this failure has
prompted the Galileo Project to fit the propulsion system tanks with pressure
relief valves which will vent the tank contents (until nominal pressure has
been achieved) in a controlled fashion with no net _V in the event of over-
pressurization from thermal (or any other) causes. This practically
eliminated the probability of an impacting trajectory due to this failure and,
consequently, it was not necessary for it to influence the aimpoint biasing
strategy.
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4.4.2.9 Micrometeoroid Impact. Based on the analysis in Section 3, impact
with interplanetary material (micrometeoroids) is the most serious problem
that the Galileo spacecraft faces with regard to Earth impact. The difficulty
is that if a collision occurs with sufficient energy to rupture a propellant
tank, there is a significant possibility of a AV resulting with no reliable
recovery mechanism. As a result, this particular failure dominates the impact
probability numbers, as well as the navigation strategy. As discussed in
Section 3.4.2.1, the micrometeoroid models have been divided into three
categories: cometary meteoroids, asteroidal meteoroids, and near-Earth debris.
Regardless of the source of the impacting material, the resulting
&V is statistically characterized by the same two densities depending upon
whether or not there is one or more damaged tanks (Figure 4-8). In the case
of a single tank failure, the maximum AV is 3.2 m/s while in the case of a
multiple tank failure, the density is log normal with 90% of the AV expected
to be less than 3.8 m/s (Section A.2.1).
The most probable spacecraft failure due to the three sources of
impacting material occurs in the asteroid zone. The asteroidal material is
distributed entirely within the asteroid region through which the spacecraft
passes between 1.8 and 2.7 years mission elapsed time (MET). The probability
of being struck by an asteroidal component large enough to cause tank rupture
is &.5 x 10 -4 . Even if only 1% of the velocities resulting from this type
of impact could lead to an impacting trajectory, there would still be a 4.5 x
10 -6 probability of impact from this source alone. This is unacceptably
high and measures have been taken to reduce it. The solution is to design the
Earth i to Earth 2 trajectory to not be susceptible to this failure. Since
micrometeoroid impacts can cause in the vicinity of 3 m/s of &V, the idea is
to make sure that while the spacecraft is in the asteroid region, the targeted
Earth 2 aimpoint will be outside of a 3 m/s vulnerability region. Figure 4-9
illustrates this constraint region. At all times that the spacecraft is in
the asteroid region, the Earth 2 targeted aimpoint must be outside the region.
The cometary material is assumed to be uniformly distributed in the
regions of the solar system between launch and EGA2. The models in Section
3.4.2.1 predict a 9.1 x 10 -6 probability of failure of the RPM tanks by the
time of EGA2 which is 7.8 x 10 -9 per day. After accommodating the
asteroidal micrometeoroids as above and targeting according to the third
ground rule, the total contribution to the probability of Earth impact from
the deep space material (cometary and asteroidal micrometeoroids) will be on
the order of 4 x 10 -7 using the upper bound models developed here.
As far as Earth avoidance is concerned, there is no danger from
near-Earth debris. Referring to Figure A-15, near-Earth debris is only
present during the final 15 minutes before the flyby. As shown in Figure
4-10, by the time the Galileo spacecraft is within this range the &V
required to achieve impact is well over I00 m/s which is well beyond the
capability of any possible failure mode involving collision with debris.
4.4.2.10 Radiation-SEU Effects. The effect of this failure is identical to
an AACS memory chip failure.
.L
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4.&.2.11 Spacecraft Char_ing. This failure can only affect the first TCM
after Earth 1 and can only cause a lateral burn in the wrong direction. At
this point in the mission, the spacecraft is targeted approximately I x i06
km from Earth and there is virtually no possibility of an erroneous burn
causing an impacting trajectory. Taking the very worst case of 50% of the
spurious &Vs causin_ an impacting trajectory would lead to a probability of
impact of 1.2 x i0 -_.
4.&.2.12 Command Generation Process. With all failures of this type, there
is a very high probability of recovery since there are no spacecraft hardware
failures to hinder recovery procedures. This, combined with the internal and
external checks in the command generation process system makes the probability
of such an event extremely remote. A very conservative upper bound on the
probability of impact from this failure is 1.3 x 10 -7 .
4.4.2.13 Uplink Command Errors. As indicated in Section A.3.2, the
probability of such an event is less than 1 x 10 -17 and is not considered.
_.5 A PARTICULAR CASE: THE OCTOBER 9, 1989 LAUNCH
Clearly the precise implementation of the considerations and
criteria listed above will depend upon the particular trajectory which in turn
depends upon launch date and other criteria. Additionally, the Earth
avoidance strategy must be adaptive to slight changes in the spacecraft
trajectory due to nominal dispersions. Thus the target parameters presented
here will necessarily be representative and not final. The final aimpoint
determination will be done in flight in response to trajectory variations.
However, all groundrules will be followed and thus the total impact
probability as presented below will not change.
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The 1989 launch period for Galileo extends from October 9 to
November24. During this period there are actually three distinct types of
trajectories to Jupiter. During the initial portion, it is possible to design
a trajectory which encounters two asteroids; Gaspra between the first and
second Earth flybys, and Ida between Earth 2 and Jupiter (Figure 2.1-2).
Later in the launch period, decreasing propellant margins require the removal
of the Ida encounter and leave Gaspra. Even later in the period, and for the
same reasons, the flyby with Gaspra is replaced with asteroid 1938SDI, also
between Earth I and Earth 2.
For this study, the trajectory corresponding to a launch date of
October 9, 1989 will be used. This is a representative trajectory and is also
the most stressful in terms of Earth avoidance requirements. The design
values for both the Earth flyby altitudes are as low as they ever become
throughout the 1989 launch opportunity and there are additional
characteristics, such as the Venus to Earth i trajectory characteristics
(covered below), which qualify the October 9 trajectory as the most demanding
in influencing the biasing strategy. The Earth avoidance strategy designed
for this trajectory will produce an equal or lesser probability of inadvertent
reentry for any other trajectory during the 1989 launch opportunity.
4.5.1 Trajectory Description
The major trajectory events for the October 9 launch opportunity are
summarized in Table &-3.
Table 4-3. Launch to Earth 2 Events for October 9, 1989 Launch
Date Event
October 9, 1989
February 12, 1990
December 8, 1990
October 29, 1991
December 8, 1992
Launch
C 3 17.7 km2/s 2
Venus Flyby
Altitude 13896 km
First Earth Flyby
Altitude 970 km
V_ 8.99 kmls
Flyby Velocity 13.8 km/s
Gaspra Encounter
Second Earth Flyby
Altitude 303 km
V® 8.88 km/s
Flyby Velocity 14.i km/s
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4.5.2 ManeuverProfile
Themaneuverprofile for the the October 9, 1989 launch has been
designed to ensure accurate delivery at each encounter with the most efficient
use of propellant and operational simplicity, while insuring that the
probability of Earth impact is madevery small. Table 4-4 summarizesthe
maneuverprofile and the main function of each maneuver.
Table 4-4. ManeuverProfile
Maneuver Epoch (days) Description
TCMI Launch+ 21
TCM2 Launch+ 50
TCM3 Venus- I0
TCM4 Venus+ 90
TCM5 Venus+ ii0
TCM6 Earth - 60
TCM7 Earth - 25
TCM8 Earth - i0
TCM9 Earth + 7
TCMI0 Earth + 71
TCMII Gaspra - 20
TCMI2 Gaspra - 5
TCMI3 Gaspra+ 281
TCMI& Earth - 60
TCMI5 Earth - 25
TCMI6 Earth - I0
Clean up IUS dispersions and removelaunch bias
Clean up TCMIdispersions and removemost of TCMI's
bias
Removelast of bias at Venus
Clean up Venusdelivery and target to first biased
aimpoint at Earth 1
Clean up for TCM4and moveaimpoint closer to Earth
Moveaimpoint closer to Earth
Target to desired flyby conditions at Earth i
Final targeting maneuverto removelast dispersions
at Earth i
Clean up dispersions resulting from Earth i flyby
Deepspace maneuvertargeting to Gaspra
Target to Gasprausing optical data
Final targeting maneuverto Gaspra using optical data
Post-Gaspra deep space maneuvertargeting to first
biased aimpoint at Earth 2
Moveaimpoint closer to Earth
Target to desired flyby conditions at Earth 2
Final targeting maneuverto removelast dispersions
at Earth 2
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4.5.3 Parameters for Statistical Analysis
For the probabilistic analysis below, the representative values of
the parameters describing the behavior of the propulsion system and the orbit
determination process have been used. These are conservative estimates of
expected performance based on specifications of the hardware and engineering
analysis. Any deviations from this expected performance have been covered in
the failure analysis of Section 3.
4.5.4 Detailed Description of Earth Avoidance Strategy
4.5.4.1 Launch to Venus. There are two principle reasons why there is no
concern for a spurious _V causing an Earth impacting trajectory during this
phase of the mission. The first is that it requires an extremely accurate
delivery at Venus for the gravitational energy augmentation to alter the
trajectory in the precise amount needed to effect the next Earth encounter.
Without any biasing whatsoever, the probability of a spurious AV
accomplishing this is on the order of i0 -I0. The second reason is that the
trajectory is to be biased to satisfy the first ground rule regarding normal
maneuver dispersions. The result of this biasing further reduces probability
of a Type 11 failure causing impact.
&.5.&.l.l Injection. As mentioned in the introduction to this report, IUS
malfunctions which would lead to reentry at less than Earth escape velocity
are not covered in this report. These cases are treated in the Galileo Final
Safety Analysis Report by the Department of Energy. There are no Earth
avoidance implications if the Galileo spacecraft were to fail during the
launch phase of the mission. For reasons of operational simplicity,
propellant savings, and reduced cycling of the RPM PIA thruster; the decision
has been made to build in a 17 m/s bias along the Sun-line into the injection
target. That is, if the IUS performs perfectly, the spacecraft will still
have to perform a 17 m/s burn at TCMI to achieve the proper Venus target
(Figure 4-11). While this complicates the launch vehicle targeting design, it
actually simplifies concerns about Earth avoidance. In particular, this bias
removes all worry about the IUS performing nominally and launching an inert
Galileo spacecraft due to some failure during the launch phase. The 17 m/s
bias at TCMI translates into some 200,000 km in the Venus B-plane, which would
cause the spacecraft to miss the Earth by many tens of millions of kilometers.
There is no possibility of reentry in this case.
Venus
Final
Venus
Target
Figure 4-11. IUS Target Bias
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4.5.4.1.2 Launch + 21 Days (TCMI). The impetus for biasing the TCMI aimpoint
is a Type I failure. The target at Venus must ensure that the dispersions at
Venus mapped to Earth do not overlap the Earth's impact circle with a greater
than i x 10 -6 probability. If TCMI targets directly to the design value for
the Venus aimpoint, then the dispersions mapped to Earth yield an a priori
probability of a post-maneuver impacting trajectory of 3 x 10 -5 , well above
the ground rule value of i x 10 -6 It is necessary to bias the aimpoint at
Venus to reduce this probability. Two thousand kilometers in the Venus
B-plane is more than sufficient. This bias is chosen to lie along the Earth
negative b-T gradient direction (Figure 4-12). The result is that the Earth
aimpoint will be shifted over 21 million kilometers, primarily in the negative
b-T direction. This will reduce the probability of navigation dispersions
resulting in an impacting trajectory to an insignificant amount (i x 10-22).
TCM1
AIMPOINT
TCM2AIMPOINT
D
TARGET
Figure 4-12. Biases of TCMI and TCM2
4.5.4.1.3 Launch + 50 Days (TCM2). Exactly the same criterion that applied
to TCMI applies to TCM2. The only difference is that now the dispersions
mapped from Venus to Earth are much smaller. This results from smaller orbit
determination errors, but is primarily based on the fact that TCM2 is a very
small clean up maneuver for TCMI and, thus, has much smaller execution
errors. However, there still must be a bias in the aimpoint. If there were
no bias, the probability of achieving an impacting trajectory would be 2 x
10 -5 . A sufficient bias to keep out of the i x 10 -6 zone is I00
kilometers. With this bias, the probability is 2 x i0 -II.
4.5.&.I.4 Venus - i0 Days (TCM3). TCM3 is the final targeting maneuver
before Venus. The maneuver removes the last of the bias left by TCM2 as well
as any execution and orbit determination errors. With the built-in bias at
Earth i, the probability of an impacting trajectory resulting from navigation
dispersions is 3 x I0 -I0.
4.5.4.2 Venus to EGAI. As mentioned in Section 4.5.4.1, the Venus aimpoint
is chosen so that the post-Venus trajectory to Earth will be targeted at a
sufficiently large distance to satisfy the i x 10 -6 navigation dispersions
criterion (Rule I) (Figure 4-13).
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Figure 4-13. Post-Venus and Final Earth 1 Aimpoints
For this trajectory, this amounts to over 700,000 km in the
B-plane. To accurately arrive at the proper aimpoint for the Earth flyby and
reduce Earth impact probabilities, there are five maneuvers. The first two
are a large DSM and clean up which do most of the targeting to the final
aimpoint. The next two sequentially step to the final aimpoint while
satisfying the third ground rule. The final maneuver is to remove, as much as
possible, the dispersions at Earth i. The target aimpoint for Earth i is b =
(-6648, -9073) which is equivalent to an altitude of 970 km. The aimpoints
for each maneuver are illustrated in Figure 4-14.
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Figure 4-14. Earth i Aimpoints
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4.5.4.2.1 Venus + 90 Days (TCM4). TCM4 does most of the work in removing the
post-Venus bias. For this trajectory, the size of this maneuver is about
12m/s and is scheduled at 90 days after the Venus encounter. The strategy for
this maneuver will be to target to the edge of the i x 10 -6 contour while
setting up the direction for the sequence of small maneuvers which move to the
final aimpoint. The aimpoints for this and subsequent maneuvers are
summarized in Table 4-5 below.
4.5.4.2.2 Venus + ii0 day Maneuver (TCM5)
Earth i - 60 day Maneuver (TCM6)
Earth i - 25 day Maneuver (TCM7).
The goal of these three maneuvers is to move in radially to the final
aimpoint. The targets for each of the maneuvers are su_=narized in Table 4-5.
4.5.4.2.3 Earth 1 - i0 day Maneuver (TCMS). TCM8 is a very small clean up
maneuver to remove the last of the dispersions from TCM7 to ensure as accurate
a delivery to Earth as possible.
4.5.4.2.4 Aimpoint Summary. Table 4-5 presents the actual aimpoints in the
Earth B-plane. Figure 4-15 indicates the target altitude as a function of time
before the Earth i encounter.
4.5.4.3 Earth i to Gaspra. There are four maneuvers planned between EGAI
and Gaspra. The first is a clean up maneuver to remove the dispersions from
the Earth flyby. The second is a fairly large (8 m/s) targeting maneuver to
aim at Gaspra. The final two are small TCMs which make use of optical data to
accurately target to the final Gaspra aimpoint. It is not necessary to bias
these maneuvers for the purposes of Earth avoidance. Because the trajectory is
designed to accommodate impacts from asteroidal micrometeoroids (Section
4.4.2.8), any concern for Type I failures is also automatically removed.
Table 4-5. Earth i Aimpoints
Mnvr. b-R b.T b Altitude
Post Venus -13974 -706387 706525 695230
TCM4 -12000 -15000 19209 8521
TCM5 -10018 -13673 16950 63_2
TCM6 -8179 -11164 13839 3381
TCM7 -6648 -9073 11248 970
TCM8 -6648 -9073 11248 970
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After a nominal first Earth flyby, the spacecraft will be targeted
over a million kilometers away from Earth 2. This, combined with the
orientation of the dispersion in the Earth 2 B-plane, makes it unnecessary to
make any special provisions for navigation dispersions. After the 8 m/s DSM,
the Earth 2 aimpoint is still several tens of thousands of kilometers removed
from the impact circle and Type I failures do not enter into the biasing
strategy.
4.5.4.4 Gaspra to Earth 2. After the Gaspra flyby the spacecraft is
targeted via a similar series of maneuvers, to an aimpoint as illustrated in
Figure 4-16. The final aimpoint is slightly over 300 km in altitude.
There will be five maneuvers between Gaspra and Earth 2. The first
will be a clean-up maneuver which will target to the nominal post-Gaspra
aimpoint. The spacecraft will remain targeted to this point until such time
as the danger of being struck by an asteroidal micrometeoroid has passed. For
this trajectory, this occurs 125 days before EGA 2. At this point, the first
of four maneuvers targeting to the final Earth 2 aimpoint begins. The final
aimpoint is b = (1079, -10537), which corresponds to an altitude of 303
kilometers. The sequence of aimpoints is illustrated in Figure 4-17.
4.5.4.4.1 Earth 2 - 125 da 7 Maneuver (TCMI4). This maneuver will do the
major portion of the work in moving from the post-Gaspra aimpoint to the final
Earth aimpoint. Its nominal size is about 24 m/s. As with TCM4, it will
target to the outside of the I x 10 -6 ellipse while setting up the direction
for the final biasing TCMs.
_Tj
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Post Gaspra
Aimpoint
Figure 4-16. Post-Gaspra and Final Earth 2 Aimpoints
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Figure &-17. Earth 2 Aimpoints
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4.5.4.4.2 Earth 2 - 60 day Maneuver (TCM 15)
Earth 2 - 25 day Maneuver (TCM 16).
The goal of these two maneuvers is to move in radially to the final
aimpoint. The targets for each of the maneuvers are summarized in Table 4-6.
4.5.4.4.3 Earth 1 - i0 day Maneuver (TCM 17). TCMI7 is a very small clean up
maneuver to remove the last of the dispersions from TCMI6 to ensure as
accurate a delivery to Earth as possible.
4.5.4.4.4 Aimpoint Summary. Table 4-6 presents the actual aimpoints in the
Earth B-plane and Figure 4-18 indicates the target altitude as a function of
time before the Earth 2 encounter.
Table 4-6. Earth 2 Aimpoints
Maneuver b.R b-T b Altitude
Post-Gaspra -20544 -59690 63126 51895
TCMI4 1079 -16267 16304 5636
TCMI5 1079 -13157 13202 2703
TCMI6 1079 -10537 10592 303
TCMI7 1079 -10537 10592 303
106
_J
,-4
<
105
104
103
102
-200 -180 -160 -140 -120 -I00 -80
Days Before Earth2
-60 -40
I i
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Figure 4-18. Earth 2 Targeted Altitude
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4.5.5 Earth Impact Probability: Consequencesof Earth Avoidance Strategy
By using the contents of Section 3.4 and the Appendix, which relate
the probability of the various failure scenarios and their expected effects
upon the spacecraft's trajectory together with the formulae above expressing
the impact probabilities as a function of these parameters, it is possible to
computea bound for the total probability of Earth impact.
Table &-7 contains a breakdownof the probabilities for each
failure category as computedfor the aimpoint design strategy above. It
should be noted that in somecases, to relieve the computational burden,
conservative techniques were used to estimate these probabilities. Thus, in
all cases, these probabilities represent an upper bound on the probability of
impact given the failure models presented above and in Section 3. The bottom
line is that a best estimate upper boundon the probability of the Galileo
spacecraft impacting the Earth is 5 x 10-7 •
Table &-7. Probability of Impact Summary
Paragraph Description P (Impact)Earth 1 Earth 2
3.4.1.1 RPMTank Failure 0.0" 0.0
3.&.i.2 Stuck Thruster (Maneuver) 9.2 x i0 -II 4.4 x 10-9
3.4.1.2 Stuck Thruster (HGAcorrect) 1.4 x 10-9 0.0
3.4.1.2 Stuck Thruster (Spin correct) 3.6 x I0-I0 0.0
3.4.1.3 RPMThruster Failure 0.0 0.0
3.4.1.4 AACSMemoryChip Failure 1.3 x 10-12 4.3 x I0-II
3.4.1.5 Structural Failure 0.0 0.0
3.4.1.6 AACSProgrammingError I.I x 10-12 3.7 x I0-II
3.4.1.7 CDSSoftware Failure 3.3 x i0 -II 2.8 x I0-II
3.4.1.8 Offsun Thermal Failure (Rupture) 3.2 x 10-10 2_i x 10-9
3.4.1.8 Offsun Thermal Failure (Parts) 3.6 x l0 -I0 3.6 x I0-I0
3.4.2.1 Micrometeoroid Impact 1.8 x 10-7 1.9 x 10-7
3.4.2.2 Radiation-SEU Effects 1.9 x 10-12 1.9 x I0-I0
3.4.2.3 Spacecraft Charging 0.0 1.2 x 10-9
3.4.3.1 CommandGeneration Process 6.0 x 10-8 7.0 x 10-8
3.4.3.2 Uplink CommandErrors 0.0 0.0
Totals 2._ x 10-7 2.7 x 10-7
Total Probability of Impact 5 x 10-7
4.6 SENSITIVITIES
Clearly the results of the previous section dependon a numberof
modeling assumptions and it is of interest to determine the sensitivity of the
final probability of impact to these assumptions. Figure &-19 graphically
presents the data in Table 4-7. The dominant factor in the Earth impact
probability is the effect of micrometeoroid impacts. As stated in Section
3.1, all of the estimates of failure probabilities are extremely conservative.
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In the case of the micrometeoroids, this conservatism is compoundedby the use
of the Galileo model for cometary micrometeoroids as opposed to the NASAmodel
and by the inclusion of the model for asteroidal micrometeoroids. If the NASA
model were used instead, the probability of impact contribution from
micrometeoroids is reduced by a factor of three. This would yield a total
probability of impact of 2.7 x 10-7 .
The next most dominant effects are the commandgeneration process
and the stuck thrusters. There is a great deal of conservatism in the
estimation of errors in the commandgeneration process and as mentioned in
Section 3.4.1.2, the analysis of stuck thrusters does not take into account
the addition of the _DE annex which significantly reduces the probability of
this failure occurring.
Going in the other direction, with the exception of failures which
do not have a feasible recovery mechanism(such as micrometeoroid impacts),
the probability of recovery plays a central role in determining the
probability of impact. Throughout this report, the value of a 1%probability
of a half subsystemfailure has been used as a factor in determining the
recovery probability. As a test of the sensitivity of the probability of
impact to this rate, an analysis of the actual part failure rates observed for
the two Voyager spacecraft has been performed. If the results of this analysis
are appled to Galileo, a half subsystemfailure rate of 5%is obtained. (See
Section 1.3.3 for a discussion of this result.) Repeating the calculations
exactly as in 4.5.5 with a 5%subsystemfailure rate yields a total probability
of impact of 7.5 x I0-7. The results of this analysis are presented in
Figure 4-20. A muchmore conservative estimate of recovery probability has
increased the probability of impact by a relatively small amount.
RPMTankFailure
StuckThruster
ThrusterFailure
AACSMemoryChipFailure
SLrucLural Failure
AACS Programming Error
CDS Software Failure
Micrometeoroid lmpsct
Radiation-SEU EFFects
Spacecraft Charging
Command Generation Process
Uplink Command Errors
OFrsun Thermal Failure
I.Oe-1 1
Figure 4-19.
NASA Model Galileo Model
I I I
I 0e-10 IOe-Og I Oe-08 I0e-07 I 0e-06
Earth Impact Probabilities Summary
• i
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I_PI'ITankFailure
StuckThruster
ThrusterFailure
AACSMemoryChipFailure
StructuralFailure
AAC5ProgrammingError
CDSSoFtwareFailure
Micrometeoroid Impact
P.adialion-SEU EFFects
Spacecraft Charging
Command Generation Process
Uplink Command Errors
Of Fsun Thermal Failure
1,0e- 11 1.0e- 10 10e-Og
I [] 5_, Subsystem Failure
1.0e-08 10e-07
• 1% Subsystem Failure
I
10e-06
Figure 4-20. Earth Impact Probabilities Summary for 5% Half Subsystem
Failure Rate and Galileo Micrometeoroid Model
As a final note, it is informative to compare the probability of a
failure occurring with the actual probability of that failure causing Earth
impact. Table 4-8 presents such a s_ry. The navigation strategy, in
conjunction with the high reliability of the spacecraft and its ability to
recover from most failures, reduces the probability of any failure actually
causing Earth impact by several orders of magnitude and has made the
probability of inadvertent Earth reentry extremely remote.
Table 4-8. Probabilities of Earth Reentry by Failure Mode
Failure Mode
Probability
of Failure
Probability
of Earth Reentry
Micrometeoroid Impact
Command Generation
Stuck Thruster
Thermal Failure
Spacecraft Charging
Radiation-SEU Effects
Software Failure
AACS Chip Failure
4.5xi0 -4
5.0x10 -3
6.5xi0 -2
1.5x10 -6
1.2xi0-3
1.0xl0 -4
4.3xi0 -5
7.0x10-5
3.7xi0 -7
1.3xlO -7
6.3xi0 -9
3.1xlO -9
1.2x10 -9
1.9x10 -I0
6.1xlO -II
4.4xi0 -ll
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APPENDIX
FAILURE MODES ANALYSIS
This Appendix describes in detail the analysis that was done for
each of the failure modes summarized in Section 3. The organization is the
same as Section 3; there is a Section devoted to each of the failures in the
same order and with the same numbering system used in Section 3. The
derivation of the standard probability of recovery values is at the end of
this Appendix.
A.I Spacecraft Failures
A.I.I Propellant Line or Tank Ruptures
The failure mode considered here includes any hardware failure in
the Retro Propulsion Module (RPM) which lead to escaping propellants or
pressurant and results in an anomalous velocity imparted to the spacecraft.
Failures in the electronics which drive the RPM thrusters and latch valves
(also known as isolation valves or isovalves) are not included in this
category; they are covered in Section A.I.4. Failures in the software that
commands the electronics which drive the RPM are similarly covered in Sections
A.I.6 and A.I_7.
In analyzing the hardware failure modes of the RPM itself, it was
discovered that by far the most likely failure mechanism was due to impact of
RPM components by a micrometeoroid. No structural failure of propellant tanks
or lines inherent in the hardware itself even came close to the chance of tank
penetration by a solid or liquified micrometeoroid. This failure category is
analyzed in great detail in Section A.2.1 as one of the environmentally
induced failure categories. The analysis of this failure mode is left to that
Section.
A.I.2 Stuck Thrusters
The failure mode under consideration here is Where a stuck open or
stuck closed thruster valve causes an anomalous velocity increment to be
applied to the spacecraft. This is only a concern during a maneuver since
only then are the isovalves opened. In this category the cause of the failure
is a hardware failure in the thruster valve, the propulsion drive electronics
(PDE), or the PDE annex. Other hardware and software failures which might
cause anomalous thruster firings are covered in Sections A.I.4, A.I.6, and
A.I.7.
Figure A-I shows the orientation and nomenclature of the twelve I0
N thrusters. Note that each thruster designation indicates 'A' or 'B'
plumbing branch, and thruster cluster number I or 2. Figure A-2 shows a
simplified schematic of the propellant tanks and plumbing. This Figure shows
how the isovalves separate the 'A' and 'B' branch thrusters, and how isovalves
and thruster valves must both be open before a thruster can fire. If only 'A'
branch isovalves are opened, then no 'B' branch thruster can fire. Isovalves
are opened only when a maneuver is about to begin, and are closed immediately
upon completion.
The isovalves act as a safety net, limiting the damage that might
be done by a stuck open thruster valve. An isovalve stuck open would not by
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itself result in imparted velocity. In any event, an isovalve stuck shut
will result in no maneuverbeing performed. This analysis considered both
isovalves and thruster valves stuck open, but the probability of such a double
failure occurring was so small that it madea negligible contribution to the
total probability.
Whenthe spacecraft is close to the Sun (near Venus), a stuck open
thruster could cause off-Sun attitude excursions which result in temperature
damageto the HGA. Suchdamagecould occur before baseline fault protection
responded. As a result, the addition of a sungate and a PDEannex device was
madeto the spacecraft specifically to guard against a stuck open thruster
fault.
The Sungate is a photoelectric sensor which triggers an on-board
fault protection response whenever the HGA-Sunangle exceedsa threshold, due
to somespacecraft malfunction.
The PDEannex detects and prevents an anomalous signal to a
thruster valve when no signal was issued by the AACS I/0. Hence, the
probability of the propulsion drive electronics (PDE) causing a stuck open
thruster failure has been greatly reduced.
The analysis described in this Appendix does not consider the
improved reliability of the spacecraft as a result of the addition of the sun
gate and PDE annex devices, since the need for them, which is unique to the
VEEGA trajectory, had not been identified when this .effort began. However,
since these devices have now been incorporated, the probability of a stuck
thruster failure will be substantially less than that used in this analysis.
Some general remarks can be made about the effects of a stuck open
thruster:
- Any S thruster stuck open will trigger AACS internal fault
monitor 25 or 26 (spin rate bounds) or if in inertial mode fault monitor 3, 4,
5, or 6 (gyro rate too high) within 3 revs (one minute), causing a task abort,
spin thruster swap, and a series of spin rate corrections. Net velocity
imparted would be less than 0.05 m/s.
- Any Z thruster stuck open in inertial mode will trigger fault
monitor 3, 4, 5, or 6 (gyro rate too high) within 3 revs (one minute), causing
the entire sequence to abort imediately. An axial velocity of 0.3 m/s or
less would be imparted.
- Any P or L thruster stuck open will impart some axial velocity
error; the spacecraft may be unaware of the fault and continue the sequence as
if nothing was wrong.
Fault protection built into the spacecraft software will detect
many stuck thruster f&ults. A failure in fault protection has not been
considered in this analysis because:
I) The probability of such a double failure occurring is
extremely small, and
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Figure A-I. Thruster Nomenclature
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2) The values used for the probability of a stuck thruster are
quite large since they do not reflect the addition of new
fault protection devices (sun gate and PDE annex).
Table A-I shows which thrusters are used for each of the burn types
under consideration. For example, the lateral burn uses the Llb, L2b
thrusters (primary branch), with Pla, P2a as an alternate thruster choice, and
is conducted in inertial mode. Then, Table A-2 summarizes the effect of all
stuck thruster possibilities on each burn type. Table A-2 shows that the
lateral burn, which normally uses the 'B' branch, is unaffected by any 'A'
branch stuck thruster since the 'A' branch isovalves remain closed for this
burn type.
An analysis of the PDE circuit components between the AACS I/0 and
thruster valves specified failure probabilities for two cases (W. Diem, D.
Lewis, "Probability of Thruster Failure," JPL Engineering Memorandum 343-I080,
14 Dec 87):
- 'A' or 'B' branch isovalves open,
- 'A' and 'B' branch isovalves open.
Table A-I. Thrusters Used for Burn Types
Mnvr Type
Primary Alternate Spacecraft
Branch Branch Mode
LAT Llb,L2b Pla,P2a Inertial
POSZ Pla Llb Inertial
PULZ Zla,Z2a Zlb,Z2b Inertial
NEGZ Zla,Z2a,Zlb,Z2b Zla,Z2a All Spin
or
Zlb,Z2b
Sun Acq Pla,P2a Llb,L2b All Spin
HGA Corr Pla,P2a Llb,L2b All Except high spin
Spin Corr Sla Slb All
or or
S2a S2b
The data below are for the case where PDE circuits 'A' and 'B' are
both powered (normal operation). If only the PDE 'A' or 'B' circuit is
powered, the change in probabilities is small. Note that these are failure
probabilities with no PDE annex in operation. These failure probabilities
will be considerably reduced by normal operation of the PDE annex.
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%
Type of Failure A or B Open A and B 0pen
Prob(any S stuck open, per year)
Prob(any Z stuck open, per year)
Prob(any S stuck shut, per year)
Prob(any Z stuck shut, per year)
Prob(Pl or P2 stuck open, per year)
Prob(Ll or L2 stuck open, per year)
Prob(Pl or P2 stuck shut, per year)
Prob(Ll or L2 stuck shut, per year)
Prob(either P stuck open, per year)
Prob(either L stuck open, per year)
Prob(either P stuck shut, per year)
Prob(either L stuck shut, per year)
0.00663 0.0131
0.00663 0.0131
0.00697 0.0138
0.00697 0o0138
0.00415 0.00415
0.00415 0.00415
0.00346 0.00346
0.00346 0.00346
0.00825 0.00825
0_00825 0.00825
0.00688 0.00688
0.00688 0.00688
The probability density for occurrence of this failure is taken to
be uniform with time. A stuck open or closed P or stuck open Zla or Z2a
thruster will be detected by any HGA correction (Fault Monitor 33). HGA
corrections will occur about once a day, so to escape detection before a TCM,
these faults must arise within a day or two preceding a TCM.
Propellant flushing maneuvers will be performed to clear propellant
lines of potentially damaging corrosion products. Propellant flushing
maneuvers will open both 'A' and 'B' isovalves and will provide detection of
any stuck open or shut thruster. During the Venus to second Earth encounter
period, propellant flushing maneuvers will occur about once per month.
Between Venus and the second Earth encounter, all TCMs except two
are to be vector mode maneuvers (no turns). Two maneuvers with turns are
scheduled, but analysis has shown that stuck thruster faults during a turn
result in a maneuver abort with no further velocity imparted.
Values for probability of recovery are obtained from Section 3.2.4.
The stuck thruster failure does not preclude recovery since all propulsive
maneuvers have an alternate thruster branch with independent plumbing.
A.I.2.1 Summary of Probability
Stuck Thruster During Lateral Burn. In the execution of a lateral
burn, normal operation is to fire an Lib pulse, then one half rev later fire
an L2b pulse. Only 'B' branch isovalves are open.
If Slb or S2b sticks open then AACS internal fault monitor 3, &, 5,
6, 25, or 26 (gyro rate or spin rate bounds) will abort the burn within one
minute and no net dV will be imparted.
If an L thruster sticks open, its lateral force component will
average out to zero because the spacecraft is spinning, and the other L
thruster will impart about half the total intended lateral velocity. However,
since the stuck open thruster is firing continuously rather than in pulses, it
will impart an anomalous axial velocity equal to about 0.7 times the intended
lateral velocity.
If an L thruster sticks shut, the other L thruster will impart
about half the total intended lateral velocity. However, it will also impart
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Table A-2. Anomalous Velocities Resulting From Afflicted
Thrusters in a Maneuver
Mnvr
Type
PA
Afflicted Thruster
LB ZA ZB SA SB
LAT OPEN: OPEN:
DVZ = 0.7*VLA T ABORT,
SHUT: DVZ = -0.3 m/s
DVZ = 0.1*VLA T
OPEN:
ABORT,
DV = 0
POSZ PIA OPEN: OPEN: OPEN:
DVZ = 8*VNOM ABORT, ABORT,
P2A OPEN: DVZ = -0.3 m/s DV = 0
DVZ = -9*VNOM
PULZ P2A OPEN: OPEN: OPEN:
DVZ = 3*VNOM ABORT, ABORT,
PIA OPEN: DVZ = 0 DV = 0
DVZ = -3*VNOM
NEGZ OPEN: OPEN: SHUT: SHUT: ABORT, ABORT,
DVZ = +4% DVZ = 0 DVZ = -20% DVZ = -20% DV = 0 DV = 0
HGA OPEN: OPEN: OPEN:
CORR DVZ = +0.18 m/s DVZ = -0.5 m/s DV = 0
SUN OPEN: OPEN: OPEN:
ACQ ABORT, ABORT, ABORT,
DVZ = +2 m/s DVZ = -6 m/s DV = 0
SPIN OPEN: OPEN: OPEN:
_ORR DVZ = +0.14 m/s DVZ = -0.4 m/s DV = 0
an anomalous axial velocity equal to about 0.i times the intended lateral
velocity (Vlat).
If Zlb or Z2b sticks open then fault monitor 3, 4, 5, or 6 (gyro
rate too high) will abort the maneuver within one minute. An anomalous axial
velocity of 0.3 m/s or less would be imparted.
A stuck open or closed L or Z thruster could arise undetected in
the period following the last opening of the 'B' branch isovalves. The 'B'
branch is planned to be opened at least once every 26 days for the propellant
flushing maneuver. This period is combined with the stuck thruster failure
_-- A-7
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rate to obtain the probability of a stuck thruster.
which cause an anomalous velocity are given below.
equal Vla t . Then:
The probability of events
Let the intended velocity
At EGA-60 (either EGAI or EGA2):
P = 0.00A15"26/365 = 29&.E-6
P = 0.00415*26/365 = 294.E-6
P = 0.00346*26/365 = 2&5.E-6
P = 0.00346*26/365 = 245.E-6
P = 0.00663*26/365 = 472.E-6
DVZ = +0.7*Vla t
DVZ = -0.7*Vla t
DVZ = -0.1*Vla t
DVZ = +O.l*Vla t
DVZ = -0.3
(Llb open)
(L2b open)
(Lib shut)
(L2b shut)
(Zlb or Z2b open)
Similarly at EGA-25 (either EGAI or EGA2):
P = 29&.E-6
P = 294.E-6
P = 2A5.E-6
P = 245.E-6
P = &72.E-6
DVZ = +0.7*Vla t
DVZ = -0.7*Vla t
DVZ = -O.l*Vla t
DVZ = +0.1*Vla t
DVZ = -0.3
(Lib open)
(L2b open)
(Lib shut)
(L2b shut)
(Zlb or Z2b open)
At EGA-10 (either EGAI or EGA2) the vulnerable period during which
the failure may arise is 25-10=15 days:
P = 171.E-6
P = 171.E-6
P = 142.E-6
P = 142.E-6
P = 272.E-6
DVZ = +0.7*Vla t
DVZ = -0.7*Vla t
DVZ = -O.l*Vla t
DVZ = +0.1*Vla t
DVZ = -0.3
(Lib open)
(L2b open)
(Lib shut)
(L2b shut)
(Zlb or Z2b open)
These data are summarized in Table A-3.
Stuck Thruster Durin_ POSZ Burn. For a burn in the positive Z
direction, normal operation is to fire a Pla pulse every one half rev.
If Sla or S2a sticks open then fault monitor 3, 4, 5, 6, 25, or 26
(gyro rate or spin rate bounds) will abort the burn within one minute and no
net _V will be imparted.
If a P thruster sticks open, its lateral force component will
average out to zero because the spacecraft is spinning, but it will impart an
anomalous axial velocity equal to about 9 times the intended axial velocity.
If either P thruster sticks shut, no velocity is imparted.
If Zla or Z2a sticks open then fault monitor 3, 4, 5, or 6 (gyro
rate too high) will abort the maneuver within one minute. An anomalous axial
velocity of 0.3 m/s or less would be imparted.
HGA correction maneuvers will detect a stuck open P or Z thruster.
A conservative approach is to assume that there ha¢e been no HGA corrections
for 2 days before each TCM. This period is combined with the stuck thruster
failure rate to obtain the probability of a stuck thruster. The probability
of events causing an anomalous veloclty are given below, where Vno m equals
the intended velocity.
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Table A-3. Lateral Burn Probability of Failure due to Stuck Thruster
and Resulting in the following AV During the Following Mission Phases
I AT EGA - 60 I
101x",ATj I 03mJsI _07xV,ATI
A×,AL+Z 0o<0<30o I24Sx106 I I. JI29,x106 i
M,x_o 30°<°<60° I !1 II I
A×,A.z 1_0o__<180o I24_x10-6I 1472x106I 1294x10-6I
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 x 10-6
I AT EGA - 25 I
AX,AL+Z 0°< e<30 ° I 245x106 ! I i I 294xl 06 I
MIXED 300< 0 <60° I I I I I I
__T_,,,, ,0o<,<,=0° I I I II I
_,x_o _=0o.._<,,0° I II I[ I
_x,_,_ ,,0o._..,80o I_"x'o" I I"'_x'o' I i_'x'0-6 I
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 x 10 -6
I AT EGA - 10 I
AXIAL+Z 0°< e <30° I 142x10"6 I I I I 171x 106 I
_,x_ _oo<_<6oo I II I I I
LATERAL 60°< e <120° [ ! I ! I !
MIXED 120°< 0< 150° [ I I ,l I I
AXIAL-Z 150°< e<180 ° I 142x10"6 1 I 272x 106 I I 171X 106 I
PRORABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 3 x 10 -4
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At EGAI-60 and at EGA2-60:
P = 0.00415*2/365 = 22.E-6
P = 0.00415*2/365 = 22.E-6
P = 0.00663*2/365 = 36.E-6
DVZ = +8.*Vno m
DVZ = -9.*Vno m
DVZ = -0.3
(Pla open)
(P2a open)
(Zla or Z2a open)
Similarly at EGAI-25 and at EGA2-25:
P=22.E-6
P=22.E-6
P=36.E-6
DVZ = +8.*Vno m
DVZ = -9.*Vno m
DVZ = -0.3
(Pla open)
(P2a open)
(Zla or ZZa open)
Similarly at EGAI-10 and at EGA2-10:
P=22.E-6
P=22.E-6
P=36.E-6
DVZ = +8.*Vno m
DVZ = -9.*Vno m
DVZ = -0.3
(Pla open)
(P2a open)
(Zla or Z2a open)
These data are summarized in Table A-4.
Stuck Thruster During PULZ Burn. Normal operation for a pulsed
burn in the -Z direction is to fire Zla and Z2a pulses together. One half rev
later, fire Zla and Z2a pulses again.
If Sla or S2a sticks open then fault monitor 3, 4, 5, 6, 25, or 26
(gyro rate or spin rate bounds) will abort the burn within one minute and no
net _V will be imparted.
If a P thruster sticks open, its lateral force component will
average out to zero because the spacecraft is spinning, but it will impart an
anomalous axial velocity such that the total axial velocity imparted is:
DVZ = +3.*Vno m
DVZ = -3.*Vno m
(P2a open)
(Pla open)
If Zla or Z2a sticks open then fault monitor 3, &, 5, or 6 (gyro
rate too high) will abort the maneuver within one minute. An axial velocity
of 0.3 m/s or less in the intended direction would be imparted.
If Zla or Z2a sticks closed then the axial velocity imparted will
be smaller than intended.
HGA correction maneuvers will detect a stuck open P or Z thruster.
Again a conservative situation is to assume that there have been no HGA
corrections for 2 days before each TCM. This period is combined with the
stuck thruster failure rate to obtain the probability of a stuck thruster.
The probability of events causing anomalous velocity are given below, where
Vno m equals the intended velocity.
In this case, -Vno m means velocity in the +Z direction.
A-10
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Table A-4. POSZ Burn Probability of Failure Due to Stuck Thruster
and Resulting in the Following AV During the Following Mission Phases
I AT EGA- 60 I
[ 0.3 m/s I I 9.0x VNOM I
AXIAL+Z 0°< 8<30 ° [ I I 22x106 I
MIXED 30 °< 8 <60° I J I I
LATERAL 60°< 8 < 120° [ I [ I
MIXED 120°< _<150 ° I I [ I
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 x 10 -6
I AT EGA - 25 I
AXIAL+Z 0°< 8<30 ° ! I I 22x10 -6 I
MIXED 30°< 8<60 ° [ i I t
LATERAL 60°< 8<120 ° I 1 I I
MIXED 120°< e<150° I I I I
 ,0o. I I! ==x,0-,I
PROBABILITY OF NO REGOVERY = 2 x 10"6
i AT EGA-10 1
AXIAL+Z 0°< 8<30 ° I I I 22x10 -6 I
MIXED 30°< e <60° I I I !
LATERAL 60°< 8< 120° ! I I I
MIXED 120°< 8<150° ! I ! 1
AXIAL-Z 150°< 8<180 ° I 36x10"6 I I 22x10"6 I
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 3 x 10 -4
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At EGAI-60 and at EGA2-60:
P = 0.00415*2/365 = 22.6E-6
P = 0.00415*2/365 = 22.6E-6
P = 0.00663*2/365 = 36.0E-6
DVZ = -3.*Vno m
DVZ = +3.*Vno m
DVZ = 0
(Pla open)
(P2a open)
(Zla or Z2a open,
task aborted with a
small AV imparted
in the intended
direction.
Similarly at EGAI-25 and at EGA2-25:
P = 22.6E-6
P = 22.6E-6
P = 36.0E-6
DVZ = -3.*Vno m
DVZ = +3.*Vno m
DVZ = 0
(Pla open)
(P2a open)
(Zla or Z2a open, see note above)
Similarly at EGAI-10 and at EGA2-10:
P = 22.6E-6
P = 22.6E-6
P = 36.0E-6
DVZ = -3.*Vno m
DVZ = -3.*Vno m
DVZ = -0.3
(P2a open)
(Pla open)
(Zla or Z2a open)
These data are summarized in Table A-5.
Stuck Thruster Durin_ NEGZ Burn. For a continuous burn in the -Z
direction, normal operation is to fire.Zla, Z2a, Zlb, Z2b continuously in the
all-spin mode. Integrating accelerometers monitor accumulated axial velocity,
providing closed-loop control of burn cutoff. A minimum burn time and a
maximum burn time are also specified which override the accelerometer cutoff
control. Commanded maximum and minimum burn times are normally set at
predicted _ 5%. This ensures that a large burn error cannot occur even if the
accelerometer-based burn cutoff algorithm failed.
If any S thruster sticks open, fault monitor 23 or 24 (spin rate
bounds) will abort the burn within a minute with no net AV.
If an L thruster sticks open, accelerometer cutoff is still
achieved within max/min burn times and no velocity error occurs. A P thruster
stuck open would impart axial velocity and cutoff would occur at max or min
time. The total axial velocity imparted would be:
DVZ = 1.04*Vno m
DVZ - 0.96*Vno m
(P2a open)
(Pla open)
The 'B' branch isovalves are opened less than one second before the
axial _V estimator is initialized, and 'A' branch isovalves are opened 20
sec earlier. The 'B' branch isovalves are closed 20 sec after burn
completion, and 'A' branch isovalves are closed 20 sec earlier. Hence, for
any Z thruster stuck open there would be a 20 sec overburn.
Any Z stuck open: DVZ = -0.08 m/s
If any Z thruster were stuck shut, cutoff would occur at max time
before achieving the intended velocity.
A-12
1625-396, Rev. A
Table A-5. PULZ Burn Probability of Failure Due to Stuck Thruster
and Resulting in the Following AV During the Following Mission Phases
I AT EGA - 60 ]
[ 0.3m/s ] [3.0XVNOM]
AX,A,+Z 0°<O<30° [ J [226x106I
M,XEO 300<0<60° [ J I I
_T_, 00°<0<_0° [ I 1 I
_,X_O ,_0°<0<_0° [ J 1 !
*X,_,_ _0°_0<'80° I I I_x'06 1
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 x 10"6
AT EGA- 25 ]
AXlAL+Z 0°< 8<30 ° I I I 22.6x10 6j
_,x_o _oo<e<,oo 1 I I ]
LATERAL 60°< o.<,=oo I I I i
PRABABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 x 10 -6
I AT EGA - I0 I
AXIAL+Z 0°< 0<30° [ I [22-6x10 6j
MIXED 30°< 0<60° [ ! [ ]
LATERAL 60°< e<120 ° l I [ ]
MIXED 120°< 8<150 ° l I [ ]
AXIAL-Z 150°< 0<180 ° ! 36"0x 10"61 [22"6x 10 6]
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 3 x 10"4
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Any Z stuck shut: DVZ= 0.8*Vnom
Consider only those faults which cause more than the intended
velocity. Note that the continuous -Z burn would not be chosen for very small
TCMssuch as the ones at ten days before each encounter.
A stuck open or shut 'B' branch thruster condition could arise
undetected in the period following the last opening of the 'B' branch
isovalves. The 'B' branch will be openedat least once every 26 days for the
propellant flushing maneuver. A stuck 'A' branch thruster would be detected
by HGAcorrection maneuverswhich will occur at least once every two days.
These periods are combinedwith the stuck thruster failure rates to obtain the
probability of a stuck thruster. The probability of events which cause an
anomalousvelocity are given below. Let the intended velocity be denoted
Vnom. Then the probability of a velocity error DVZis:
At EGA-60(either EGAIor EGA2):
P = 0.00415*2/365 = 22.6E-6
P = 0.00663*2/365 = 36.0E-6
P = 0.00663*26/365 = 472.E-6
DVZ = 0.04*Vno m
DVZ = -0.08 m/s
DVZ = -0.08 m/s
Similarly at EGA-25 (either EGAI or EGA2):
(P2a open)
(Zla or Z2a open)
(Zlb or Z2b open)
P = 22.6E-6
P = 36.0E-6
P = 472.E-6
DVZ = 0.04*Vno m
DVZ = -43.08 m/s
DVZ = -0.08 mls
(P2a open)
(Zla or Z2a open)
(Zlb or Z2b open)
The NEGZ burn would not be used for small maneuvers such as at
EGA-10. These data are s_rized in Table A-6.
Stuck Thruster During HGA Correction. Normal operation for high
gain antenna pointing maneuvers is to fire Pla and P2a pulses together once
per rev. HGA corrections will occur about daily during the early cruise phase
of the mission. The isovalves are open for a maximum of i00 sec.
Any 'A' branch thruster open or Pla or P2a closed means the
commanded attitude will not be achieved with sufficient accuracy and fault
monitor 33 (HGA error) will close the isovalves, swap the HGA thruster branch,
and restart the star-based attitude determination process. This fault
sequence serves as an early warning for a stuck thruster on the A Branch.
Sla or S2a open: no net velocity
Zla or Z2a open: axial DV = -0.5 m/s
Pla or P2a open: axlal DV = ±0.18 mls
The stuck thruster failure rates are used to obtain the probability
of a stuck thruster at any time in the periods preceding each encounter. The
probability of events which cause an anomalous velocity are given below.
From Venus flyby to EGAI-25:
P = 0.00663*275/365 = 4995.E-6
P = 0.00415*275/365 = 3126.E-6
P = 0.00415*275/365 : 3126.E-6
DVZ = -0.5 (Zla or Z2a open)
DVZ = 0.18 (Pla open)
DVZ = -0.18 (P2a open)
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Table A-6. NEGZBurn Probability of Failure due to Stuck Thruster
and Resulting in the Following &V During the Following Mission Phases
I AT EGA - 60 ]
_0.04x VNOMI [ 0.08 rn/s I
_x,_+_ 0o<_<_0o I I I I
MIXED 30°< e <60° ! ] I !"
LATERAL 600< 0 < 120° I _ l I
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY ---2 x 10 "6
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Fromaphelion maneuverto EGA2-25:
P = 0.00663*335/365 = 6085.E-6
P = 0.00415*335/365 = 3808.E-6
P = 0.00415*335/365 = 3808.E-6
DVZ= -0.5 (Zla or Z2a open)
DVZ= 0.18 (Pla open)
DVZ= -0.18 (P2a open)
From EGA-25to EGA-5(either EGAIor EGA2):
P = 0.00663*20/365 = 363.E-6
P = 0.00415*20/365 = 227.E-6
P = 0.00415"20/365 = 227.E-6
DVZ= -0.5
DVZ=0.18
DVZ= -0.18
(Zla or Z2a open)
(Pla open)
(P2a open)
From EGA-5to EGA(either EGAIor EGA2):
P = 0.00663"5/365 = 91.E-6
P = 0.00415"5/365 = 57.E-6
P = 0.00415*5/365 = 57.E-6
DVZ = -0.5
DVZ = 0.18
DVZ = -0.18
(Zla or Z2a open)
(Pla open)
(P2a open)
These data are suammrized in Tables A-7 and A-8.
Stuck Thruster During Spin-Rate Correction. Normal operation for
spin rate correction maneuvers is to fire two pulses, one half rev apart, from
either Sla or S2a for spin down or spin up, respectively. This maneuver is
expected to occur about once every 18 days.
If Sla or S2a stuck open or closed, the commanded spin rate would
not be achieved with sufficient accuracy. Fault monitor 32 (spin-rate error)
would trip and re-try spin rate correction with the other thruster branch and
hence no net velocity would result.
Any other 'A' branch thruster open may trigger fault protection in
inertial mode (gyro rate too high), but not in cruise mode. In this case,
some axial AV will occur (isovalves are open for 80 sec, max).
The stuck thruster failure rates are used to obtain the probability
of a stuck thruster condition arising during the approach to EGAI and EGA2.
The probability of events which cause an anomalous velocity are given below.
From Venus flyby to EGAI-25:
P = 0.00663*275/365 = 4995.E-6
P = 0.00415*275/365 ffi3126.E-6
P = 0.00415*275/365 = 3126.E-6
DVZ = -0.4
DVZ = 0.14
DVZ = -0.14
(Zla or Z2a open)
(Pla open)
(P2a open)
From aphelion maneuver to EGA2-25:
P = 0.00663*335/365 = 6085.E-6
P = 0.00415*335/365 ffi3808.E-6
P = 0.00415*335/365 = 3808.E-6
DVZ = -0.4
DVZ = 0.14
DVZ = -0.14
(Zla or Z2a open)
(Pla open)
(P2a open)
From EGA-25 to EGA-5 (either EGAI or EGA2):
P = 0.00663*20/365 = 363.E-6
P = 0.00415*20/365 = 227.E-6
P = 0.00415*20/365 = 227.E-6
DVZ = -0.4
DVZ = 0.14
DVZ = -0.14
(Zla or Z2a open)
(Pla open)
(P2a open)
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Table A-7. HGACORRProbability of Failure Due to Stuck Thruster at EGAI
and Resulting in the Following &V During the Following Mission Phases
VENUS _ EGA1 - 25 !
I 0"18m/s I I 0.5m/s 1
AXlAL+Z 0°< 8 <30° 13126x10-6_ I ]
MIXED 30o< ( <600 I ] I I
AX1AL-Z 150o< 8 <180 ° 13126x 10"61 [4995x 10"61
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 x 10 -6
I EGA1 -25 _ EGA1 -5 I
,_,__÷z oo_o.,3oo 1227xlo-61I 1
,AT_RA" 60°_e"'20° I I [ I
°°I I o x,o
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 3 x 10 -4
5x 10 "3
(EGA1- 25 to EGA1-10)
(EGA1- 10 to EGA1-5)
EGA1 -5 -I_ EGA1 I
,ATe,,,, ,o°.,_.,,_o° ! i I I
M,X_O ,_0°._.,,0° I i I I
,_,__oZ ,,0°._.,,"0° ! "x'0 °' II _'x'0°' i
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 10 "1
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Table A-8. HGA CORR Probability of Failure Due to Stuck Thruster at EGA2
and Resulting in the Following _V During the Following Mission Phases
I APHELION --_ EGA2- 25 I
I 0.18m/s J [ 0.5m/s J
.x,_÷z _<_<_oo [_.o.x,o.j [ I
_,x_o _oo<_<.oo [ J 1 i
._. _oo<_<_oo [ J I I
_,x_o _oo<_<_oo [ J1 !
_x,_z _oo<_<_oo [_o_x_o_]l_o_x_o_l
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY -- 2 x 10 -6
EGA2 - 25 -I_ EGA2 -5 J
.x,_÷z _<_<_oo L_.x,o. j I I
_,xeo _oo<_<.oo L J ! I
.ATE.AL '0°<e<120° [ J / I
M,×EO 120°<0<1S0° I I I I
_X,_Z _0°<_<_0o [ _x _0_J!_x _0_1
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 3 x 10 -4
5x 10 .3
EGA2.- 5 -I_ EGA2 ]
(EGA2 -25 to EGA2, -10)
(EC_ -I0 to EGA2 -5)
M,x_o _oo<o<,oo [ JI I
LATE.AL .0°<0<120° I II I
M,XEO 120°<0 I.0° [ JI ]
AX,__-Z I_0°<0 180° [57.10"6]I91x10"6I
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 10 °1
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From EGA-5 to EGA (either EGAI or EGA2):
P : 0.00663"5/365 = 91.E-6
P : 0.00415"5/365 = 57.E-6
P = 0.00415*5/365 = 57.E-6
DVZ = -0.4
DVZ = 0.14
DVZ = -0.14
(Zla or Z2a open)
(Pla open)
(P2a open)
These data are summarized in Tables A-9 and A-10.
Stuck Thruster During Sun Acquisition. Normal operation for Sun
acquisition maneuvers is to fire the Pla and P2a pulses together once per rev.
This maneuver is not planned to be used after the first TCM and, therefore,
presents no failure risk. Analysis is similar to that for HGA corrections.
This maneuver mode will not be considered further.
A.I.3 RPM Thruster Failures
A recent failure in another satellite thruster system which is
based on the Galileo design has caused the Galileo Project to take a careful
look at their thruster system. The satellite failed due to operating its
thrusters at an operating point which caused thruster overheating and melting,
as well as melting of the thermally coupled redundant thrusters. Since the
Galileo spacecraft uses thrusters of similar design, an analysis was done to
assure that similar failures were not a threat to Earth avoidance or the
mission.
The Galileo thrusters are fired at an operating point defined by
the flow rate and mixture ratio. Both of these parameters are controlled by
adjusting orifice sizes in the RPM design. Figure A-3 shows a plot of
possible Galileo operating points. Points to the left of the curves represent
points determined through testing to be safe from thermal runaway. The region
to the right of the curves is a region where thrusters may overheat and cause
destruction of the thruster system. The failed satellite was built without
the benefit of such an analysis. Its failure is attributed to operating in
the unsafe region in the steady-state mode. That satellite is now operating
in the pulsed mode as is its recently launched replacement.
The thruster manufacturer states that the Galileo thrusters are
safe if operated at a flow rate of 3.5 gm/s or less. The Galileo system is to
be operated at 3.2 gm/s, which provides a safe margin at the expense of thrust
level. Adequate testing of thrusters operating at 3.2 gm/s will be performed
to guarantee safe operation in pulsed mode.
The remaining concern is the operation of the thrusters in
continuous burn mode. The S (spin) and Z (axial) thrusters are used in this
mode to change the spacecraft spin rate from 3.15 rpm to I0 rpm and back and
to perform large AV maneuvers in a turn-burn-turn mode. Testing of thruster
operation in continuous burn mode is still in progress to determine that there
is no overheating concern and to verify the manufacturer's claim of safe
operation at 3.5 gm/s. Furthermore, a fault protection system is being
installed on the S and Z thrusters to detect any overheating and to shut them
off before redundant thrusters can be affected. This fault protection system
consists of redundant temperature sensors on each S and Z thruster and fault
protection software. The software will detect thermal runaway and shut down
the thruster system within a few seconds, which is adequate to prevent damage
to redundant thrusters. The spacecraft will not be operated in continuous
burn mode until this fault protection system is in place.
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Table A-9. SPIN CORR Probability of Failure due to Stuck Thruster at EGAI
and Resulting in the Following &V During the Following Mission Phases
I VENUS -I_ EGA1 - 25 I
AXIAL + Z
MIXED
LATERAL
MIXED
AXIAL - Z
0° < 6 < 30° I
30° < 0 < 60° I
60°< e < 120° [
120 ° < 0 < 150 ° [
150 ° < 0 < 180 ° [
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 x 10 -6
EGA1 -25 -I_ EGA1 -5 ]
AXIAL + Z 0° < 0 < 30°
MIXED 30° < 0 < 60°
LATERAL 60° < 0 < 120 °
MIXED 120° < B < 150°
AXIAL-Z 150° < 0 < 180°
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 3 x 10 -4
5x 10 -3
EGA1 -5 _ EGA1 I
AXIAL+Z 0°< 0 430°
MIXED 30° < 0 < 60°
LATERAL 60° < 0 < 120°
MIXED 120° < 0 < 150°
AXIAL - Z 150 ° < 0 < 180 °
1 0'7rrvs I I 0.4m/s J
3126x 10"61 i J
I! i
Jl I
Jl I
3126x,o-6j[,,99_x,o-61
227 x 10"6 1[ J
i[ J
!1 I
II I
227,,10-6j i _x ,0-6j
(EGA1 -25 toEGA1 -10)
(EGA1 -10 toEGA1 -5)
L,,,,,,o-_] l J
L ]L J
L It J
L ]1 I
[ _,x,o-_1 [ ,,,,,,o-_/
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 10 "1
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Table A-10. SPIN CORR Probability of Failure due to Stuck Thruster at EGA2
and Resulting in the Following AV During the Following Mission Phases
I APHELION -I_ EGA2-25 I
AXIAL+ Z 0° < e < 30°
MIXED 30° < e < 60°
LATERAL 60° < e < 120°
MIXED 120° < e < 150°
AXIAL - Z 150 ° < e < 180 °
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY -- 2 x 10 -6
EGA2 - 25 -I_ EGA2 -5 I
AXIAL + Z 0° < e < 30°
MIXED 30° < e < 60°
LATERAL 60° < e < 120°
MIXED 120° < e < 150°
AXlAL-Z 150°< e < 180°
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY -- 3 x 10 -4
5x 10 -3
I EGA2 - 5 _ EGA - 2 I
AXIAL + Z 0° < e < 30°
MIXED 30° < e < 60°
LATERAL 60° < e < 120 °
MIXED 120 ° < e < 150 °
AXlAL-Z 150° < e < 180°
[ 0.07m/s ! I 0.4m/s ]
I I[ J
! il J
1 IL J
!38o_xlo-61L o8_xlo-6j
1227xlo-61[ ]
1 I[ ]
1 II 1
1 II I
1227xlo-6113_xlo-61
(EGA2 - 25 to EGA2 - 10)
(EGA2- 10to EGA2-5)
I _7xlo-6I I I
I IL J
L 1[ J
t 1[ J
[ _Txlo-81[ 91xlo-6j
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 10 "1
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Thruster overheating does not provide a threat to Earth avoidance
with this strategy for thruster operating point verification and fault
protection implementation. First, pulsed mode thruster operation cannot lead
to thruster overheating, since there is adequate cooling time between pulses.
Second, continuous burn mode thruster operation will not be used until fault
protection has been implemented to protect the redundant thrusters. The only
planned uses of the continuous burn mode before the second Earth flyby are
three relatively large maneuvers performed approximately 210 days before the
first Earth encounter, before the first asteroid encounter, and at least i00
days before the second Earth encounter. These burns will not be performed in
continuous burn mode unless it is determined to be highly unlikely to have a
thermal failure. However, even if such a failure occurred, the thruster would
be shut down within seconds by a redundant fault protection system. Until
time of shutdown, the thruster efficiency would be reduced and the worst
effect could be a small thrust for a few seconds in the wrong direction, with
a worst-case SV error of 0.04 m/s. Since the trajectory never passes close
enough to Earth for a &V of this size to lead to an impacting trajectory,
either while in cruise or during the course of a maneuver, this small
erroneous thrust cannot result in an impacting trajectory. Even if it could,
the fault protection system would guarantee the integrity of the redundant
thrusters. Recovery to a non-impacting trajectory would be highly probable
since there are at least i00 days to perform the recovery.
In summary, continuous burn thruster operation is still under
investigation, but adequate protection has been implemented to remove any
threat to Earth avoidance.
A.I.4 Memory Failure
The failure category under discussion here is one where spacecraft
electronics, most likely an AACS memory chip, fails, causing an anomalous
thruster firing.
The worst-case situation is a failed AACS memory chip that escapes
detection until causing trouble during a TCM. Most AACS memory is checksummed
(including all the code) and checksum region failures will be detected almost
immediately, although the spacecraft takes no action other than setting an
indicator in telemetry. Two failure classes will be examined:
l) A failure that occurs outside of the checksum region such
that there is no internal detection,
2) A failure that occurs in the checksum region but within two
days of a TCM such that there is insufficient time for
detection and corrective action from the ground.
Failure Occurs Outside Checksum. The probability that an AACS
memory chip fails during the mission has been calculated from the upper limits
of TCC24_ memory chip failure rates obtained by testing.
P(an AACS memory chip fails during mission) = 0.4
A-23
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All but 5376 of 32768 bytes of memory are checksummed.
P(occurs outside checksum region) = 5376/32768 = 0.16
To cause impact, a burn must be either too big or in the wrong
direction, or both. If a failed chip led to a burn too big, it would be
terminated by the backup 7STOP co_nd which is built into all maneuver
sequences. However, if data storage related to stator orientation were
affected, then a lateral burn could occur in the wrong direction anywhere in
the plane perpendicular to the axial without on-board detection. Data used to
control stator orientation, and which are autside of the checksum region, are
stored in scan data (60 locations).
P(failure occurs in scan data) = 60/5376 = 0.011
Most locations in scan data are also used by the HGA correct
algorithm, so that failure of this algorithm would provide early detection.
P(not detected by HGA cot) = 0.I
Then the probability per year of a failed memory chip which could
lead to an anomalous thrust without detection is:
P(occurs undetected per year) = 0.4/8"0.16"0.011"0.1 = 9.E-6
The probability of a memory chip failure outside of the checksum
region which causes a velocity error (DVL) is given below. The failure causes
the intended lateral burn velocity magnitude (Vla t) to be delivered, but in
the wrong direction. The period of vulnerability is the time elapsed since
the last maneuver.
Venus to EGAI-60:
EGAI-60 to EGAI-25:
EGAI-25 to EGAI-IO:
P = 9.E-6"240/365 = 5.7E-6
P = 9.E-6"35/365 = 0.8E-6
P = 9.E-6"15/365 = O.&E-6
DVL =Vla t
DVL =Vla t
DVL =Vla t
Aphelion to EGA2-60:
EGA2-60 to EGA2-25:
EGA2-25 to EGA2-10:
P = 9.E-6"3001365 = 7.2E-6 DVL =Vla t
P = 9.E-6"351365 = 0.8E-6 DVL =Vla t
P = 9.E-6"15/365 = 0.4E-6 DVL =Vla t
Failure Occurs Inside Checksum. The remaining memory is
checksummed:
P(occurs inside checksum) = 0.84
This failure could cause damage to code or permanent data. In most
cases an error causing improper execution of a TCM would trip fault
protection, but commanding the wrong thruster to fire might not be detected by
plume impingement fault protection. This could result in delivering the
intended velocity magnitude, but in the wrong direction. Such errors would be
concentrated in the turnburn or burngo algorithms which occupy about 4% of the
checksum region.
P(occurs in turnburn or burngo) = 0.04
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Assumingthat it is not possible to detect and respond to a
checksumerror arising within the two days preceding a TCM, the probability of
this failure occurring per two days is:
P = 0.4/8*0.84*0.04*2/365 = 9.2E-6
Let the intended TCMvelocity be Vnom. The velocity error (DVL
or DVZ)maybe lateral or axial with equal probability. Then for each burn
type (LAT, POSZ,PULZ,NEGZ)in the TCMspreceding EGAIor EGA2:
P=4.6E-6
P=A.6E-6
DVL= Vnom
DVZ= Vnom
Failure probabilities are summarizedin Table A-11.
A.I.5 Structural Failures
Beyondthe obvious requirement to keep the spacecraft together,
Galileo's structure plays a vital role in stabilizing the spacecraft.
Galileo, like all spinning spacecraft, must have proper ballasting, structural
alignments, and control of massproperties to remain dynamically stable. If,
for example, an improperly designed piece of structure broke and released a
large component, the resulting shift in massproperties would affect the
spacecraft's rotation. At best, the spacecraft would be left with an
uncorrectable wobble which would degrade telecommunications and science
instrument pointing. At worst, the resulting nutation and wobble maymake the
spacecraft uncontrollable.
Given the navigation strategy which biases the spacecraft
trajectory, even worst-case structural failures which release hardware would
have almost no chance of leading to Earth impact. The only hypothesized case
where Earth impact could be imagined are failures where an RTGbreaks free and
flies off on its own trajectory. As will be shownin the following
paragraphs, the spacecraft's design makesthis scenario implausible.
By themselves, most structural failures produce little or no AV
and so do not risk Earth impact. In the case of an RTG, if one could break
free, and if its angular momentumcould hurl it away from the remainder of the
spacecraft, it would becomeuncontrollable and a potential hazard to the Earth.
However, this worst-case scenario is not credible for several
reasons. First, all spacecraft structure, including the RTG booms, is
designed with a large margin of safety (a factor of 1.4 or greater). Second,
prior to launch, the entire spacecraft is exhaustively tested on a dynamic
shake table to validate that all structural members can withstand launch
vibration, the worst dynamic environment of the entire mission. Finally, even
if an RTG boom could completely disintegrate, the RTG would still be retained
by heavy electrical cables. These cables can easily hold the RTG even against
the tension (about 40 pounds at i0 rpm) resulting from a stuck-open spin
thruster (second fault) before onboard fault protection software intervenes.
Although a dangling RTG would leave the spacecraft with a severe wobble, the
RTG would remain with the spacecraft.
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Table A-II. Probability of Failure Due to AACS Memory Chip Failure
and Resulting in the Fallowing _V During the Following Mission Phases
I AT EGA - 60 I
ll_vl= IvNO M I
AXIAL Z °°<e < 30° I 2.3x10 .6 I
MIXED 30°< 8 <60° I I
LATERAL 60°< 8 < 120° I * I
MIXED 120°< 8< 150° I I
AXlAL-Z 150°< 8<180° I 2.3x10 -6 J
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 x 10 .6
AT EGA - 25 I
AXIAL+Z 0°< 8 <30° I 2.3x10 .6 I
MIXED 30°< 8 <60° I i
LATERAL 60°< 8<120 ° i 5.4x10 -6 I
M,x_o .=oo<. <_.o° I I
AX,ALz 15o°< e<16o° I 2.3_10.6 1
I "10.3x10 "6 ATEGA111.8x10"6 ATE A2
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 x 10 -6
I AT EGA - 10 I
AXIAL+Z 0°< 8 < 30° I 2.3x10"6 I
MIXED 30o<8 < 60° I I
LATERAL 60°< 0 < 120° I 5,0 x 10 .6 I
_,X_D _oo<_<_soo I I
_x,_z _oo<e<"o° I _ __o6I
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 3 x 10 .4
v
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Given the design and testing practices which secure the RTG, there
is no credible structural failure which could lead to an RTG becoming
separated from the spacecraft. Accordingly, the probability of this failure
type is treated as zero.
A.I.6 AACS Flight Software Coding Error
The failure mode to be discussed here is one where an AACS flight
software programming error causes an anomalous thruster firing. A flight
software programming error may affect execution of some maneuver which fires
thrusters. The software error may be present at launch, or it may be
introduce_ by an in-flight software code change. A software error present at
launch would very likely be detected by TCMs preceding the Venus flyby. It is
more likely that such an error near Earth encounter would be introduced by an
in-flight software change. No such in-flight software changes are planned
until after the second Earth encounter.
Only during a propulsive maneuver, when the isovalves have been
opened, can a software error cause an anomalous thruster firing. HGA
correction maneuvers will be performed approximately daily. Flight software
code errors which affect the HGA correction maneuver would therefore be
detected early. In spin correction maneuvers, an anomalous thruster firing
would trip fault protection while imparting only a fraction of a meter per
second at most. The worst situation is an error affecting vector mode
maneuvers and not affecting HGA corrections. If an error caused a burn to be
too big, the burn would be stopped by the backup 7STOP command which is built
into each burn sequence. However, an error in the burn control algorithm
could cause either of the following problems which would escape on-board
detection:
l) Lateral burn executed in the wrong direction, anywhere in the
plane perpendicular to the axial direction (turnburn
algorithm), or
2) Select the wrong thruster (burngo algorithm).
Given the level of testing to which the software is subjected, it
is estimated that the probability of discovering in-flight an AACS software
coding error is bounded by 0.I for the eight year mission. In the Voyager
mission to date, no such AACS software errors have been encountered during
execution.
P(error occurs during mission) = 0.i
The turnburn and burngo algorithms in the AACS constitute about &%
of the flight code, and only about 10% of their code is related to lateral
burns or to thruster selection and not used in HGA corrections.
P(occurs in turnburn or burngo) = 0.04
P(affects lat burn or thruster ID, not HGA) = 0.i
The probability density for error occurrence is taken to be uniform
{n time. Then the probability of error occurrence per year is:
P(occurs per year) = 0.1/8*0.O&*0.1 = 50.E-6
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An error in the critical section of code mayor maynot affect the
burn results. If the error affects the burn magnitude only, it cannot lead to
an impacting trajectory becauseburns too large are stopped by the backup
7STOPcommand,and burns too small cannot result in an impacting trajectory.
If the error affects the burn arc or thruster selection, a burn of the right
magnitude but in the wrong direction mayresult. A worst-case assumption is
used, that the software error has a 50%chance of a resultant burn in the
wrong direction.
The probability of a software code error causing an anomalous
_elocity is found below, where the period of vulnerability is the time elapsed
since the last maneuver. Backup7STOPcommandswill prevent imparting too much
velocity, but the intended velocity magnitude (Vnom) maybe delivered in the
wrong direction. The velocity error (DVLor DVZ)maybe lateral or axial with
equal probability.
Venus to EGAI-60:
Venus to EGAI-60:
P = 12.5E-6"240/365 = 8.2E-6 DVL = Vno m
P = " 8.2E-6 DVZ = Vno m
EGAI-60 to EGAI-25:
EGAI-60 to EGAI-25:
P = 12.5E-6"35/365 = 1.2E-6
P = " I. 2E-6
DVL = Vno m
DVZ = Vno m
EGAI-25 to EGAI-10:
EGAI-25 to EGAI-10:
P = 12.5.E-6"15/365 = 0.51E-6 DVL = Vno m
P = " 0.51E-6 DVZ = Vno m
Aphelion to EGA2-60: P = 12.5E-6"300/365 = 10.0E-6 DVL = Vno m
Aphelion to EGA2-60: P = " I0.0E-6 DVZ = Vno m
EGA2-60 to EGA2-25 :
EGA2-60 to EGA2-25 :
P = 12.5E-6"35/365 = 1.2E-6
P = " i. 2E-6
DVL = Vno m
DVZ = Vno m
EGA2-25 to EGA2-10:
EGA2-25 to EGA2-10:
P = 12.5E-6"15/365 = 0.51E-6 DVL = Vno m
P = " 0.51E-6 DVZ = Vno m
Failure probabilities are summarized in Tables A-12 and A-13.
A.I.7 CDS Software Errors
The failure mode considered here is one where commands correctly
received by the CDS are subsequently transferred to other subsystems
erroneously, causing spacecraft events which result in an anomalous velocity
increment. The most likely specific failure in this category is one where the
CDS sends an erroneous command to AACS. To be accepted by AACS, the command
must have a correct checksum. In the worst case, the command causes the AACS
to execute an anomalous burn.
The CDS is designed such that there is no more than a 1% chance of
sending an anomalous command to the AACS during the mission. The probability
of this command occurring in the 34 months between Venus closest approach and
EGA 2 is:
0.01 x (34 months / 8 years) = 3.5 x 10 -3 .
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Table A-12. Probability of Failure Due to AACS Programming Error at EGAI
and Resulting in the Following AV During the Following Mission Phases
I AT EGA1 - 60 ]
I I,_Vl= IvNOMI1
AX,AL+Z 0o<e<30° [ 4.1x10-6I
_,x_o _o°<_<6o° L I
,_T_L _oo<_<,_o° [ ,,._x,o-_I
M,X_O _0°<_<,_0° L I
AXlAL-Z 150° < 8 < 180° [ 4.1 x 10 .6 I
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 x 10"6
AT EGA1 - 25 I
AXIAL+Z 00< 8<30 ° [ 0.6x10 "6 I
MIXED 30°< 0< 60° [ I
LATERAL 60°< e < 120° I 1.2 x 10 -6 I
MIXED 120°< 0< 150° l I
AXIAL-Z 150°< 0 <180° I 0.6x10 .6 I
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY -- 2 x 10 "6
I AT EGA1 - 10 I
AXIAL + Z 0o<8< 30 ° I 0.26 x 10-6 I
MIXED 30°< 0< 60° I I
LATERAL 60°<_<'=0° L0_'x_06]
AXIAL-Z 150°< 0 <180° [0 -26x 10"6 ]
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 3 x 10 "4
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Table A-13. Probability of Failure Due to AACSProgrammingError at EGA2
and Resulting in the Following &V During the Following Mission Phases
I AT EGA2 - 60 I
[l"vl=Iv.oMIJ
AX,AL÷Z 0°<O<30o [5.0x10-0J
M,XEO 30°<O<O0° [ J
LATERAL 60° < 0 < 120° [ 10.0 x 10 .6 ]
MIXED 120°< e<150 ° [ J
AX,ALz 15oo<o<18oo [ 5.ox1o-6J
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 x 10 .6
I AT EGA2 - 25 I
AXlAL+Z 0° < 0 < 30°
MIXED 30° < 8 < 60°
LATERAL 60° < e < 120°
MIXED 120° < 0 < 150°
AXIAL- Z 150° < 8 < 180°
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 x 10 .6
l AT EGA2. - 10 I
AXIAL+ Z 0° < e < 30°
MIXED 30° < e < 60°
LATERAL 60° < 8 < 120°
MIXED 120 ° < e < 150 °
AXlAL-Z 150°< e < 180°
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 3 x 10 -4
0"6x10"6 I
E I
1.2 x 10"6 J1
1 I
0.6 x 10 -6 I
0.26x10"6 J
i I
I 0"51x 10"6 I
I I
[0.26x10 .6 J
\
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A sixteen-bit checksum is attached to every AACS command in order
to prevent such anomalous commands from affecting the spacecraft.
Accidentally getting this checksum correct has a probability of
2-16 = 1.5 x 10 -5
The most likely way for such a command to be received by the AACS
is for a valid command to be anomalously distorted into an AACS command which
induces thruster action and for that command to have the checksum just happen
to be correct. The probability for this occurring between Venus CA and EGA2 is
(3.5 x 10 -3 ) x (1.5 x 10 -5 ) = 5 x 10 -8
For the following specific periods, probabilities are:
EGA I -60 days to EGA i -25 days: 1.7 x 10 -9
EGA 1 -25 days to EGA 1 -5 days: 9.8 x i0 -I0
EGA i -5 days to EGA I: 2.5 x I0 -I0
EGA 2 -60 days to EGA 2 -25 days: 1.7 x 10 -9
EGA 2 -25 days to EGA 2 -5 days: 9.8 x i0 -I0
EGA 2 -5 days to EGA 2: 2.5 x i0 -I0
It should be noted that these probabilities only account for an
erroneous command being sent by the CDS, and then being accepted by the AACS,
with no allowance for the further reduction when considering the likelihood
that such a command would lead to a thruster firing. This factor was not
pursued in this analysis, since the "probabilities are already so small as to
present no risk to Earth impact.
The probability of recovery from such a failure depends upon the
time available before the next Earth encounter. Recovery probabilities have
been taken from Section 3.2.3 since the initial failure in this case does not
interfere with recovery. The failure probabilities for this category are
shown in Table A-IS.
A.I.8 Spacecraft Drifts Off Sunline
The Galileo spacecraft is protected from extreme temperature
excursions by multi-layer insulation (tiLl), which envelopes critical
subsystems (including the four Retro Propulsion Module (RPM) propellant
tanks), and by mechanical and structural shade devices. The thermal control
systems are designed such that subsystem temperatures will remain within
flight allowable limits as long as the angle between the spacecraft's -Z-axis
and the Sun remains less than 14 °. If the spacecraft loses its Sunpoint
during the first three years of its mission, the resulting thermal problems
could lead to failures which could cause a AV, either through inadvertent
thruster firings or through an impulse due to RPM tank rupture.
Several thermally induced failures were examined, but only two were
determined to be serious enough to analyze in detail. Electronic parts
failures due to high temperatures resulting from offsun conditions are shown
to have very low probabilities of causing _Vs. RPM tank rupture due to
thermally induced overpressure was originally shown to be of significant
concern; however, as a consequence of this determination, the Galileo Project
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Table A-14. Probability of Failure due to CDS Software Failure
and Resulting in the Following _V During the Following Mission Phases
ISUM FOR BOTH EGAs EGA- 60/EGA- 251
AXIAL+Z 0°< 8<30 °
MIXED 30° < 8 < 60° I
LATERAL 60 ° < 8 < 120 '= I _
MIXED 120 ° < 8 < 150 ° I
AXIAL-Z 150 ° < 8 < 180 ° I
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 x 10-6
I EGA - 25/EGA -5 I
AXIAL + Z 0° < 0 -< 30 °
MIXED 30 ° < e -= 60 °
LATERAL 60 ° < 8 ,< 120 °
MIXED 120 ° < e '< 150 °
AXIAL - Z 150 ° < 8 '< 180 °
PROBABILITY OF NO REOOYERY = 3 x 10 -4
5x10 -3
|
AXIAL+Z 0°< 8 <30 °
MIXED 30 °< 0<60 °
LATERAL 60°< 8 < 120 °
MIXED 120 ° < 8 < 150 °
AXIAL - Z 150 '=.< e < 180 °
J -1 m/s J
I
(EGA - 25 to
(EGA - 10 to
I !
I I
I I
I I
I l-l°r_sII lo-3on_sI
I
I
I,,I
i
I
30 - 1000 m/sJ
I II I
I !1 I
3,,xlo91r, lr,,
I II !
I I
I I
I I 2oxlo9I[
I I
I I
II II I
EGA -10)
EGA -5)
I 5.Oxlo-lO I
!1 I
II I
1 II I
II I
II I
I II I
I II I
I II _1
I II I
I II I
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 10 "1
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has incorporated changes to the RPM design which will prevent RPM tank rupture
due to overpressure. The spacecraft would lose attitude control capability if
both redundant halves of some element in the command chain failed. This could
occur in the RFS, MDS, CDS, or AACS.
A.I.8.1 RPM Tank Rupture. One of the most important variables for a
meaningful analysis of thermal failure modes is the process of heating the RPM
tanks. For the purposes of this analysis, worst case conditions were used to
evaluate the probability of RPM tank rupture. Heat transfer from the RPM
tanks to cooler portions of the spacecraft (e.g., the bus) was intentionally
minimized. No blocking effects on direct solar heating of the tanks were
incorporated into this analysis. This is conservative since in reality the
spacecraft structure will shade much of the RPM subsystem even when offsun.
The outer layer (black Kapton) of the blankets does not degrade or disappear
even at the worst case (non-spinning near Venus) temperature of 240°C.
This is conservative since loss of the polyester binder in the blankets'
carbon would result in lower solar absorptance (i.e., lower tank temperatures).
In addition, this study limited its analysis to the spacecraft
spinning condition (non-spinning cases were evaluated, but determined to be
very improbable because it ta_es a precise attitude control adjustment to
completely nullify the spacecraft's rotational velocity). The outer blanket
surface reaches an average temperature around its circumference based on the
thermal equilibrium induced by the spinning condition. The heating sources on
the outer blanket surface consist primarily of direct solar heating and to a
lesser extent heat dissipated from the shunt heater. The shunt heater converts
the excess electrical power of the spacecraft electronic subsystems to heat
which is radiated to the RPM tanks, then ultimately through the blankets to
space. For this study, two shunt heater power states were considered: the
nominal power of 49 W and an unpowered case. (If the spacecraft is pointed
offsun, potential subsystem overtemperature failures could reduce the amount
of electrical power consumed by the subsystems and thus increase the amount of
heat dissipated by the shunt heater. Over 75 W of power could be reasonably
expected under these conditions. Although these cases were not analyzed in
detail, the RPM design changes that have been incorporated into the spacecraft
will eliminate these cases as concerns.)
The distance of the spacecraft from the Sun and the angular
velocity of the spacecraft relative to the Sun as functions of mission time
were accurately modelled in the analysis. The maximum allowable tank
temperatures (burst temperatures) as a function of time (Figure A-4) were
derived from a detailed analysis of tank stress tolerance as a function of
temperature and tank ullage.
The determination of the probability of tank rupture begins with
the determination of the probability of loss of both strings of a subsystem
critical to communication and control. Any such loss requires at least a two
point failure. A two point failure in a specified system has a probability of
i0 -4 of occurring sometime during the mission (see Sections 3.2.1 and
3.2.2). There are three potential failure locations within the CDS: HCD, HLM,
and Bus; three potential failure locations within the AACS: CPU, I0, and PDE;
one potential failure location in the RFS, and one potential failure location
in the MDS. This results in a total probability of 8 x 10 -4 for a two point
failure causing the loss of a critical communication subsystem.
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Figure A-4. Steady-State Tank Temperatures for 90 ° 0ff-Sun Attitude
A-34
1625-396, Rev. A
The determination of the probability of tank rupture continues with
the determination of the probability of the tanks exceeding their burst
temperature. Examplesof typical tank temperature histories during offsun
conditions for loss of commandcapability at 250, 550, and 800 days are shown
in Figures A-5 and A-6. Note that loss of commandcapability at 250 days
results in tank burst at about 370 days, very close to the first Earth
encounter. Loss of commandcapability at 550 days is not a problem since the
tank burst temperature is reached after the second Earth encounter. However,
loss of commandcapability at 800 days results in at 800 days results in tank
burst temperatures being exceededjust a few days before the second Earth
encounter.
The length of time from loss of commandcapability to tank burst is
obtained by determining whenthe tank temperature will exceed its limit. This
is done for each day of the mission. This information is plotted on Figure A-7
for launch through the second encounter. There are three periods of
vulnerability where the time of tank burst following loss of command
capability is before one of the two encounters.
The first period of vulnerability is from VenusCA-30 (closest
approach minus 30 days) to EGAI-90, resulting in tank burst prior to EGAI.(The period begins at VenusCA-30 rather than launch because this is the first
time whenthe actual rupture would occur after Venus CA. A rupture before
VenusCAis extremely unlikely to result in an impacting trajectory.) This is
eight percent of the mission (240 days/8 years). The total probability of the
tanks bursting during the first period of vulnerability is thus 6.4 x 10-5
(0.08 x 8 x 10-4). The time of the tank rupture due to a loss of command
capability in this period ranges from Venus CA to EGAI.
The second period of vulnerability is from EGAI-90 to EGAI+75,
resulting in tank burst after EGAI but prior to EGA2. This is six percent of
the mission (165 days/8 years). The total probability of the tanks bursting
during the second period of vulnerability is thus 4.8 x 10 -5 (0.06 x 8 x
10-4). The time of tank rupture due to a loss of command capability in this
period ranges from EGAI to EGA2, but is strongly weighted toward the first i00
days after EGAI. Note that a rupture during the first i00 days after EGAI is
unlikely to result in an impacting trajectory since there would be no
opportunity for the necessary trajectory correction maneuver to target the
spacecraft for EGA2. This second period of vulnerability is thus broken into
two subperiods, EGAI-90 to EGAI+50 when the rupture occurs during the first
i00 days after EGAI, and EGAI+50 to EGAI+75 when the rupture occurs closer to
EGA2. The probabilities of burst for these two subperiods are 4.i x 10 -5
and 7.3 x 10 -6, respectively.
The third period of vulnerability is from EGA2-345 to EGA2-145,
resulting in tank burst very near EGA2. This is seven percent of the mission
(200 days/8 years). The total probability of the tanks bursting during the
third period of vulnerability is thus 5.6 x 10 -5 (0.07 x 8 x 10-4). For
this third period, the rupture will occur between EGA2-10 and EGA2.
Note that the periods of EGAI+75 to EGA2-345 and EGA2- 145 and
beyond all result in tank burst after EGA2 and therefore are of no concern
with regard to the Earth avoidance issue.
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In all of the periods, the worst case failure mode of the tanks was
determined to be a sudden rupture as opposed to a leak since the tanks will be
stressed to the point of failure of the tank wall. The _V imparted to the
spacecraft due to the escaping liquid in the ruptured tank is a function of
the ullage in the tank at the time of rupture. The rupture was modelled for
each type of tank and for each period of vulnerability. It was determined
that one nitrogen tetroxide tank would rupture first, imparting a &V to the
spacecraft. This would relieve the pressure on the remaining nitrogen
tetroxide tank, and escaping liquid and gas from it would have an additional
effect on the spacecraft velocity. This event would be followed by a similar
rupture of one mono-methyl hydrazine tank imparting another &V and relieving
the remaining tank. The resulting &V would be the vector sum of the effects
of the two tank ruptures.
Several hardware changes were considered to reduce the offsun risk
to the RPM tank. The two most viable changes were to add a pressure relief
system to the oxidizer and fuel tanks and to put new insulation blankets with
a low absorptance to emittance ratio around the RPM tanks. Due to its
superior results in reducing the offsun risk to the RPM tanks (as well as
protecting against high shunt heater power dissipation), a pressure relief
system was chosen to be incorporated into the spacecraft (ref. JPL IOM
353-GLL-88-007, R. Fradet to R. Spehalski, "Conceptual Design of a Relief
System to Protect Against RPM Thermal Overpressure;" January 25, 1988).
The pressure relief system (shown in Figure A-8) consists of a
burst disk/relief valve provided to each of the oxidizer and fuel tank
pressurization systems down stream of the check valves. Each vent line is
terminated with a T to insure that no net _V is caused by venting of helium
and propellant vapors.
This design change was readily incorporated into the RPM with
minimal packaging impact, and did not have any impact on any shuttle safety
items. The long exposure time of the burst disk to propellant vapors is a
potential mission reliability concern, but the Viking 75 mission provided
successful in-flight experience with identical hardware. However, if the
effectiveness of the burst disk is degraded, the relief valve will continue to
provide adequate, albeit with loss of redundancy, overpressurization
protection.
This design concept will reduce the probability of RPM tank rupture
by 10 -4 , the chance that the redundant pressure relief valve system fails to
operate. Thus, the worst case probability of tank rupture is the sum of the
probabilities from each period of vulnerability from above multiplied by 10 -4 ,
i.e., (6.4 x 10 -5 + 4.1 x 10 -5 + 7.3 x 10 -6 + 5.6 x 10-5)x 10 -4 which
equals 1.7 x 10 -8 .
A.I.8.2 Electronics (AACS) Parts Failure. Several worst case conditions were
used to evaluate the probability of electronic parts failure. The most
conservative VEEGA Mission Bay 8 shear plate prediction (33°C) was used for
this study. A simple equilibrium energy balance between the Bay 8 shear plate
and the AACS, which included solar heating of the AACS, was used to calculate
AACS piece part temperatures for both spinning and non-splnning conditions. For
these failures, only conservative steady-state conditions with the spacecraft's
Z-axis perpendicular to the Sun were considered. The energy
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balance used values of absorptance and emittance equal to 0.32 and 0.8,
respectively, for the louver system on the AACS. To be conservative, a 30°C
rise from the shear plate to the junction was used. Generic IC single piece
part failure probabilities were calculated from MIL-STD-217E. The probability
of failure of electronic piece parts equals 1.0 when their junction
temperature reaches 175°C. Figure A-9 shows the AACS part temperatures for
a 90 ° off-Sun attitude for both spinning and non-spinning bus cases. Figure
A-10 shows the probability of failure for various AACS logic devices at a
spinning 90 ° off-Sun attitude.
The determination of the probability of electronic parts failure
begins with the determination of the probability of an occurrence which leads
to an offsun condition. Any such occurrence must be the result of a two point
failure which has been previously shown to have a probability of 8 x 10 -4 .
The determination of the probability of electronics parts failure continues
with the determination of the probability of a PDE parts failure which leads
to thrust. A very conservative upper bound for the number of parts for which
a failure may affect the thrust valves is 103. If the parts are 90 ° offsun
for i0 days near Venus CA (the worst case) then the probability of a single
part failure is 0.015 (0.06/106 hours x I0 days x 103 parts). The probability
of a part failure at some time in the mission affecting thruster valves is not
greater than 1.2 x 10 -5 (0.015 x 8 x 10-4). Since these probabilities are
very small, upper bounds for this category can be calculated.
If the probability of a parts failure is equally likely from Venus
CA to EGA2 (assumed to be the worst-case value of 0.06 x 10 -6 failures per
hour from Figure A-10), then the probability of failure from EGA-180 to EGA-20
is 6.6 x I0 -! (160 days/8 years x 1.2 x I0-_), the probability from EGA-20
to EGA-10 is 4.1 x 10 -8 (10 days/8 years x 1.2 x i0-_), the probability
from EGAI0 to EGA-3-1/2 is 2.7 x 10 -8 (6-i/2 days/8 _ears x 1.2 x 10-b),
the probability from EGA-3-1/2 to EGA-I is 1.0 x I0- (2-1/2 days/8 years x
1.2 x 10-5), and the probability from EGA-I to EGA is 4.1 x 10 -9 (i day/8
years x 1.2 x 10-5). These values are applicable to both EGAI and EGA2.
A.1.8.3 Other Failures. Other failures involving an offsun condition were
considered, but are not worst case scenarios. For example, thruster valve
failure due to drifting offsun is not probable because valves are acceptance
tested to i15°C and are designed to survive to 160°C, but the valves'
temperatures will always be less than or equal to the tanks' temperatures
which will never exceed I14°C as shown by analysis (Figure A-4). Another
example, stuck thrusters, is not a worst-case cause of drifting off-Sun
because although stuck thrusters are caused by a two point failure and they
result in an unpredictable offsun condition followed by orbital drift, they
have a very high probability of recovery unlike the communication failure
which assumes none.
The probabilities of RPM tank rupture as a function of mission time
and resulting _Vs are shown in Table A-15.The probabilities of electronics
(AACS) parts failure are shown in Table A-16.
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Figure A-10. Probability of Failure for AACS Logic Devices
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Table A-15. Probability of Failure Due to Off-Sun Thermal Failure -- Tank
Rupture Resulting in the Following _V During the Following Mission Phases
I VENUS CA TO EGA1 1
Z AXIAL+Z 0°< e <30 °
o c0
O MIXED 30° < e < 600
O
I- o LATERAL 60°< e < 120 °
w
_>c0
,,_ __ MIXED 120o< e < 150 °
n.- AXIAL - Z 150 ° < 8 < 180 °
6TO 14m/s I
! I
I I
6.4 x 10 -9
I !
I i
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 1
! EGA1 TO EGAI+ 100 DAYS J
Z AXIAL+ Z 0°< 0<300 I I
o<n
¢n_ MIXED 30°< e<60° I JO
_1'-_ LATERAL 60o< 0 <120 ° J 4.1X10 -9 J
I I<: _ MIXED 120 ° < 0 < 150 °
,..J--
,,- ,x,,L-z ,,0o<_.:,,,0oI I
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 1
I EGA1 + 100 DAYS TO EGA2 - 10 DAYS I
AXIAL+ Z 0°<0< 300 I I
_o _,x_o =0o<_<_ooI I
,,,°_ _._E,,_, _0o<_<,_0o17.3x,o"OI
>_
_ MIXED 120°< e<150° I I
_ AXIAL- Z 150°<8 <180° I I
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 1
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Table A-15. Probability of
Tank Rupture Resulting in
Mission
Failure Due to Off-Sun Thermal Failure
the Followin_ AV During the Following
Phases (Continued)
I EGA2 - 10 DAYS TO EGA2
z AXIAL+Z 0° < 8 < 30 °
Oco
O MIXED 30°< e<60 °
O
I- _ LATERAL 60° < e < 120 °
ILl
>co
._r_ MIXED 120 ° < e < 150 °
iii
.6TO 14 m/s]
I
[ J
[ ]
[ _._x,0-_]
[ ]
I ]
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 1
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Table A-16. Probability of Failure Due to Off-Sun Thermal Failure --
Parts Resulting in the Following _V During the Following Mission Phases
FOR EACH EGA
EGA - 180/EGA - 20
AXIAL+Z 0o< 8 <30 °
MIXED 30 ° < e < 60 °
LATERAL 60 o < 8 < 120 °
MIXED 120 ° < 8 < 150 °
AXlAL-Z 150 °< 8 <180 °
[ 0.1m/s ] [ 1-10rn/s [ I 10-30m/s ] 130-1000m/s]
I
L 1[ IL J[ I
L IL JL Ji I
I-- I[ ,.,x,0-_1 L _ J [ --I
L IL It Jl J
[ IL IL Jl ]
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 x 10 -6
z
o9
O
w
_>
<
.J
uJ
tr
EGA- 20/EGA - 10 J
AXlAL+Z (p< 8 <30 ° [
MIXED 30 o < 8 < 60 o L
LATERAL 600< 8 < t20 ° L --'
MIXED 120 o• e < 1_° L
AXIAL - Z 150 ° < 8 < 180 ° L
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 3 x 10 -4
1[ ![ Jl I
IL IL J[ J
l[ 4.1x10"8J[ _ J l _ J
It IL Jl J
IL IL Jl J
V
Z
O
p-
w
_>
5
w
EGA - 10/EGA - 3-1/2 J
AXIAL +Z 0o< 8 < 30 ° [
MIXED 30 ° < 8 < 60 ° [
LATERAL 60o4 8 < 120 ° [ --,
MIXED 120 ° < 8 < 150o [
AXIAL - Z 150 ° < 8 < 180 ° [
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 5 x 10 -3
It IL ]1 ]
IL It ]t ]
! L2.TX10-6II _ I[ _ J
It IL ]L ]
It IL ]1 ]
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Table A-16. Probability of Failure Due to Off-Sun Thermal Failure --
Parts Resulting in the Following _V During the Following
Mission Phases (Continued)
EGA - 3-1/2/EGA - 1
AXIAL +Z
MIXED
LATERAL
MIXED
AXIAL - Z
L
J
0-1 m/s I [ l"10m/s i L1030m/s J [30-1000m/s_
oo.,._oo I 11 I[ Jl
_o°_,<,o° I l[ II 11
,o°.,<,_o° I-- ]1 ,.ox,o-,I[ _ J l
_o°__o° I !1 II I1
_o°__o° I !1 I L J l
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 0.1
z
co
O
t--
LU
>_
5
w
EGA - 1/EGA - 0 I
AXIAL + Z 0°< 8<30° I I L I [ J L
_,x_o =o°<_o° I II I[ J l
,_,_, ,o°<_._=o°I-- II 4.1xlo-9 l[ _ J[
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 0.9
A-47
1625-396, Rev. A
A.2 ENVIRONMENTAL FAILURES
A.2.1 Meteoroid Damage to Propellant Tanks.
Although no interplanetary spacecraft is known to have suffered
catastrophic meteoroid damage, meteoroid-induced failure of a Galileo
propellant tank poses a potential Earth impact risk. The failure has the
potential of expelling several hundred kilograms of propellant, imparting
velocity to the spacecraft and enveloping it in a cloud of caustic vapor.
resulting spacecraft damage makes a recovery maneuver unlikely.
The
As l.J_er sections will show, empirical knowledge of the solar
system's meteoroid distribution is incomplete, especially for meteoroids large
enough to harm propellant tanks. Extensive data exist for large meteors
(based on lunar and Martian cratering) and for fine meteoric dust (estimated
from zodiacal light observations), but little is available for intermediate
sizes. Since the meteoroid sizes relevant to spacecraft failures fall in this
intermediate range, this report must rely on available models which employ
interpolations to predict the likelihood of tank failure. Where assumptions
must be made, they have been chosen to err conservatively, overestimating
rather than underestimating the risk.
To assist in the estimation of the critical mass to puncture a
Galileo propellant tank, JPL contracted with H. Swift, an expert in the field
of hypervelocity impacts, to provide a detail_d description of the mechanics
of meteoroid penetration. This study, reviewed by other experts in the field,
provides the best understanding to date of the interaction of micrometeoroids
with fluid-filled tank walls and bumper shields.
The question of how a micrometeoroid penetration affects a tank was
also the subject of significant analyses. These included studies of fluid
flow from a punctured tank, effects of multiple tank failures including
combustion and propellant discharge, effects of propellant escape on
spacecraft dynamics, and vulnerability of blankets and electronics to free
propellants. The findings of all of these studies contributed to the results
in the following sections.
The Galileo propulsion system uses four spherical titanium tanks to
carry Galileo's 955 kg propellant supply. The fuel (monomethyl hydrazine) and
oxidizer (nitrogen tetroxide) reside in tank pairs as shown in Figure A-If.
The innermost propellant tank halves are completely enclosed by solid
spacecraft structure; thruster booms and electronic bays partially surround
the outermost tank halves, but otherwise only their multi-layer insulation
(MLI) lies between them and space (see Table A-17).
In flight, the spacecraft rotation holds the propellant against the
outer tank walls where tubing leads it to the thrusters. Helium pressurant,
used to drive the propellant out to the thrusters, fills the ullage volumes,
the tanks' remaining capacity, along the inside wall. Together, these
fluid/gas vessels operate at pressures between approximately 17 and 20
atmospheres, depending on temperature. Even up through the second Earth
encounter, the tanks will still contain nearly their full launch load of
propellant, approximately 90% by volume.
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Table A-17. Characteristics of Galileo RPM Meteoroid Protection
Material
Total Areal
Density Thickness Density
gm/cm 3 cm No. Layers gm/cm 2
BUMPER SHIELD CHARACTERISTICS
MYLAR
KAPTON
TEFLON
NYLON NET
TITANIUM ALLOY
TITANIUM ALLOY
1.38 6.35 x 10-4 20 0.01753
1.38 2.54 x 10-3 4 0.01402
2.00 5.08 x 10-3 i 0.01016
0.95 --- 21 0.01469
TOTAL AREAL DENSITY = 0.05640
TANK CHARACTERISTICS
PROPELLANT TANKS (4)
4.54 0.08 1 0.36320
PRESSURANT TANKS (2)
i
8.65 m 2
0.75 m
0.38 m
4.54 0.35
DIMENSIONS
SENSITIVE AREA:
PROPELLANT TANK DIAMETERS:
PRESSURANT TANK DIAMETERS:
BLANKET STAND-OFF FROM TANKS: > 0.I m
1.58900
V
Figure A-12 shows a simplified picture of how the Galileo
propellant tanks interconnect with the rest of the propulsion system. When
thruster firings burn off propellant, high pressure helium (about 200
atmospheres at launch) flows through a pressure regulator which expands the
helium, lowering the downstream pressure to about 17 atmospheres. Helium
pressurant then flows into the propellant tanks through either of two
spring-loaded check valves; these valves permit helium to flow into the tank
but automatically seal themselves so neither helium nor propellant vapor can
flow back out. Once inside the propellant tanks, this new pressurant settles
in the ullage volumes, replacing propellant volume lost by firing the
thrusters. Fault protection software continuously monitors tank pressures so
it can detect and isolate a failed regulator; relief valves, added for the
VEEGA mission, protect against overpressures caused by anomalous solar heating
of the tanks (see Section A.I.8).
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Cometary and asteroidal particles in orbit around the Sun may
impact Galileo surfaces and cause damage. Particulate sizes range from dust
particles with masses below 10 -6 g up to km-sized asteroids, while the
velocities range from a few km/s up to 50 km/s. Here, the discussion
concentrates on particles with masses between I0 and I000 mg and speeds
between about 5 km/s and 30 km/s as these correspond to the approximate range
of values associated with the lowest mass particles capable of penetrating
Galileo's meteoroid protection and causing an RPM tank failure. Since tank
failure due to meteoroid impact represents the only major source of gV from
meteoroids, particles capable of penetrating the RPM shield are the primary
particulate threat to a successful Earth flyby.
A micrometeoroid of sufficient size and velocity will penetrate the
micrometeoroid shield, either intact or producing an expanding shell of fluid
or debris which penetrates the tank wall. This penetration results either in
a hole in the tank of some size or a crack which may propagate to the
gas-filled ullage region of the tank, causing a violent tank rupture. Such a
tank rupture is likely to involve all four propellant tanks and may result in
combustion of propellants in the inner regions of the RPM.
Both tank holes and rupture induced combustion result in an
anomalous AV imparted to the spacecraft due to the momentum carried off by
escaping propellants. The two cases result in similar amounts of AV
imparted, albeit from very different processes. Therefore, it was not
necessary tQ address the difficult question of which of the processes was most
likely. Instead the two were considered equally likely in the analysis,
noting that if either process were determined to dominate, the change in the
overall Earth impact probability would be negligible.
The failure analysis is described in the following three sections.
First, the characterization of the meteoroid environment and the analysis of
tank susceptibility to failure will be described and the probability of a tank
failure determined. Next, the analysis of the consequences of tank holes and
ruptures and the AV resulting from these occurrences will be described. In
the final section, the calculations leading to probability of failure and
resultant _V will be summarized.
A.2.1.1 Micrometeoroid Failure Mechanism. This subsection provides an
estimate of the threat in terms of the probability that the RPM will be struck
by a meteoroid large enough to cause failure during the portion of the Galileo
mission between launch and second Earth flyby. Failure probability
calculations require meteoroid fluence models as a function of mass and speed
(velocity relative to the spacecraft), critical mass (meteoroid size capable
of penetrating a tank) as a function of speed, and the exposed sensitive
area. Each model will be discussed.
In this analysis, the probabilities for the Galileo trajectory
profile in terms of the instantaneous probability of meteoroid penetration
will be computed for four different populations. The first is based on the
cometary meteoroid model (density of 0.5 g/cm 3) adopted by the Galileo
Project following a review by a panel of experts in the field. The second is
based on the original NASA guidelines for computing the cometary meteoroid
fluence and velocity. The third model, again based on the original NASA
guidelines, is used to compute the asteroidal meteoroid component (density of
3.5 g/cm3). The final model is that for the debris environment around the
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Earth. Debris particles are taken to have a density of about 2.8 g/cm 3 --
between that of the cometary and asteroidal debris. The debris model is based
on the I-I0 cm NSSR and NORAD observations for the altitude and latitude
distribution, and on modelled and measured mass distributions between 500 and
600 km as described in Aguero, R., "Earth Debris Model," JPL IOM 5137-88-118,
June 14, 1988. These models are referred to respectively as the Galileo
model, NASA cometary model, the NASA asteroidal model, and the debris model.
The interplanetary meteoroid models used here are all based on the
NASA cometary and asteroidal models as defined in publications NASA SP-8013,
SP-8038, and SP-8042 which date from 1969-1970. (These models are
comprehensively described in the referenced NASA documents and will not be
discussed further.) Subsequent modification of the two NASA models was
carried out by a con_mittee (the Galileo Meteoroid Panel) convened by the
Galileo Project Office in 1978-1980 to incorporate the latest Pioneer I0/ii
meteoroid data. As the Galileo model has never been formally documented, the
major recommendations of the Panel are repeated here:
i) The NASA meteoroid model consists of two populations:
cometary (density of 0.5 g/cm 3) and asteroidal (density of
3.5 g/cm3). Based on the Pioneer i0/ii results which
indicated the absence of an asteroidal component at low
masses, the panel recommended that only the cometary
componen_ be considered.
2) Except for the spatial density, the NASA cometary model was
used as the basis for the Galileo Model. The NASA cometary
model includes an R-I.5 power dependence of the spatial
density on distance. As a conservative assumption, the panel
recommended assuming a constant density between i and 5 AU
for the Galileo model.
3) The constant particle spatial density of the Galileo model
was taken to be twice that of the NASA cometary model at i
AU. (Note: as the original mission did not go inside I AU,
nothing was decided by the panel for variations within i AU.
It has, however, been tacitly assumed in the current study
that the factor of 2 and constant spatial density should also
be applied within I AU.)
4) The flux was assumed to be isotropic.
Subsequent work with the Galileo Model has led to this additional
assumption:
5) The so-called "_ factor" in the NASA cometary model which
accounts for the distribution of actual spacecraft to
meteoroid relative velocities has been eliminated from the
Galileo model.
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For the purposes of this analysis, the most conservative approach
was taken to evaluate the bounding case. The Galileo cometary model as
described above was used in conjunction with the NASA asteroidal model. In
order to demonstrate the conservatism of these assumptions, the probability of
tank failure will be presented for the NASA cometary model as well. As will
be shown, the total set of assumptions is more conservative than either the
Galileo model or the NASA model taken separately.
The susceptibility of a tank to failure by a micrometeoroid was
the subject of extensive study. Analyses used in the past to determine shield
thickness such as those by Cour-Palais (AIAA Paper 69-372, 1969 and Int. J.
Impact Engng., Vol. 5, pp. 221-237, 1987) were reviewed. Eowever, none of the
existing work adequately dealt with a hypervelocity impact to a tank partially
filled with liquid and the remainder with pressurized gas. As a result, a
study was commissioned to calculate the characteristics of the threshold
particle which could penetrate a Galileo Propellant tank. The study was
performed by H. Swift, an expert in the field of hypervelocity impacts, and
reviewed by Professor T. Ahrens (CIT), another expert in the field, as well as
several members of the JPL Technical Staff.
The tanks are protected by a micrometeoroid shield which will be
described below. The analysis of the threshold mass and velocity for
penetration is determined as a function of the shield parameters and is also
described in the lollowing section. The results of the analysis are
summarized in the final section.
The MLI enclosing the propellant tanks, as with all Galileo thermal
blanketing, provides both thermal control and meteoroid protection. It is
made from Kapton plastic sheets and alternate sheets of Mylar and nylon mesh
sandwiching a single 2-mil Teflon layer, then stitched together with Dacron
thread. To enhance meteoroid protection, fiberglass arches hold the MLI at
least I0 cm from the tank walls, giving the blanketed RPM core the appearance
of a large inner tube.
Most meteoroids, those weighing in the tens of milligrams or less,
vaporize or pulverize on impact with the MLI. Larger, less plentiful
_eteoroids, around I00 milligrams, may or may not vaporize or pulverize
depending upon their velocity and density. In the most extreme and least
probable case, the spacecraft will encounter a meteoroid greater than I00
milligrams which perforates the MLI intact.
Vaporized or pulverized meteoroids form a debris cloud upon exiting
the MLI. The large gap between the MLI and the tanks allows this debris cloud
to disperse over an area of at least several square centimeters before
striking a tank wall. Meteoroids of sufficiently low mass and velocity form
debris clouds which only briefly deform a tank wall. Larger meteoroids break
open tank walls with either a more powerful debris cloud or an intact
particle. These specific failures are discussed in more detail in the
following material.
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Whethera meteoroid will penetrate a tank is a function of its mass
and velocity and the characteristics of the tank and shield, including their
thicknesses and separation. A kinematic analysis was done on the impacting
projectile to determine massand velocity thresholds for the tank parameters.
Cometaryand asteroidal meteoroids were treated separately since their
different densities, 0.5 and 3.5 gm/cm3 respectively, affect the thresholds.
The first test of whether an incident particle will cause tank
failure is whether it is either fully pulverized or vaporized in passing
through the bumpershield. It was found that all cometary meteoroids in the
relevant massrange are easily vaporized by the available energy of the
collision. Stony, dense asteroidal meteoroids, however, can be treated with
confidence as fully crushed only if the shock waveduration is longer than the
time it takes the shock wave to pass through the meteoroid. In this case the
meteoroid is isostatically or "fully shocked" and disintegrates. Any
meteoroid which is not fully shocked is considered to be capable of
penetrating a tank.
Fully shockedmeteoroids pass from the bumpershield to the tank as
an expanding shell of debris. For this debris cloud to penetrate the tank it
must satisfy two conditions as it strikes the tank. First, the thickness of
the incipient spall, ts, (which is proportional to the wavelength of the shock
wave in the tank wall) must be less than the tank w_ll thickness, tt. This is
required to form a reflected tensile shock wave in a region of the wall which
is not undergoing the incident compressive shock. Thus, a condition which is
denoted by "ts = tt" bounds the region for which a tensile stress exists which
will pull material away from the inner surface of the tank. This material is
referred to as spall.
The second condition is that the pressure induced by the reflected
tensile wave must exceed the tank wall strength. This is referred to as the
"no spall" condition. Meteoroids for which the debris cloud meets these two
conditions will induce separation of material from the inner tank wall surface.
If this spall removesenoughmaterial to exceed the stress
tolerance of the tank at its operating pressure, the tank will fail.
Otherwise, the spall is termed "acceptable spall."
The results of this analysis are shownin Figure A-13. Separate
curves are plotted for cometary (p = 0.5 gm/cm3) and asteroidal (p = 3.5
gm/cm3) meteoroids. The results are also presented for two values of bumper
shield and tank separation, S. The minimumvalue of S is i0 cm, but most of
the tank is over 15 cm from the shield. Greater separations result in
increased meteoroid thresholds for fully shockedparticles since the cloud has
more time to diffuse and disperse its momentum.Since at least 90%of the
tanks' outward facing surface is greater than 15 cmfrom the shield, the
separation wasvery conservatively treated as 10%at I0 cmand 90%at 15 cm in
determining the threshold meteoroid massand velocity at a given point in the
spacecraft trajectory.
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For each of the four combinations of density and spacing, Figure
A-13 showsthe threshold penetrating meteoroid parameters. The limiting
factor in each region of the curves is labelled as described in the previous
section. Only asteroidal meteoroids showa "fully shocked" threshold. The
"t s = tt" and "no spall" conditions for spall production are also shown.
The "transmitted waveno spall" refers to the "no spall" condition applied to
a shock wavethat has passed through the fluid inside the tank and reflected
off its inside surface. "Acceptable spall" conditions are also shown.
For the pressurant tanks, which contain only gas, more traditional
constraints apply. The threshold mass is inversely proportional to velocity
in all regions and dependsupon the square of the separation.
As just discussed, the critical mass for the existing Galileo
configuration was found to vary in a complex fashion with impact velocity,
density, and spacing. The probability of an impact of a meteoroid of this
massor larger on the RPMduring the VEEGAmission is computedby multiplying
the meteoroid fluence by an estimate of the sensitive area of the RPM. To a
high degree of accuracy, this cumulative probability of impact of a meteoroid
on the Galileo RPMis given by:
Prob(t) = F(t) * A
where:
t = elapsed time since launch
F meteoroid fluence at or above critical mass as a
function of time
t
= 0.25_0 p(t) <V(t)> dt
A = Appropriate sensitive area for Galileo (Table A.17)
p Spatial density for critical mass at average velocity
at time t
<V> = Average impact velocity (speed) at time t
The meteoroid fluence as a function of time is derived for each of
the four environment models. Specifically, a "p" and a "<V>" are computed for
time steps along the Galileo trajectory and the above equation integrated to
give "F" for the appropriate spacing and particle species. The results of
this probability of failure calculation will now be presented.
Given the questionable existence of the asteroidal component and
the ability to bias the trajectory to limit these effects, cometary meteoroids
are the most critical population for the Earth avoidance study. The impact
probabilitles as a function of mission elapsed time (MET) for the Galileo and
NASA Cometary models are plotted in Figure A-14 and listed in Table A-18.
These values are derived using the critical mass necessary to penetrate the
propellant tanks assuming the MLI is spaced 15 cm away from 90% of the
sensitive areas and I0 cm away from the remaining 10%.
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Figure A-13. Variations in Meteoroid Critical Mass for RPM Propellant Tanks
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As in the case of the cometary meteoroids, the probability of an
asteroidal meteoroid impact is given by the product of the fluence and
sensitive area. Unlike the cometary meteoroids, however, the asteroidal
component will, if it exists, only be observed in and near the asteroid
belts. This behavior is reflected in Figure A-15 where it is clear that,
through the time of the second Earth flyby, only between the two flybys is
there any risk of encountering this component. The flux is strongly modulated
by orbital position, approaching zeronear the Earth. In order to guarantee
that the total estimated probability of tank failure is an upper bound of the
actual probability, this study will assume the existence of the asteroidal
component despite the Galileo Meteoroid Panel recommendations. The final
probability is listed in Table A-18.
The Earth debris environment resembles the asteroidal component in
its behavior. First, the density is quite high (2.8 g/cm 3) so that the
critical mass is roughly the same. Secondly, the debris are concentrated only
near the Earth so that the flux is non-negligible for only a short time during
the two Earth flybys. Similarly, the probability of a propellant tank hit is
given by the product of the fluence and sensitive area. This probability is
plotted in Figure A-16 where it becomes clear that only for a few minutes
during the first and second Earth flybys is there any chance of encountering
this component. At this time, the AV required to achieve an impacting
trajectory is so large that the risk is essentially non-existent. Table A-18
lists the final results for debris impact.
The four propellant tanks are filled with liquids and, as shown in
Swift (1988), this critically alters the mass/velocity curves. As a result,
the penetration curves are very dependent on the density and other properties
of the incoming particles (se_ Figure A-13). The two pressurant tanks, on the
other hand, are filled with gas and therefore respond more like a typical
double meteor shield and are nearly independent of the density of the incoming
particle. The critical mass/velocity penetration is given by the formula:
m c = 0.0168 S2/V
where:
m c = Critical penetration mass (grams)
S = Shield spacing (centimeters)
V = Relative impact velocity (kilometers/second)
The geometry of the helium tank shield is also somewhat simpler
than for the propellant tanks, making possible a direct integration of the
penetrating fluence per unit area as a function of spacing over the shield
surface area. This integration gives the probabilities of failure listed in
Table A-18.
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Table A-18. Meteoroid Impact Tank Failure Probabilities
for Launch Through Second Earth Flyby: 9 Oct. 1989 - 12 Dec. 1992
System
Probability*
of Tank Failure
PROPELLANT TANKS
Galileo Cometary Model
NASA Asteroidal Model
Debris Model
6.07 x 10 -6
4.37 x 10 -4
1.40 x i0 -I0
PRESSURANT TANKS
Galileo Cometary Model
NASA Asteroidal Model
3.06 x 10 -6
1.23 x 10 -5
*Assumes 7.74 m 2 of area at 15 cm spacing, 0.86 m 2 of area at I0 cm
spacing and 0.0564 gm/cm 2 of shielding.
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Table A-18 and Figures A-14 through A-16 show the probabilities of
RPMpenetration by a micrometeoroid. Since the probability of an Earth debris
hit is so low, it will be ignored. The remaining results are combinedto
produce a total probability of RPMpenetration b_ a cometary meteoroid, 9.13 x
10-6 , and by an asteroidal meteoroid, 4.49 x 10-4 . For the former case,
although the actual failure probability varies slightly from launch to EGA2,
this probability was modeledas uniform over this period. For the latter
case, the failure risk is only present while in the asteroid belt between1.5
and 4.2 AUand is fairly constant during that period. The failure is,
therefore, treated as equally likely from launch plus 1.8 years to launch plus
2.7 years and zero at all other times before the second Earth encounter.
Thesedata are sunmmrizedin Table A-19.
A.2.1.2 Consequences of Tank Failure. Empirical observations show that
tank punctures behave differently for liquid-filled and gas-filled volumes.
Walls of liquid-filled pressure vessels tend to crack, while the walls of
gas-filled vessels are more likely to shatter. Discussions with industry
experts led to the conclusion that meteoroid penetration of a Galileo
propellant tank, containing mostly liquid with a small gas-filled ullage,
would cause the tank to fail as if liquid-filled, but the tank may also
exhibit gas-filled behavior when the resulting crack contacts the ullage
bubble. The following scenario (Figure A-17) describes the best estimate of
how a nearly full propellant tank behaves when struck by debris from
meteoroids above the critical mass.
Since blanketing disperses the debris striking the tank walls, a
large meteoroid impact forms a crack rather than a pinhole. Internal
pressures rapidly enlarge the crack into a "clamshell" rupture. Once started,
this crack, spreading at near-sonic velocity, randomly propagates around the
tank. If the crack enters the ullage bubble region, compressed helium gas
escapes into the RPM central cavity, immediately relieving internal
pressures. The sudden gas release may shatter that part of the tank wall.
Crack propagation and possible gas release occur before most of the tank's
propellant can exit the tank.
Table A-19. Probability of RPM Tank Failure Due to Impact by a
Micrometeoroid Between Launch and Second Earth Flyby
Meteoroid
Source
Cometary
Asteroidal
Total Failure
Probability
9.13 x 10 -6
4.49 x 10 -4
Period of
Vulnerability
Launch to EGA2
Launch + 1.8 yrs to
launch + 2.7 yrs
Probability
per day
7.8 x 10 -9
1.4 x 10 -6
As a minimum, a failed propellant tank will be left with a large
gash opened toward space. If the crack extends to the ullage bubble, the tank
may also have a large hole where the gas release fragmented the interior
wall. Either way, the tank releases its contents.
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In the case of a single tank failure, the liquid is pushed out of
the tank by the pressurant behind it. This propellant discharge is the
mechanism by which AV is applied to the spacecraft.
If a propellant tank crack contacts the ullage region before
internal pressures have been relieved, rapid gas release may shatter part of
the tank wall. As compressed helium escapes into the central cavity, it
carries off any titanium fragments and accelerates them to high speeds. This
tank wall "shrapnel" readily broaches any tanks it encounters (see Figure
A-17b).
The conditions for creating shrapnel from a mixed fluid/gas-filled
tank are complex and not well understood. Some researchers believe that no
shrapnel will be created while others regard shrapnel generation as nearly
certain. No relevant empirical data could be found to resolve this question.
Therefore, to adopt the more conservative approach, this report assumes
meteoroid damage to a propellant tank will be as likely to produce shrapnel as
not. Subsequent sections show that these two failure scenarios lead to AV
distributions of roughly similar magnitude.
Unlike propellant tanks, pressurant tanks fail in a well-defined
manner. Based on empirical data, meteoroid damage to these tanks results in
violent releases of high pressure helium (about 200 atmospheres versus less
than 20 atmospheres for the propellant tanks) and shattering of the vessel.
High-speed titanium pieces scatter in all directions. Given their proximity
to the RPM central body, pressurant tank shards are almost certain to
penetrate adjacent fuel and oxidizer tanks. Nearby blanketing will also be
ripped open, exposing damaged tanks to space.
When one or more propellant tanks break open, the energy released
drives liquid propellant through the exterior clamshell crack and so perturbs
the spacecraft's velocity. This energy comes from either fuel and oxidizer
combustion in the the case of multiple tank failures or discharge of
pressurized fuel, oxidizer, or helium in the case of single tank failures.
The presence or absence of propellant tank shrapnel determines
which energy source dominates. For example, combustion requires propellant
mixing in a confined volume like the RPM central cavity. This only occurs if
a damaged propellant tank releases shrapnel. Since this scenario releases the
damaged tank's compressed helium before the liquid slug can accelerate
outward, only combustion effects impart thrust. If, on the other hand, the
meteoroid-stricken tank releases no shrapnel, damage is confined to that
single tank; propellant pushed out by the discharge of compressed helium
pressurant is the only significant source of thrust.
Combustion requires fuel and oxidizer to mix together; neither
component by itself releases chemical energy by exposure to a vacuum or
contact with spacecraft surfaces. Propellant mixing by direct meteoroid
penetration of two tanks is virtually impossible since the meteoroid would
have to penetrate the MLI, the tank wall, and still traverse a large volume of
energy-absorbing liquid before exiting the opposite tank wall with sufficient
energy to break another tank.
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A far more plausible scenario presumesthat the meteoroid-stricken
tank releases wall fragments upon contact of the clamshell crack with the
ullage volume; this shrapnel then strikes and gouges tanks containing
dissimilar propellant (that is, fuel tank fragments damagean oxidizer tank or
vice-versa). With both liquid fuel and oxidizer contacting hard vacuum, the
exposedsurfaces of the propellants "flash vaporize" and rapidly fill the RPM
central cavity with propellant vapors.
Uponreaching an ignition pressure of approximately 0.2 psi, the
vapor mixture burns, creating hot gases which drive the tank's fluid slug
through the outboard clamshell crack. The MLI offers little resistance and
the sudden impulse propels the spacecraft laterally. With the fluid slug
expelled, the large cracks in the tank vent the central cavity; internal
pressures immediately return to hard vacuum, extinguishing further combustion.
Upon expelling the fluid slug, the cavity releases its propellant
vapor. Meanwhile, the regulator works at its maximum flow rate to release the
contents of both pressurant tanks over a period of about half an hour. This
helium expulsion has little thrust and most of that is smeared out by
spacecraft rotation. Likewise, the evaporation and release of the remaining
propellant imparts negligible net thrust.
For this scenario, combustion energy depends on the vapor mass
reacting inside the central cavity. The amount of propellant vapors filling
the cavity is limited by the volume of the cavity (32.5 ft 3) and by the
thermodynamic properties of the propellants at ambient temperature. The vapor
pressures of the fuel and oxidizer are I psia and 15 psia, respectively, at
ambient temperature. Since oxidizer has a higher vapor pressure than fuel,
the cavity will be rich in oxidizer vapor with the availability of fuel vapor
limiting the combustion energy released. Even assuming perfect mixing prior
to ignition, the amount of fuel and oxidizer reacting together comprise a
small percentage of the RPM's total propellant. At the propellant vapor
pressures, the vapor mixture in the cavity will contain 0.18 Ibm of fuel and
6.5 ibm of oxidizer.
In the vapor combustion case, the RPM central cavity is treated as
a rigid, gas-tight chamber whose only escape path is created by expelling a
propellant slug. Using these assumptions, a peak combustion pressure of 103
psia is predicted for the RPM central cavity. In fact, the central cavity
contains many vent paths through surrounding structure which will partially
relieve internal pressure as the slug is expelled. Furthermore, a large
barrier enclosing the top cavity is made from thin metal which will probably
be blown out by the combustion. These effects reduce the energy imparted to
the propellant slug and thus lower the resulting _V imparted to the
spacecraft. For conservatism and to simplify calculations, these effects were
deliberately excluded from the combustion model.
Another more speculative scenario presumes the broken propellant
tanks release most of their contents as liquid droplets into the central
cavity. Ordinarily, spacecraft rotation would tend to keep liquid away from
the central cavity, but some liquid release can not be ruled out. Droplets
expelled into the cavity will either partially or completely vaporize and help
pressurize the volume. Due to heat lost from the liquid by flash
vaporization, smaller droplets freeze into solid crystals.
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When dissimilar liquid droplets collide at sufficient speed, the
transient pressure pulse causes their contacting surfaces to burn. Unlike
rocket engines, which tightly confine propellants during burning, droplets
colliding in the RPM central cavity will blow apart by the energy released at
initial contact. Experimental data confirm that combining liquid propellants
in this manner releases only a small percentage of the total chemical energy
available (less than 0.3% of the chemical energy of the propellants).
The combustion energy released by droplet collision depends on the
liquid mass thrown into the central cavity and the probability that a given
pair of dissimilar droplets will collide at speeds sufficient for combustion.
Given the haphazard way tanks release their contents, accurate estimates of
the amount of energy generated are virtually impossible to derive. To bound
the problem, analysts estimated the propulsive effects by assuming the maximum
energy release possible from bulk impingement and mixing of the spacecraft's
propellants in the central cavity and having the resulting combustion occur
instantaneously and without venting -- clearly very conservative assumptions.
Using these assumptions, a peak combustion pressure of 580 psia is predicted
for the RPM central cavity.
The case of pressurant tanks damaging adjacent propellant tanks is
special in that both fuel and oxidizer tanks are broken open on their outer
hemispheres. The same scenarios apply as before except that two tanks will be
initially ruptured instead of one. Outside, fuel and oxidizer _apors will be
rapidly released from the ruptured tanks. Since the pressurant tank rupture
will have blown away most of the nearby blanketing, exterior propellant vapors
vent directly to space. Without containment, these vapors cannot build up to
ignition pressure. Therefore, external combustion will not take place.
For the reasons given above, the report treats pressurant tank
impacts as equivalent in consequence to propellant tank impacts.
Even in the absence of combustion, tank ruptures can impart
velocity by expelling a tank's pressurized liquid contents, much like "water
rockets" sold as children's toys (see Figure A-17). If a meteoroid opens a
tank, and the crack does not propagate to the ullage volume, then the
compressed gas discharges and drives the liquid slug out at high speed. The
MLI offers little resistance. Expulsion is so rapid (about one second to
empty the tank), the regulator cannot keep up with the pressure loss created
by the expanding ullage bubble. In the end, the energy stored by the ullage
volume's helium gas (about 17 atmospheres pressure) is released as kinetic
energy to both the spacecraft and fluid slug. The spacecraft acquires a
velocity change, primarily in the lateral direction (see Figure A-17c).
Upon releasing most of its liquid contents, the tank immediately
loses its propellant vapor. The regulator now works at its maximum flow rate
to release the contents of both pressurant tanks over a period of about half
an hour. The helium expulsion has little thrust and most of that is smeared
out by spacecraft rotation. If, on the other hand, the tank's crack does
extend to the ullage volume, the consequences will be very different. Crack
propagation is so rapid that most propellant will still be in the tank when
the pressurized gas is released into the RPM central cavity. In this case,
the tank's energy is dissipated by blowing helium pressurant into the RPM
central cavity. With the pressurant gone before the propellant can fully
escape, the fluid slug accumulates little momentum and the fluid merely oozes
out the crack. This has little effect on spacecraft velocity.
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Propellant residing in the outermost portion of the tank mayremain
after liquid expulsion. Liquid propellant exposed to vacuum,whether it is in
the damagedor the undamagedtank connected to it, slowly boils away (the
undamagedtank, having a thin tube which constricts evacuation, will take at
least four days to empty). The release is so slow and the thrust so small
that the spacecraft spin-rate smearsout any lateral component; furthermore,
the thrust efficiency of the evaporating propellant is so low that any axial
componentcreated by the orientation of the escapepaths will be
insignificant. Thus, evaporating propellant adds little or no velocity change
to the spacecraft.
In summary,velocity imparted to the spacecraft strongly dependson
where the crack propagates. Cracks which stay on the outer tank hemisphere
release most of the tank's propellant before the helium can escape. Cracks
reaching the gas relieves the internal pressure before most of the propellant
can be accelerated outward.
A.2.1.3 Resultant _V. As mentioned earlier, propellant tank shrapnel
must form for combustion to take place, otherwise velocity will be imparted by
pressurant discharge only. Since the incidence of shrapnel cannot be
demonstrated with certainty, this analysis uses identical likelihoods of
shrapnel and combustion as no shrapnel and fluid expulsion.
In the case where combustion occurs, the energy released within the
RPM central cavity is virtually identical for either a fuel tank or oxidizer
tank broken open by a micrometeoroid. However, since the oxidizer mass is
significantly greater than the fuel mass, expelling the oxidizer slug of a
single tank imparts slightly more velocity to the spacecraft than a fuel
slug. Calculations show that even if worst-case vapor combustion is present,
damaging a fuel tank laterally propels the spacecraft no more than 3
meters/second while damaging an oxidizer tank produces no more than 4
meters/second.
A AV resulting from liquid combustion was modelled by assuming
the maximum energy release possible from bulk impingement and mixing of the
propellants in the RPM central cavity. This yields a lateral spacecraft _V
of about 8 m/s for a damaged fuel tank and i0 meters/second for a damaged
oxidizer tank.
Vapor combustion is judged to be significantly more likely than
liquid combustion. Analysts estimate that the conditional probability that
combustion produces a spacecraft _V of 3.5 meters/second (mean of fuel and
oxidizer tank AVs) or less is about 90%. The probability that the AV will
be 9 meters/second or less (massive fluid combustion) is at least 99.9%.
Based on these probabilities, a probability distribution can be constructed
for the resultant _V as shown in Figure A-19. This distribution
approximates the effects of other phenomena, such as venting within the
central cavity (tending to reduce the net _V) and combinations of vapor and
fluid combustion. The direction of the spacecraft _V is determined to be in
the lateral direction.
In the case where there is no combustion, and the AV results from
propellant discharge, the worst-case AV results from assuming that the
propagating crack never reaches the ullage bubble, allowing the compressed gas
within the tank to transfer all its stored energy into
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propelling the fluid slug. Table A-20 summarizesthe sources of impulse to
the spacecraft. Due to spacecraft rotation, only the first two will produce
non-negligible AV. In this worst-case, the expelled propellant produces a
AVof 3.2 meters/second.
In reality, the tank's pressurant will always be released before
all propellant is expelled. As discussed previously, the crack maypropagate
to the ullage bubble and release the pressurant even before the propellant has
had a chance to escape and build up momentum. In other cases, where the crack
doesn't quite reach the ullage bubble, the ullage bubble will expandas
rapidly as propellant is expelled. At somepoint it will reach the edge of
the crack, escape, and stop imparting momentumto the fluid slug. Thus, the
.spacecraft's &V is probabilistic and can be muchless than the worst case.
Basedon the considerations given earlier, the study team used a worst-case
velocity magnitude distribution which is uniformly distributed between0 and
3.2 meters/second.
The exact direction of the AV is a function of the meteoroid
strike location and crack orientation. There will always be a strong lateral
component,but a crack formed predominantly in an upper or lower hemisphere
will produce someaxial componentas well. Clearly, this too is
probabilistic. Given that the spacecraft structure above and below the RPM
protects the tanks at their poles, the study teamused a distribution of
angular direction which is uniform between60° and 120° from the
spacecraft's spin axis.
A.2.1.$ Probability of Recovery. Depending on the meteoroid's entry point
and the type of propellant expulsion, spacecraft attitude and spin rate will
be perturbed. During parts of the VEEGA trajectory where telecommunications
performance is weak, an unplanned attitude change could disrupt the data link
between the ground and the spacecraft. In this case, the ground must rely on
the spacecraft's fault protection software to autonomously switch antennas and
restore communications.
If the spacecraft spins up or spins down during propellant
expulsion, AACS fault protection will respond by firing a spin thruster to
bring rotation back to nominal. However, the rapid loss of pressurant coupled
with the propellant loss will probably make this ineffectual. If the
spacecraft spins up to 14 rpm, parts of spacecraft structure, especially the
magnetometer boom, will break off and leave a large residual wobble (see
Table A-20. Spacecraft Impulse Resulting From Propellant Discharge
Escaping Fluid
Impulse
(Newton-seconds)
Impulse Duration
(seconds)
First Tank Liquid
First Tank Vapor
Pressurant
Second Tank Vapor
7820 1.0
_80 0.6
1220 2070
12000 >i00 hours
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Section A.I.5 for a description of how the RTGsare retained in spite of
structural failures). If the final spin-rate is near zero, the spacecraft
will be dynamically unstable and prone to tumbling.
Fuel or oxidizer can chemically attack the Dacron threads used to
hold the MLI together. If liquid droplets land on blanketing threads, the MLI
layers will weakenand, if the exposedarea is large, cause thermal blanketing
to fall off. Without thermal protection, exposedelectronics bays will cool
to inoperable temperatures.
Chemical reactions with the propellants can harmspacecraft cabling
and electronics. The oxidizer is particularly caustic and attacks most
plastics (Teflon is immune,however). Wherenon-Teflon insulating materials
are exposed to the oxidizer, they will slowly erode. Powerand signals
necessary to control the spacecraft could short out. By comparison, the fuel
is muchmorebenign, softening plastics rather than eroding them.
Besides these effects, recovery dependsupon limiting the damageto
only the fuel tanks or only the oxidizer tanks. If a propellant tank failure
produces high velocity fragments, all propellant tanks maybe damaged.
Fragmentation of a pressurant tank is almost certain to damageat least one
fuel and one oxidizer tank.
Quantifying the remote recovery prospects for these failures is
extremely difficult and subject to large uncertainties; therefore, this report
models the likelihood of recovery from meteoroid-induced tank failure as zero.
A.2.1.5 Summary. The risk of RPM tank damage due to micrometeoroids has
been determined to come from two sources, cometary meteoroids and asteroidal
meteoroids. While the threat from the cometary component is present and
relatively uniform for the entire first three years of the mission, the
asteroidal threat is only present for less than a year while in the asteroid
belt. The probabilities per day of the micrometeoroid damage for both
components are shown in Figure A-18. As can be seen, the asteroidal risk,
when present, is over two orders of magnitude greater than the cometary risk.
If an RPM tank fails due to a micrometeoroid hit, two possible
failure scenarios have been determined. In the first, only a single
propellant tank is involved, and _V is imparted to the spacecraft due to the
momentum carried off by escaping propellants. The _V imparted to the
spacecraft is equally likely to have magnitudes from zero to 3.2 m/s and
directions between 60 ° and 120 ° to the spacecraft spin axis. The
magnitude distribution is shown in Figure A-19. In the other case, tank
damage results in a crack propagating to the ullage region followed by a tank
rupture, fragments from which rupture the remaining propellant tanks. Ensuing
combustion pushes propellants out through the initially struck tank, imparting
_V to the spacecraft through momentum transfer. The magnitude of the _V
is modelled as a distribution which peaks at about 2 m/s as shown in Figure
A-19. The direction of the _V is 90 ° to the spacecraft spin axis.
The two cases of velocity distribution have been taken to be
equally likely. If one should subsequently be shown to prevail, the effect on
the Earth avoidance probability will be negligible since they are so similar.
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A.2.2 Radiation
Although radiation has been carefully considered for its effects on
mission reliability, it poses a negligible threat to Earth avoidance. This is
due to the fact that the majority of the radiative effects that will be seen
by the spacecraft occur in the vicinity of Jupiter. Galileo, like Voyager, is
radiation hardened to the Jovian environment. The dose that it will receive
by the time of the second Earth encounter is less than 5% of the total dose •
designed for in the entire mission. As will be discussed in this section,
Earth avoidance protection from the two principal radiative effects, total
dose nd single event upsets, requires only a small fraction of the design
margin that is available to withstand the Jovian environment. As a result,
the probabilities of an anomalous _V resulting from these two effects are
<10 -7 and <2 x 10 -5 per TCM, respectively. In each case the standard
recovery probabilities apply. "
As electronic components have grown smaller and have reduced their
operating voltages, their susceptibility to radiation damage has increased.
The principle forms of this damage fall into five categories: total dose
ionization effects, displacement damage, single event upsets (SEUs), signal
interference, and latchup. Latchup (where the radiation alters the actual
electronic circuit) has been shown not to be a problem for Galileo parts.
Displacementdamage (where the atoms in the device are physically displaced by
impacting partlcles) caused by protons and neutrons was studied by the
Project, and findings indicate that no Galileo systems that could cause a
sig_nificant AV are impacted. Signal interference (perhaps through a light
flash in the star scanner due to passage of a cosmic ray) is also not believed
to be a likely source of AV. This section will therefore concentrate on
total dose and single event upsets. In particular, the probability Of
occurrence of each failure mechanism will be discussed and estimates of
potential AV provided.
A.2.2.1 Total Dose lonization Damage. A primary mission concern for
Galileo is that long term exposure to the ambient radiation environment will
result in various dose-dependent failure mechanisms. Here "dosage" will be
assumed to be the energy deposited in a material due to the slowing of charged
particles as they pass through the material. Although long term changes in
structural material properties could be important due to this effect, most
critical to the Galileo mission are effects such as ionization on solid state
electronic components due to prolonged exposure to the high energy particles.
Typically, the IC part characteristics will change with increasing dose until
the part fails to perform properly. Figure A-20 illustrates this for a
representative electronic component. As should be clear, even with parts from
the same manufacturer as shown in Figure A-20 and same batch, the failure
point as a function of total radiation dosage can vary from device to device
by as much as a factor of 40%. The time to failure will be greatly dependent
on the part type, manufacturer, shielding, radiation spectrum, exposure rate,
and even operating cycle. The picture is further complicated because parts
will fail over the course of the mission due not only to radiation effects but
also thermal effects due to heating.
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For reference, there are approximately 75,000 individual ICs on
Galileo and roughly 500 part types. Eachpart has its ownunique radiation
shielding and dose-failure characteristics. For example, the softest part is
predicted to fail at only 16 krad dose while the hardest parts did not fail at
doses in excess of 150 krad. The end of mission dose that these parts are
expected to survive, behind Galileo's average 2.1 g/cm2 of shielding, is
about 75 krad. Although the probability of failure of these parts due to
radiation is typically assumedto follow a normal or log-normal distribution
around a fixed design dose, this can vary depending on part history. Here the
typical Galileo radiation design margin (RDM)of 2 (150 krad) to 3 (225 krad)
will be ignored. It is assumedinstead, as a moreconservative estimate, that
Galileo parts will fail with a log-normal distribution in do§age peaking at a
total mission dose (shielded) of 75 krad (RDMof i) and a log-normal standard
deviation of factor l.&. Figure A-21 plots log-normal probability density and
integral probability distributions for a part having these properties.
The estimate presented here is conservative since typical Galileo
parts, behind average shielding, have been carefully selected to withstand
over 150 krad (RDMof 2). Individual parts softer than this level have been
further protected by adding a spot radiation shield to withstand from 150 krad
to, in the case of the softest parts, 225 krad (RDMof 3). The predicted
total dose from solar flares (95%confidence level), Earth's radiation belts,
and solar wind/cosmic rays gives a 3.3 krad dose behind Galileo's 2.1 g/cm2
of shielding at about 6 years of mission elapsed time (MET), Table A-21.
Thus, assuminga worst-case scenario of RDMi (or a failure level of 75 krad
shielded) and a 1.4 standard deviation factor around this value for an
individual part, a dose of 6 krad or more would be required to give a
probability of failure (Figure A-21) of le-12 for a given part. For 75,000
parts, this would be about i x 10 -7 • _or the probability to approach I, the
dose would have to exceed 15 krad behind 2.1 g/cm 2 for a part to fail due to
radiation in the transit phase. Thus, part failures due to radiation dosage
are highly unlikely (less than i x 10 -7 ) until following JOl as the dosage
is far too low to affect even marginal parts.
A.2.2.2 Single Event Upsets. Very high energy particles such as cosmic ray
heavy ions, heavy ions at Jupiter, and solar flare protons above several MeV
per nucleon can deposit sufficient energy in materials to cause light flashes
in optics and logic upsets in ICs. These upsets result in signal interference
and "soft errors"--errors that are transitory and can be corrected by
software. As it is difficult to shield against these effects except for the
lowest energy particles, some SEUs must be tolerated during a mission. Of the
effects, the random bit flips associated with logic upsets in Random Access
Memory (RAM) circuits and similar ICs which could affect control programs are
the most serious (light flashes are considered to be interference effects
ignored here, see earlier). "Voting" and/or constant monitoring of RAM are
common stop-gap measures used to limit the worst effects of this interaction.
Despite these fixes, several spacecraft have still exhibited problems with
SEUs. A particularly severe example has been the TDRS spacecraft which has
about I0 serious SEUs per month. It has been necessary to check TDRS memory
several times a day for SEUs and then reinitialize the memory if any are
detected to prevent loss of vehicle control. Galileo's memories most likely
to result in anomalous thrust due to SEUs are those in the AACS. Propulsion
drive electronic (PDE) logic has also been investigated, but was determined to
be immune to SEUs. For Galileo, a careful evaluation of the AACS by Burdick
et al. (1986) has shown that SEUs could be a concern throughout the mission.
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SEUevents are, aside from solar flare effects, equally likely at
all portions of the VEEGAmission (there maybe slight increase in the
vicinity of Earth's radiation belts, but these are ignored here). Solar flare
proton fluxes, for the largest events, constitute an additional, unpredictable
threat. The probability of an SEUaffecting AACShas been conservatively
estimated from a low of about i error per several years for the cosmic ray
background to i every few minutes for anomalously large solar flares. Solar
flares, for Earth impact studies, will be assumedto occur randomly in time
(there is evidence that solar flares are not truly randombut occur primarily
within +3-4 years of solar cycle maximum)and to last for 1-2 days. For
estimation purposes, as a very conservative estimate, 7 ordinary flares (100%
probability) as used in the Burdick et al. study and i anomalously large solar
flare (with 33%probability) could be assumedfor the 3.5 year VEEGAmission
phase. A plot of the probability of an anomalously large flare occurring
during the planned Galileo mission is shownin Figure A-22.
Table A-21. Galileo Total DoseBehind 2.l-g/cm 2 (300-mil)
Shielding as a Function of Mission Time
Dosage (Rads-Si)
Mission Phase SMI N AI/Si Sph. Shell SMA X
0 to 107 rain 0.8 0.8
0 to VFB
CR + SW 7.3
Solar Flare (95%) 575
VFB - EFBI
CR + SW 16.95
Solar Flare (95%) 1080
Earth Flyby 1 4.2 4.3
(± 70 min)
EFBI - EFB2
CR + SW 16.95
Solar Flare (95%) 1060
Earth Flyby 2 2.0
(± 66 min)
EFB2 - JOI (N5.3 AU)
CR + SW 9.52
Solar Flare (95%) 557
2.1
TOTAL 7.0 3322 7.2
__j
For solar flares the Feyrunan model was used, which takes into account
the so-called "AL" flares as part of the normal population of flares.
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Soft errors are, by their definition, recoverable. Thus the
induced progr_ing error could be corrected. The probability of a correction
of the effect is, as discussed in Burdick et al. (1986) and elsewhere, very
mucha function of mission phaseand the type of error. Typical recovery
times range from hours to days dependingon a variety of variables.
Fortunately, manySEUswill be corrected in the normal operations of the
system or will have no effect (see later). Thus, the probability of recovery
ranges from near 0 during Jupiter injection to i during cruise.
A.2.2.3 Probability Analysis for Failure. As the only failure believed to
have a significant chance of causing a _V is an SEU in the AACS, the
following analysiswill only consider this area. Following the procedure laid
out in Burdick et al. (1986), SEU rates for the AACS have been estimated for
the new VEEGA mission. The following parts were assumed to be sensitive to
SEU:
AACS UNIT IC Name Number of Devices
MDR 25LS374 i
AOR 54S37& 1
RUPT AM2914 &
MEMI 54LS373 i
MEM3 54LS373 i
MEM5 54LS373 I
MEM8 54LS373 i
The upset tables of Burdick et al. were computed under the
conservative assumption that only those units that contained these devices
would experience SEUs. The rates used for incident radiation were those used
by Burdick et al. (Note: recent rate estimates are a factor of 2-3 lower for
flares and about 4 higher for cosmic rays -- which are not important -- making
the old rates a more conservative estimate.)
By way of summary, if SEUs in the "miss" and "no effect" categories
are ignored, the total AACS upset rates in terms of times between events were,
assuming a box shield:
Galactic Cosmic Rays
Typical Solar Flare
Anomalously Large Flare
30 yrs/event
2 days/event
i0 minutes/event
These rates are believed to be accurate to within a factor of 3 for
the solar flares. They are conservative since they include all SEUs except
those in the "miss" and "no effect" categories (see later). Thus, it can be
concluded that galactic cosmic rays will, conservatively, contribute only i or
2 SEUs during the mission while a typical solar flare (assume 7 during the
VEEGA phase) would contribute perhaps 2 to 3 SEUs during the event (events
last about 2 days). An anomalously large flare, on the other hand, could
generate several i00 SEUs over its duration.
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Tables A-22, A-23, and A-24 summarize the SEU computations. The
format followed is that of the original AACS study with only those units
included that are believed to be subject to bit flips. The flip rate per
device is multiplied by the percentage time that a flip is expected to have a
given effect on the system. These categories of flips are (see Burdick et al.
for a detailed explanation of the categories and how the percentages were
derived):
Miss Bit flip results in no possible effect
No Ef No apparent effect; effect uncertain/not observed
RPT No apparent effect but flip observed
ACE Anomalous spacecraft operation
POR Power on reset
The final flip rates were determined by summing the "RPT", "ACE",
and "POR" rates.
A.2.2.4 Summary of Probability. In order to facilitate the computation of
the failure probability due to SEUs, the conservative assumption was _ade that
8 flares (I anomalously large and 7 "normal" flares) of 2 days duration each
would occur--cosmic ray induced SEUs are at such a low rate as to be ignorable
for this calculation. This gives a probability of a flare being in progress
on any day of 8 flares * 2 days per flare/3.5 years = 0.013. Further, it was
assumed that the only way for an anomalous _V to result from a flare would
be for the flare to occur during a maneuver and for the effect to be a memory
change but no POR (a POR would abort the maneuver harmlessly). If a flare
were in progress during a maneuver, the most likely way for an anomalous
maneuver to occur is for only one or two SEUs to occur. More than this makes
it almost certain that a POR will abort the maneuver. From Table A-23, 0.75
of the SEUs that occur and are not "misses" or "no effects" will impact
something other than the POR. The probability that a non-POR type SEU affects
a burn is the same as for the AACS memory chip failure calculations. That is
only failures occurring outside the AACS checksum region will be undetected
and uncorrected. Since there are 5,376 bytes outside the total of 32,768
bytes, this gives a probability of 0.16 of a critical byte being hit. A
command resulting in an excess burn will be detected and corrected unless it
is in the lateral direction. This limits the possibilities for the AV
magnitude to the lateral burn magnitude range and to a probability of 0.011 as
there are only 60 bytes of the 5,376 that could result in such an event.
Thus, the probability of an anomalous burn during a trajectory correction
maneuver (TCM) due to a solar flare SEU is:
Prob = 0.013 * 0.75 * 0.16 * 0.011 = 1.7 x 10 -5
The probability of no recovery is taken to be 2 x 10 -6 for TCMs
before Earth minus i0 days as it should normally be possible to recover from
such an error unless a double fault occurs and 3 x 10 -4 for the TCM at Earth
minus I0 days since a single fault will prevent recovery (Table A-25).
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Galileo AACS SEU Failure Table (Cosmic Rays)
Galactic Cosmic Rays -- Box Shield
(For Units Containing: 54LS373, 25LS374, 54S374, 2914)
SEU Risk Sun_rmry for AACS
Category
Total Flip Rate:
(Flips/sec)
Time/Event:
(Days)
% Occurrence:
P > 1 Disturbance
in i00 Days:
Miss No Rpt Ace POR
3.7E-7 2.5E-9 4.E-IO I.E-10 4.E-10
Ace Effect Obs
(Rpt+Ace+POR)
9.E-10
30.915 4545.5 30458 78850 27557 12225
99.076 0.67383 0.10056 0.03885 0.11115
0.96063 0.02176 0.00328 0.00127 0.00362
0.25056
0.00815
Table A-23. Galileo AACS SEU Failure Table (Solar Flare)
Typical Solar Flare -- Box Shield
(For Units Containing: 54LS373, 25LS374, 54S374, 2914)
SEU Risk Su_m_ary for AACS
Category
Total Flip Rate:
(Flips/sec)
Time/Event:
(Days)
Occurrence:
P > i Disturbance
in i00 Days:
Miss No Rpt Ace POR
0.00012 0.00002 3.7E-6 5.2E-7 1.5E-6
0.10055 0.68094 3.1486 22.316 7.7992
83.543 12.336 2.6679 0.37642 1.0770
i I I 0.98868 1.0000
Ace Effect Obs
(Rpt+Ace+POR)
5.7E-6
2.0382
4.1214
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Table A-24. Galileo AACS SEU Failure Table (AL Flare)
Anomalous Solar Flare -- Box Shield
(For Units Containing: 54LS373, 25LS374, 54S374, 2914)
SEU Risk Summary for AACS
Category
Total Flip Rate:
(Flips/sec)
Time/Event:
(Days)
% Occurrence:
P > I Disturbance
in i00 Days
Ace Effect Obs
Miss No Rpt Ace POR
0.03307 0.00486 0.00105 0.00015 0.00042
0.00035 0.00238 0.01097 0.07885 0.02756
83.612 12.289 2.6665 0.37112 1.0619
i I 1 i I
(Rpt+Ace+POR)
0.00162
0.00714
4.0995
i
A.2.3 Spacecraft Charging
Spacecraft charging also does not pose a significant threat to
Earth avoidance. Both surface and internal charging have been considered.
The most likely threat is from internal charging at the time of the first
Earth encounter which may perturb the first TCM thereafter. This occurrence,
however, is very unlikely (probability of 1.2 x 10 -3 ) and the probability of
recovery is excellent (i - 2 x 10-6).
Spacecraft charging as defined here refers to the buildup of
charged particles and subsequent arcing on external spacecraft surfaces or on
(and inside) internal surfaces. The former process is usually referred to as
surface charging while the latter is termed internal charging. Since each
process is associated with a different charged particle population, the
details of the charging processes are somewhat different. To accommodate this
difference, the two processes and their associated probabilities will be
treated separately. As the principle effect of the two, namely, induced
electrical transients, is similar, however, the final probability for failure
due to spacecraft charging will be a combination of the two.
Although the outer surface of the Galileo spacecraft is designed to
be an equipotential surface, some small surfaces will be electrically isolated
by design or accident (see Galileo waiver list). Surface arcing, primarily
near the Earth's geosFnchronous orbit, could occur. Arcing can result in
disruptive signals on the vehicle buss, damage to electrical devices, surface
damage, and false signals. Arcing (likely due to internal charging rather
than surface, however) is believed'to have caused PORs on Voyager I and has
been blamed for several serious spacecraft failures near the Earth.
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Table A-25. Probability of Failure Due to Radiation-SEU Effects and
Resulting in the Following AV During the Following Mission Phases
i EGA-_0 I
ll_vl--Ivno_l]
_x,A,+z oo<_<3oo! I
M,xEo 3oo<O<,oo I l
,ATE,A, ,0o<0<120oI,.7x10-_i
_,X_O 1_0o<_ _0o i !
_X,_,oZ _0o<0<_0o i i
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 X 10 .6
L EGA25 I
AXIAL+Z 0°<0< 30° L J
MIXED 30°<e <_0° I J
LATERAL 60o< 0<120 ° [ 1.7X 10 .5 J
MIXED 120°< 0<150 ° [ J
AXIAL-Z 150°< 0< 180 ° [ J
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 X 10 .6
EGA- 10 J
AXIAL + Z 0°< O<30 ° [ ]
MIXED 30°< 0<60 ° [ ]
LATERAL 60°< 0<120 ° [ 1.7X 10-5 ]
MIXED 120°< e<150 o [ ]
AXIAL-Z 150°< 0< 180 ° [ ]
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 3 X 10 -4
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Spacecraft surfaces will accumulate charge due to exposure to the
space environment from the ambient plasma, sputtering, secondary emission, and
photoelectron emission. As a rough estimate, the Galileo spacecraft could
achieve potentials relative to space on the order of a few volts positive to
several hundred volts negative in the solar wind and voltages as high as -20
kV near geosynchronous orbit at Earth. Only potential differences between
surfaces, however, are of concern for arcing since a difference of 500 V or
higher (depending on configuration) is necessary for a discharge to occur that
could damage systems.
Data from the Earth-orbiting SCATHA spacecraft have clearly shown
differential potentials on an electrically isolated test surface oscillating
at i rpm by 2 kV as the surface rotated in and out of sunlight--more than
sufficient to cause arcing. SCATHA is" the most charging immune spacecraft
ever flown yet it experienced approximately 147 discharges in 2.5 years of
operations in and near geosynchronous orbit because of such potential
variations. These arcs, as a function of amplitude, are presented in Figure
A-23. As shown in Figure A-24, for an early portion of the mission, most of
the arcs occurred in a narrow local time range between midnight and 03 LT.
Interestingly, 28 of the 147 events occurred on 22 September 1982.
Subtracting these 28 from the total implies that under normal conditions
approximately i arc occurred every 7-8 days while, for exceptional geophysical
conditions, the maximum rate could be as high as i or more per hour
(approximately I day in 2.5 years). In contrast, a poorly designed spacecraft
electrostatically, the geosynchronous TELECOM i, had approximately i arc per
day with the peak occurrence between noon and 18 LT. Thus arcing is quite
common in and near geosynchronous orbit for even the most meticulously
designed spacecraft and can occur at any local time dependent on the
configuration of the spacecraft."
Unlike surface charging, which is typically in response to short
term (hours to seconds) variations in the i0-I00 keV electron environment,
internal charging as a result of long term (months to years) exposure to the
0.I - 1.0 MeV or greater electron environment can result in the buildup of
electrons within dielectrics and on isolated conducting surfaces or wires
inside the spacecraft. Briefly, electrons with energy in excess of I MeV can,
unlike protons of the same energy, penetrate far into a surface before
becoming trapped (see Figure A-25). These trapped charges build up in
dielectrics or on internal conducting surfaces over long periods of time until
the conditions for an arc breakdown occur (typical dielectric breakdown occurs
for fields of 10E5-10E6 V/cm). In the case of Galileo, electrically isolated
internal components, either dielectric or conducting, of the spacecraft may
build up sufficient charge to cause arc breakdown. A random component may
then arc causing false signals and/or part damage. The fact that the arc can
occur internal to the electrostatic shielding makes this type of arc of
particular concern.
As an example of internal charging, _2 anomalies on Voyager i were
attributed to this problem during passage through the inner Jovian radiation
belts. On Voyager i, a sudden impulse, believed to be due to the internal
charging and arcing, apparently stimulated a POR condition. In the case of
Galileo, ungrounded wires (since corrected) were found to exhibit this
behavior during ground testing.
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A.2.3.1 Probability Analysis for Failure. Although -i00 V potentials have
been observed in the solar wind, and anomalous conditions associated with a
solar flare might produce higher potentials, it is unlikely that surface
arcing is a concern in the interplanetary environment or near Venus. The main
concern is within a few Earth radii of geosynchronous orbit and, in the
absence of data on the actual Galileo response, likely to occur with equal
probability at all local times. It will be assumed, therefore:
i) Probability of arc discharge in interplanetary space: 0.0
2) Probability of arc discharge during one Earth flyby:
a) Arcs can occur uniformly between 5-10 Re and at all
local times.
b) Arc rate = 1 per 8 days = i per 192 hr (nominal-SCATHA)
= 1 per day (poor design-TELECOM)
= 1 per hr for 1 day in 900 (worst case-SCATHA)
c) Susceptible period = i hr (Launch)
2 hr (Flyby i)
2 hr (Flyby 2)
d) Arc probability (from SCATHA data):
0.5 V arc = 36/118 (nominal)
= 64/147 (worst case)
2.0 V arc = 18/118 (nominal)
= &5/147 (worst case)
7.5 V arc = 10/118 (nominal)
= 27/147 (worst case)
e) For Voyager, a 2 volt or higher arc on the line was
required to cause upset. Assuming a similar level for
Galileo as a conservative value (Galileo is better
designed in this respect), the probability of one
random IC upset per 2 hour transit (probability is 1/2
of these values for launch) is:
Nominal probability for upset = (18/118) (2/192) = 0.15%
Worst-case prob. for upset = (&5/l&7) (2/900) = 0.068%
"Poor design" prob. for upset = (18/118) (2/24) = 1.3%
(Note: The fact that a single day gave an anomalously large arcing
rate may indicate a threshold effect for SCATHA arcing. This is probably
spacecraft specific.)
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The internal charging rate is a function of the existing charge
(which complicates the local electric fields), the electrical properties of
the material, shielding, and the incident flux. Although "pre-charging" of
coaxial cables has been observed during the manufacturing process, it can be
assumed that the vehicle is electrostatically "clean" to start with. Even
given this assumption, the time to breakdown will be a complex convolution of
the above variables so that the probability of breakdown can not be directly
estimated. However, a "worst-case" estimate can be made. If the current in a
typical arc is integrated over time, the total charge in an arc can be
estimated to be on the order of about i011 e- per event. Therefore, the
earliest that sufficient charge could accumulate and cause an arc, based on
Voyager and Galileo test experience, is when the total fluence exceeds i011
e-/cm 2 since Galileo has been designed so that isolated, internal
charge-collecting surfaces should not be larger than a few cm 2 (charge may
bleed off, however, making this process rate dependent also). An arc would
presumably deplete the accumulated charge so that a breakdown would likely not
reoccur until the total fluence again exceeded i011 e-/cm 2. The electron
fluences (without shielding) above 0.i MeVas a function of mission time are
given in Table A-26 and those above i MeV in Table A-27. The 0.i MeV (see
Figure A-24) corresponds to the trapped charge expected near the surface while
I MeV would correspond to the charge behind typical shielding. At the
electron fluence rates expected for the VEEGA profile, the periods most
critical for this effect are during the initial out-bound maneuver from Earth
and during the two Earth flybys. In all cases, the region from about 2 Earth
radii to about 8-9 Earth radii from the center of the Earth is the major
contributor to total electron fluence until Galileo reaches Jupiter. Thus the
greatest likelihood of arcing would be near the Earth as solar flares and the
interplanetary environment do not contribute sufficient fluences of electrons.
At the levels of Tables A-26 and A-27, only an unshielded component
very near the surface would likely experience internal charging since only the
fluence at 0.i MeV is sufficient to produce enough charge buildup over the
time periods involved. A conservative estimate of internal arcing would be
100% probability for about 3 arcs on such an unshielded surface component
during the first few hours following orbital injection, 4-7 during each of the
two Earth flybys, and 0% during interplanetary transits. Given the careful
design of Galileo, it is highly likely that any such arcs will be below the
critical threshold for upset, but, as this cannot be known with certainty, it
is conservatively assumed here that any arc will result in I upset.
A.2.3.2 Summary of Probability. The effects of surface charging can be
summarized as follows. Barring the possibility of a design flaw (or "poor
design") in Galileo, the total "nominal probability" value of 0.15% for the
first Earth flyby is recommended as a conservative estimate of the arc
discharge probability due to surface charging. As the only serious surface
charging will take place near the Earth, when there is insufficient time to
alter significantly the Earth relative trajectory, this effect would only
affect the long range probability of impact on the return two years later.
The difficulty of affecting the trajectory within I0 Re (Earth radii) of the
Earth is discussed in Section 4.
/
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Table A-26.
Met
Electron Integral Fluences Above 0.I MeV for VEEGA 1989 Mission
Integral Fluence (/cm Z)
AE8MAX Above 0.I MeV AE8MIN
0 - 107 min 3.18EII 1.52EII
0 - VFB
SW 6.3E8
VFB - EFBI
SW i. 2E9
EFBI 7.08EII 2.85EII
(+ 70 min)
EFB2 - EFB2
SW 1.4E9
EFB2 3.85EII 1.80EII
(+ 66 min)
EFB2 - JOl (.5.3 AU)
SW 6.5E8
TOTAL 1.4E12 3.9E9 6.2EII
AE8MAX corresponds to the model for electron fluxes at solar maximum,
AE8MIN to those at solar minimum. VFB stands for Venus Flyby; EFB for
Earth flyby; JOl for Jupiter orbit insertion; and SW for solar wind.
For internal charging, an arc will likely only occur during passage
through the Earth's radiation belts. As a worst case estimate, a maximum of 7
internal arcs would be expected per flyby (much higher than the surface arcing
rate). As in the case of surface charging, an arc during the actual orbital
injection or the Earth flybys will be of minimal concern since it will be
difficult for such errors to cause trajectory changes near the Earth which
would lead to immediate impact (See Section 4). The only problem following
such events would be long term effects on the subsequent Earth flyby. As
another arc during the interplanetary phase will likely not occur, there
should be sufficient time to recover from such an error.
Based on the preceding conclusion, the final probability of a AV
due to spacecraft charging is estimated at 1.2 x 10 -3 . This probability is
arrived at in a similar fashion to the AACS memory chip failure calculation.
S_rizing that development, it is argued first that only failures occurring
outside the checksum region will be undetected and uncorrected. As there are
5376 bytes outside the total of 32768 bytes, this gives a probability of
0.16. A command resulting in an excess burn will be detected and corrected
unless it is in the lateral direction. This limits the possibilities to the
i-3 m/s range and to a probability of 0.011 as there are only 60 bytes of the
5376 that could result in such an event.
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Table A-27.
Met
Electron Integral Fluences Above 1MeV for VEEGA1989Mission
Integral Fluence (/cm2)
AE8MAX Above i MeV AE8MIN
0 - 107 min 9.11E9 6.23_9
0 - VFB
SW 6.3E6
CR 6.2E6
VFB- EFBI
SW 1.2E7
CR 1.7E7
EFBI 1.15EI0 7.86E9
(+ 70 min)
EFB2 - EFB2
SW 1.4E7
CR 4.2E7
EFB2 9.10E9 6.21E9
(+ 66 min)
EFB2 - JOl (.5.3 AU)
SW 6.5E6
CR 6.2E7
TOTAL 2.97EI0 1.7E8 2.03EI0
Finally, there is a 0.i probability that the bad bit will fail to be detected
by the High Gain Antenna (HGA) correction algorithm. Thus, for 7 upsets (the
surface charging arc probability is ignored):
Prob = 0.16 * 0.011 * 0.I * 7 = 1.2 x 10 -3
This is for a 1-3 m/s dV in the lateral direction. The
probability of no recovery is taken to be 2 x 10 -6 as it should normally be
possible to recover from such an error (Table A-28).
A.3 GROUND INDUCED ERRORS
A.3.1 Command Generation
The Sequencing Process for generating and checking commands for the
spacecraft was described in Section 2.3. The material presented here
describes the most probable scenarios for errors to occur in that process.
Comm&_nd generation errors occur due to combined failure of automated software
checks and procedural checks (htnaan error).
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These combined software and procedural checks will be discussed as
a combined step, without specifying the detailed split between software and
procedures unless necessary.
There are four ways to get an erroneous maneuver command to the
spacecraft:
l) Send an erroneous individual maneuver command, instead of
another comm_nd, or instead of no command. This category is
further subdivided into the cases of sequenced commands and
Real-time commands. The probabilities per day for such
errors actually causing a _V to be implemented by the S/C
are shown below to be 6 x 10 -7 and 9 x ID -7, respectively.
2) Send an erroneous value in any maneuver Profile Activity.
Probability per Trajectory Correction Maneuver is shown to be
i x 10 -7.
3) Send an erroneous maneuver PA instead of another PA, or
instead of no PA. Probability is 6 x i0 -II per day.
4) Send an accurately built maneuver PA that reflects the
Navigation Team's requested maneuver, but the Navigation Team
has internally made an error. Probability per TCM is 2 x
10-4.
In generating these scenarios, only the case where one erroneous
command is sent, or one erroneous PA is sent is considered. Cases with
multiple errors are considered even less probable. The exception to this is
where Navigation erroneously requests an incorrect maneuver. To cover worst
case situations, each error is assumed to be introduced as late as is possible
in the Uplink Sequence Generation process, thus giving minimum opportunity for
detection. The sequence checks are derived from the Galileo Space Flight
Operations Plan (625-505, Vol. II, Operating Plans).
Table A-29 shows the possible _Vs generated by these error
scenarios. In each case anomalous velocity Ws are equally likely from zero to
the specified maximum. Furthermore, all directions are equally likely, except
as specified.
The individual command error is the case where a single command can
cause the spacecraft to execute a _V causing maneuver. Three are of this
type; an unbalanced turn command, a pulsed maneuver command, and a negative Z
maneuver command. Since these commands can be sent either by placing them in
the stored sequence or by sending them as a real-time command, this scenario
is subdivided into those two subcases.
For the stored sequence route, the assumption of this report is
that the error happens as late as possible in the Sequence Generation
Process. For this scenario, the single command is inserted into the
spacecraft stored sequence after the preliminary review, with the last updates
to the sequence. From analysis of the Voyager Project experience in con_nand
errors I , a
Error Management in Real-Time Commanding, IOM VOYAGER SCT-86-193, R. R.
Lutz, 24 September 1986; and Error Management in Real-Time Commanding
Status Update, IOM VOYAGER SCT-87-138, R. R. Lutz, 22 June 1987.
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Table A-28. Probability of Failure Due to Spacecraft Charging and
Resulting in the Following AV During the Following Mission Phases
I FIRST BURN AFTER EGA1 ]
1 -3rrVs J
AXIAL+Z 0°< 8 <30 ° [ I
MIXED 30°< 8<60 ° [ J
LATERAL 60°<e<120° [ 1.2x10-3J
M,x_o. ,_oo.,_.,1_oo [ ]
_..z _,oo<-_.,,80° [ ]
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = 2 x 10 "6
Table A-29. Maximum Erroneous Maneuver _Vs
Error Class Error
Max. &V (m/s)
First three years in Mission
i) Erroneous Single CMD-Lateral 71.0
(7 BURN) +Z 12.1
-Z 57.8
(7 NEG Z) -Z 6.0 (last value for 7AXDV)
(7 TURN) Lateral 0.7
2) Erroneous Man. PA Value
Any direction 5% high*
3) Erroneous Man. PA
Any direction 345.5
4) Erroneous Nay Request
Any direction 5"*
*Time cutoff occurs at nominal value plus 5% maximum *'1105.6 is the
theoretical maximum, but based on analysis, any maneuver larger than 5
would be rejected.
\
f\
A-92
1625-396, Rev. A
probability of 6 x 10 -2 (per day of sequence execution) is assigned to the
possibility of introducing an erroneous command. This number is conservative
in two distinctly different ways. First, the numbers for the Voyager Project
included two spacecraft during most of the period, and second, Voyager did its
sequencing primarily as individual commands.
Next consider the fact that only 3 commands are of concern. With a
total of 1175 possible commands, a probability of I x 10 -3 was assigned to
the odds of the erroneous command being each of the 3 of concern (1/1175
rounded to i significant digit).
The next part in the process is a set of reviews of the sequence.
These consist of two types of reviews. The first is a normal sequence review
conducted by the Orbiter Engineering and Probe Engineering Teams. In this
review, all of the individual commands in the sequence (as opposed to the PAs
in the sequence) are scrutinized. Based on the presently perceived workload
and engineering judgment, a probability of 5 x 10 -2 was established for the
likelihood that an erroneous command would slip through this check. A second
check occurs where all of the commands of the type considered restricted (and
all of these commands are) are separated out via software and individually
reviewed by the same two teams. The same probability, 5 x 10 -2 , was
assigned to this review.
Then the sequence is presented to the Mission Director for
approval. The purpose of this review is primarily to assure that all steps in
the approval process have been properly followed. Therefore, it is considered
unlikely that any erroneous commands would be caught in this step.
A command-conference then occurs, where the sequence has been
translated to the uplink command messages and final approval for sending those
messages is given. Based on the format of the meeting and the review products
available, it is unlikely that this would catch any erroneous commands.
At this point the commands are uplinked to the spacecraft and
executed. No on-board checks would stop the execution of these individual
commands. Table A-30 summarizes and totals the probabilities for this case.
As a confidence check in these estimates, a comparison was made to Voyager
experience. While Voyager did not send any erroneous maneuver commands, they
have sent other commands in error. Voyager commands are subjected to steps 6,
9 (normal only, as all the Voyager errors were non-restricted commands), i0,
and ii in Table A-30, giving a probability of 3 x 10 -3 per day, which agrees
well with Voyager history.
The probability of recovery from an erroneous AV is a function of
when the SV was performed with values as listed in Section 3.2.4.
For the real-time command route, the scenario is that the single
command is inserted as either a restricted command request in the real-time
command process, or is inserted as a request (erroneously) for a
non-interactive command. Again from analysis of the Voyager Project
experience in command errors, assume that on average there will be one command
error per day. This number is also conservative in two distinctly different
ways. First, the numbers for the Voyager Project included two spacecraft
during most of the period, and second, Voyager sent many more real-time
commands than Galileo will.
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Table A-30. SequenceChecksin Process and Probabilities of Passing
for Class IA (SequencedIndividual ManeuverCon=hand)
Step #* Item Probability per Execution Day _..d
6 Introduce Erroneous Cmd
Oddsof it being one of 7BURN, 7NEGZ, or
7 TURN Commands
9 Flight Team Sequence Review - Normal
Restricted Command
i0 Flight Team Approval Meeting - Miss. Dir.
II Command Conference
Total Probability for each of 3 commands
* From Operating Plan Template and/or R/T CMD Process
(6 x 10 -2)
(i x 10 -3)
(5 x 10 -2)
(5 x 10-2)
(i.o)
(i.o)
(2 x 10 -7)
Then take into account the fact that only three commands are of
concern. A probability of I x 10 -3 was assigned to the odds of the
erroneous command being each of the three of concern.
The next part in the process is Conlmand Planning and Integration
performed by the Mission Control Team, where each command is reviewed for
category (restricted, interactive, or non-interactive). Those commands deemed
to be restricted or interactive are sent to the OET for the normal constraint
sequenced commands. For those commands classified as non-interactive, only a
review by the Mission Control Team and the Science Team requesting the command
is performed. Based on engineering judgement, the probability of erroneously
classifying a restricted command as a non-interactive command is i x 10 -3 .
If these commands are correctly identified as restricted, the
probabilities that the three commands of concern would be caught by the normal
command review or the restricted command review are each 5 x 10 -2 . The next
part in the process is again a Command Planning Meeting run by the Mission
Control Team, where the plans are set for when and how the commands are to be
uplinked (no likelihood of catching a bad command). The next step is the
Command Approval Meeting where the Mission Director gets a chance to review
and approve all real-time commands. As these commands are never intentionally
to be sent in real-tlme, the probability is i x 10 -1 that the Mission
Director will not catch this error. Then the commands are sent to the
real-time operator and entered into the real-time command system to be
uplinked to the spacecraft. No chance exists that this would catch a bad
command.
\
A-94
1625-396, Rev. A
If the commandwere erroneously classified as non-interactive, the
conm_andwould have almost no chance of being caught in the Constraint Checkby
the MCTor Science Team. The next step, again, is the CommandApproval
Meeting where the probability is i x i0 -I that the Mission Director will not
catch this error. Then the commandsare given to the real-time operator, and
entered into the real-time commandsystem to be uplinked to the spacecraft.
In this case, since the commandswere erroneously classified as
non-interactive, the commandsystem will correctly notify the commandperator
that he is trying to send a restricted command. Since he must type in an
override for this, the probability is I x 10-2 that the bad commandwill not
be caught.
executed.
commands.
At this point the commandsare uplinked to the spacecraft and
No on-board checks would stop the execution of these individual
Table A-31 s_rizes and totals the probabilities for this case.
Again comparison to Voyager yields an expected rate of erroneous
commandsthat proceed to execution in agreementwith experience.
The erroneous maneuverPAvalue involves the case where a single
error is madein the input to a planned maneuverPA. Since this is in the
case of a planned maneuver, all probabilities are per Trajectory Correction
Maneuver(TCM). Onceagain the assumption of this report is that the error
happensas late as possible in the SequenceProcess. The worst-case maneuver
type planned for this period is the "fast response" type discussed in Section
3.2.4.3. Fromengineering judgment, assign a probability of i x I0-I (per
TCM)to the possibility of introducing the error. Thenassign a probability
to the error either affecting the direction of the TCMor magnitude (i x
I0-I) instead of any of the other 18 PA parameters. Then further assign a
probability to the error surviving software input checks on the PAs (i x
10-1).
Maneuver sequences are then further reviewed by an independent
software check (the 0ET Maneuver Analysis Program Set, MAPS), which is
assigned a probability of i x 10 -3 for an error surviving the check.
The next part in the process is the set of reviews of the
sequence. The first (normal sequence review) is assigned a probability of 1 x
I0 -I. The second check (restricted sequence review) does not apply to PAs,
but a different check for appropriateness of the PA for the applicable mission
segment does. Since a maneuver was planned, 1.0 probability is assigned.
Then the sequence is presented to the Mission Director for
approval. Based on engineering judgement, it is considered unlikely that any
erroneous commands would be caught in this step.
A command conference then occurs, where the sequence has been
translated to the uplink command messages, and final approval for sending
those messages is given. Based on the format of the meeting and the review
products available, it is unlikely that this would catch any erroneous
commands.
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Table A-31. SequenceChecks in Processand Probabilities of Passing
for Class IB (Real-time Individual ManeuverConmmnd)
Item Probability per Day
Introduce Erroneous Cmd
Oddsof it being one of 7 BURN,7 NEGZ, or
7 TURNCommands
CommandPlanning and Integration (MCT)
Non-Interactive or Restricted
assigned as interactive or restricted
assigned erroneously as non-interactive
Constraint Check/Risk Assessment(OETor MCT)
Normal
Restricted Command
CommandPlanning Meeting (MCT)
CommandApproval Meeting (Miss. Dir.)
Real-Time CommandSystemCheck
Total Probability for each of 3 commands
io0
1 x 10-3
Interactive
1.0 N/A
N/A 10-3
5 x 10-2 1.0
5 x 10-2 N/A
1.0 N/A
I0-i I0-i
1.0 10-2
3 x 10-7 i x 10-9
At this point the commandsare uplinked to the spacecraft and
executed. No on-board checks would stop the execution of these commands.
Table A-32 susm_rizes and totals the probabilities for this case.
Probability of recovery is dependenton how long before the Earth
encounter the TCMis executed and uses the standard values described earlier.
The error where an erroneous maneuverPA is used involves the case
where an entire unplanned maneuverPA is inserted into the sequenceprocess.
As this is an unplanned maneuver, all probabilities are per execution day.
Once again the assumption of this report is that the error happens as late as
possible in the Sequence Process. For this scenario, the error is inserted
into the spacecraft stored sequence after the preliminary review, with the
last updates to the sequence. From engineering judgement, assign a
probability of I x l0 -z to the possibility of introducing the error. Then
assign a probability to the error being one of the five PAs capable of causing
a _V (6 x 10-2).
Then comes the set of reviews of the sequence. The first (normal
sequence review) is assigned a probability of I x 10 -3 (as the reviewers
have an excellent chance of detecting this problem). The second check
(restricted sequence review) does not apply to PAs, but a different check for
appropriateness of the PA for the applicable mission segment does. Since a
maneuver was not planned, the probability is assigned as 1 x 10 -3 .
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Table A-32. SequenceChecksin Process and Probabilities of Passing
for Class 2 (Erroneous ManeuverPAValue)
Step # Item Probability per TCM
Introduce Erroneous PAValue
Oddsof it being in Direction or AV
Oddsof it passing SEQGENinput checks
MAPSCheck
i0-i
i0-i
i0-i
Ix10-3
Flight TeamSequenceReview- "Fast Response" 1 x i0-I
Restricted Command N/A
Mission Approval 1.0
Flight TeamApproval Meeting - Miss. Dir.
ConmmndConference
Total Probability
1.0
1.0
1 x 10-7
Then the sequenceis presented to the Mission Director for approval.
Since these PAsare never intentionally to be sent as a part of a normal
sequence, the probability is only I x i0 -I that the Mission Director will
miss it.
A commandconference then occurs, where the sequencehas been
translated to the uplink commandmessages,and final approval for sending
those messagesis given. Basedon the format of the meeting and the review
products available, it is unlikely that this would catch any erroneous
commands.
At this point the con_nandsare uplinked to the spacecraft and
executed. No on-board checks would stop the execution of these commands.
Table A-33 s_rizes and totals the probabilities for this case.
In the case of a navigation design error, a single error is madein
the input to a planned maneuverPA, but the error occurs in the Navigation
design of the TCM,prior to the Sequencegeneration cycle. Since this is in
the case of a planned maneuver,all probabilities are per Trajectory
Correction Maneuver(TCM). Fromengineering judgement, assign a probability
of i x 10-2 (per TCM)to the possibility of introducing the error in the
AV vector determination step. Then assign a probability to the error
surviving the independent maneuver verification step (2 x 10-2). These
represent very conservative estimates of error rates, since at the time of the
final Earth delivery maneuvers, the Navigation Team will have had considerable
experience in the design and verification of maneuvers.
Maneuver sequences are then further reviewed by an independent
software check (the MAPS check), which is assigned a probability of 1.0 for
this type of error surviving the check.
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Table A-33. Sequence Checks in Process and Probabilities of Passing
for Class 3 (Erroneous Maneuver PA)
Step # Item Probability per Execution Day
6 Introduce any Erroneous PA
Odds of it being a Man. PA
9 Flight Team Sequence Review - Normal
Restricted Command
Mission Approval
i0 Flight Team Approval Meeting - Miss. Dir.
II Conlnand Conference
Total Probability
10-2
6 x 10-2
10-3
N/A
10-3
i0-i
1.0
6 x i0-II
The next part in the process is the set of reviews of the sequence.
The first (normal sequence review) is assigned a probability of 1.0, as the
review would be verifying against the Navigation input. The second check
(restricted sequence review) does not apply to PAs, but a different check for
appropriateness of the PA for the applicable mission segment does. Since a
maneuver was planned, the probability is assigned as 1.0.
Then the sequence is presented to the Mission Director for approval.
Based on engineering judgement, it is cons commnds. Table A-34 summarizes
and totals the probabilities for this case.
The process described below specifically applies to the 7TURN will
produce AVs only in the lateral direction (and is limited to changes of 0 to
0.7 mps). The last command, 7BURN, can produce velocity changes in both the
-Z and lateral directions and along the +Z axis. Because the probability of
an undesired 7BURN command is constant regardless of the direction in which it
acts, its contribution to any one of the directions is 1/3 of its total
probability.
Therefore, the probability of failure in each of the three directions
was determined as:
in the +Z direction = I/3*P(7BURN)
in the -Z direction = P(7NEGZ) + I/3*P(7BURN)
in the lateral direction = P(TTURN) + I/3*P(7BURN)
The probability of recovering from one of these errors is dependent on
the time of the failure, including the recognition that there is a problem,
and is described in Section 3.2._.
A-98
1625-396, Rev. A
Table A-34. SequenceChecksin Process and Probabilities of Passing
for Class A (Navigation Design Error)
Step # Item Probability per TCM
4
5
8
Introduce Erroneous NayValue
_V Vector Determination
_V Design Verification (Fast Response)
Flight TeamSequenceReview- Normal
Restricted Command
Mission Approval
10-2
2 x 10-2
1.0
N/A
1.0
Flight TeamApproval Meeting - Mission Director 1.0
Command Conference
Total Probability
1.0
2 x 10-4
A.3.2 Uplink Transmission Errors
In this failure category, correct sequences undergo bit errors in
transmission such that an erroneous but valid sequence is executed on board
the spacecraft and it results in an anomalous velocity increment. For such a
failure to occur, the following constraints apply:
Sequence bit flips are such that they escape the single error
correcting, double error detecting uplink code. This requires 3 or
more bit flips.
The uplink checksum must also remain correct. This requires an even
number of bit flips and an unlikely coincidence.
Erroneous commands must appear valid to the AACS or other subsystem
Commands must result in an anomalous _V and inadequate ability to
recover.
For such a failure to occur, there must be four or more bit flips in a
command. With a bit error rate of 10-5 , the probability of this is 10-20
on a given command, or 10-17 per mission. In addition, it is unlikely that
the co---_nd appears valid to the AACS and further unlikely that it results in
an anomalous burn. Furthermore probability for recovery is excellent.
The resultant probability is less than 10-17 so this case will no
longer be considered.
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Table A-35. Probability of Failure Due to ErroneousSingle Command,
Sequenced,and Resulting in the Following _V During
the Following Mission Phases
I PROBABILITY PER DAY J
AXIAL+Z 0°< e_30 °
MIXED 30 °• 8•60 °
LATERAL 60 °< 8 • 120 °
MIXED 120°< 8 < 150 °
AXIAL-Z 150 °• e<180 °
[0-*0.Tn sJL0.7---6.0J 10.0- '2-'J[12.1-,-71]
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = SEE SECTION 3.2.4
Table A-36. Probability of Failure Due to Erroneous Single Command,
Real Time, and Resulting in the Following _V During
the Following Mission Phases
PROBABILITY PER DAY J
AXIAL+Z 0°• 0•30 °
MIXED 30° < 8 ,= 60°
LATERAL 60° < e < 120 =
MIXED 120 ° < 8 < 150 °
AXIAL - Z 150 = < e • 180 °
lo--_o.'zrrvsJ [0.7--_6.0 J [s.o-_12.1J [12.1-I_71 J
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = SEE SECTION 3.2.4
\
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Table A-37. Probability of Failure Due to Erroneous PAValue and
Resulting in the Following _V During the Following Mission Phases
I PROBABILITY PER TCM
AXIAL + Z
MIXED
LATERAL
MIXED
AXIAL - Z
0-5%HIGH J
I
o_._,,._oo I I
60°< e <120° lx10"7" !
120 ° < e < 150 ° [ ]
/150 ° < 8 < 180 ° J .
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = SEE SECTION 3.2.4
* DISTRIBUTED EQUALLY OVER THE SPHERE
Table A-38. Probability of Failure Due to Erroneous PA and
Resulting in the Following _V During the Following Mission Phases
I 0-345m/s J
I PROBABILITY PER DAY I
,'MIXED 30° < 0 < 60°
LATERAL 60°< 8 <120 ° 6x10"11" 1
MIXED 120°< 8<150°/ I I
AXIAL-Z 150°< 8<180° IJ !
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY - SEE SECTION 3.2.4
* DISTRIBUTED EQUALLY OVER THE SPHERE
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Table A-39. Probability of Failure Due to Navigational Design Error
and Resulting in the Following &V During the Following Mission Phases
I PROBABILITY PER TCM
AXIAL + Z
MIXED
LATERAL
MIXED
AXIAL - Z
[ 0-5rn/s I [5-1105m/sl
I
oo<,<=ooi II I
 oo, ,,oo [ ]1 I
PROBABILITY OF NO RECOVERY = SEE SECTION 3.2.4
* DISTRIBUTED EQUALLY OVER THE SPHERE
A.4 PROBABILITY OF RECOVERY
A detailed evaluation is developed here for the probability of the
spacecraft being able to recover from an anomalous &V, given that the
initial failure does not interfere with the recovery. This probability is a
function only of the time of the initial failure. There are several limiting
factors, the importance of which depends on this time. The limiting factors
are:
i) A subsequent dual failure in the spacecraft which prevents
further recovery operations.
2) A subsequent single failure in the spacecraft which aborts
the first recovery attempt, perhaps leaving insufficient time
for further recovery attempts.
3) An error made in the process of developing the recovery
maneuver on the ground. By the time the error is discovered,
there may be insufficient time to attempt another recovery
Hbaneuver.
4) The initial failure may occur so close to Earth flyby that
there is insufficient time to plan and execute a normal
recovery maneuver. A maneuver developed in a quick
turnaround mode is more likely to be in error.
Table A-40 presents a summary of these recovery failure categories,
their relevant time domains and the associated probability of no recovery.
The following paragraphs explain how the probabilities were determined in each
case.
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A.4.1 Two Spacecraft Hardware Faults
Typically it will take two spacecraft faults to result in the
initial failure which imparts a AV to the spacecraft. For most such
failures, there is a good chance of effecting a recovery maneuver if in fact
one is required in order to avoid the Earth. If there is plenty of time to
execute the recovery maneuver (more than 20 days), then it will take two more
faults to cause a recovery failure. The first of these, which could have
occurred any time in the mission up to the time of the recovery maneuver,
would abort the first recovery attempt in the first i0 days after the failures
that caused the AV. The second would abort a second recovery attempt on
redundant systems performed in the next i0 bays.
There have been determined to be approximately i0 such two fault
cases which would prevent a non-time-constrained recovery. In each case, the
first fault must happen sometime in the first three years of the mission to be
in effect at the time of flyby. The probability of such a first fault is:
(i0 failure modes) x
3 years
(I Mission)
x 10 -2 _ 1/30
The second fault must occur sometime in the 20 days following the
initial failure which resulted in the AV. If it had happened earlier than
this, two spacecraft disabling faults would already be in effect in redundant
systems at the time of the initial failure. The spacecraft would be
inoperable, the mission would be over, and no maneuvers or other spacecraft
activity would be taking place which could have resulted in the failure
causing the AV. If the second fault occurred after the 20 days following
the initial failure, the recovery would have already been achieved. Therefore
the probability of the second fault is:
(20 days)
1 Mission
x 10 -2 = 6 x 10 -5
and the probability of two hardware failures preventing recovery is
1/30 x 6 x 10 -5 = 2 x 10 -6
for all initial failures which occur more than 20 days before an Earth flyby.
A.4.2 One Spacecraft Hardware Fault
If the initial spacecraft failure which results in a AV occurs
sufficiently close to the flyby, it is possible for a single hardware fault to
prevent recovery. Specifically, if the initial failure occurs between 20 and
I0 days before flyby, there will, conservatively, only be adequate time for a
single recovery attempt, and several single faults can prevent the recovery.
There have been determined also to be approximately I0 such hardware faults
which will prevent recovery in these i0 days. The probability of interference
from such faults is
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(i0 failure modes)x I0 days
i mission
x 10-2 = 3 x 10-4
A.4.3 OneGroundError
All maneuvers, including recovery maneuvers,are generated on one
of three timelines, the Standard Response, the Fast Response,and the Time
Critical Response. These take ten, six, and three days, respectively to
generate and send to the spacecraft. Subsequently, approximately two more
days are needed to determine whetheK the maneuver was successful and determine
the new spacecraft trajectory. Based on the analysis presented in Section
A.3, the probability of errors in each of these response modes in 1 x I0 -A,
2 x 10 -4 , and 5 x 10 -3 , respectively.
It is planned that recovery of the spacecraft, when required less
than ten days from Earth, would be done with successive maneuvers of the Time
Critical Response type until one is successful. Ground errors will become the
limiting factor in recovery when there is only time for a single recovery
attempt. Therefore for initial failures which occur between 3-1/2 and i0 days
before Earth closest approach, the probability of no recovery is bounded by 5
x 10 -3 , and will be reduced below this value when time for more than one
attempt is available. In keeping with the conservative philosophy of this
analysis, 5 x 10 -3 will be used for these cases.
A.4.& One "Quick" Ground Error
When there is insufficient time for a recovery maneuver which is
subjected to all normal checks, but there is adequate time to generate and
send a maneuver using standard maneuver profile activities, the probability of
a successful recovery is 0.9. This will be the case from 3-I/2 to i day
before Earth flyby.
A.4.5 One "Emergency" Ground Error
When there is only time to send a few commands to the spacecraft
with only minimal checking, the probability of recovery is taken to be only
0.I. This will be the case for the last day before Earth flyby.
A.&.6 Use of Recovery Probabilities
For the detailed fault category recoveries analyzed previously in
this Appendix where the standard recovery probabilities are applicable, the
values summarized in Table A-40 are used. These probabilities only apply
where the initial fault does not interfere with the recovery.
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Table A-40. Probability of No Recovery
Time of Failure Limiting Factor Probability of
Before Encounter
(days)
on Recovery No Recovery
lm
2.
3.
5.
20 or more
I0 to 20
3-i/2 to I0
I to 3-1/2
8 hrs to i
2 S/C H/W Faults
1S/C H/W Fault
1 Ground Error
i "Quick" Ground
Error
1 "Emergency"
Ground Error
2xi0-6
3x10 -4
5xi0-3
0.I
0.9
A-105
=J
